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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
For the past two decades, agricultural product and factor markets in the EU new 
member states have been subjected to important institutional and policy changes. In the 
beginning of the 1990s there were the initial reforms which characterised the transition 
of a state-controlled economy to a market based economy, such as trade and price 
liberalisation (Hartell and Swinnen, 1998; Tangermann and Banse, 2000) and land 
reform and farm restructuring (Csaki and Lerman, 1997, 2000; Swinnen et al., 1997; 
Lerman, 1998; Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). More recently, the main driving forces 
behind changes in their agricultural economies have been globalisation (Gow and 
Swinnen, 2001; Dries and Swinnen, 2004; White and Gorton, 2006; Milczarek-
Andrzejewska et al., 2007; Dries et al., 2009; Falkowski, 2012) and the integration of 
their economies in a single and integrated European market (Swinnen, 2002; Bartosova 
et al., 2007; Csaki and Jambor, 2010). In particular, EU accession led to two major 
institutional changes in the agricultural sector.  
First, EU accession led to the adoption of more stringent veterinary and sanitary 
standards. The gradual alignment of food standards, a process that started already 
before the actual accession to the EU, contributed to a more rapid shift towards modern 
supply chains (e.g. Milczarek-Andrzejewska et al., 2007; Falkowski, 2012). However, in 
the literature there is substantive debate on the impact of the rapid growth of modern 
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supply chains in transition and developing economies, in particularly on poor 
households. Some argue that these developments are likely to benefit small farmers as 
they gain access to high value production, hereby increasing their productivity and 
incomes (e.g. Dries and Swinnen, 2004; White and Gorton, 2006; Dries et al., 2009; 
Minten et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Others point out that these 
developments may lead to marginalisation and exclusion of small farms from the 
market (e.g. Key and Runsten, 1999; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Weatherspoon et al., 
2001; Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Humphrey et al., 2004: 
Okello and Swinton, 2007; Pingali et al., 2007).  
Second, by accessing the EU the EU new member states became entitled to 
agricultural subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy. The ten EU new member 
states gradually phased in EU direct payments, which they were allowed to “top-up” 
with national subsidies. In addition, they gained access to European rural development 
funds. For most of the countries, the increase in agricultural subsidies has been 
substantial. However, the existing literature has shown that subsidies are likely to affect 
agricultural factor markets, such as the agricultural land market (e.g. Patton et al. 2008; 
Ciaian et al. 2010; Breustedt and Habermann 2011; Ciaian and Kancs 2012; Kilian et al. 
2012; Latruffe et al. 2013) and labour markets (e.g. Dries and Swinnen, 2002; Pietola et 
al., 2003; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Petrick and Zier, 2011; Olper et al., 2013).  
The aim of this doctoral dissertation is twofold.  
First, it aims to contribute to the existing knowledge on the determinants of farm 
restructuring and in particularly on the impact of supply chain modernisation and 
institutional innovations on farm survival and growth in the EU new member states 
(Chapter II and III). More specifically, Chapter II uses household survey data from the 
Bulgarian dairy sector to econometrically estimate the influence of contractual 
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exchange problems (late payments) and institutional innovations (interlinked 
contracting) on farm growth in the period 1994-2003. Chapter III analyses the 
determinants of farm survival and growth based on panel survey data of the subsequent 
period 2003-2009, focusing in particularly on the potential role of supply chain 
modernisation and quality standards. Both chapters provide valuable insights on the 
determinants of structural change in the Bulgarian dairy sector in the  period 1994-
2009, but the findings are relevant beyond the Bulgarian dairy sector. Contractual 
exchange problems and supply chain modernisation are important in other transition 
and development countries and are relevant factors to consider for economic 
development programs.  
Second, it aims to contribute to the existing knowledge on the functioning of 
agricultural factor markets and in particularly on the impact agricultural subsidies have 
on land and labour markets in the EU (Chapter IV and V). More specifically, Chapter IV 
empirically analyses the impact of direct payments in the EU new member states on 
land rents in the period 1994-2009. It provides valuable insights on the capitalisation of 
subsidies in land rents as it is the first study that (A) includes both the post-accession 
period and the pre-accession period in the EU new member states and (B) provides 
empirical evidence on the interaction between subsidy capitalisation and land and 
credit market imperfections. Chapter V analyses agricultural labour adjustments in the 
EU and provides a novel explanation for the remarkable empirical observation that 
increases in agricultural incomes (e.g. through subsidies) have not had a positive effect 
on agricultural employment. Credit constraints are suggested to play an important role: 
in case farmers are credit constraints, the additional income as a result of an increase in 
farm income is invested by credit-constrained farmers in their children’s education and 
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educated children are less likely to become farmers themselves. The chapter provides 
both theoretical and empirical evidence. 
The analyses in this dissertation are very diverse. It includes empirical analyses 
based on micro- and macro level data, combines both theoretical and empirical work 
and makes use of qualitative and quantitative evidence collected during a dairy 
processing company and a household survey in the Bulgarian dairy sector that was 
designed and executed by the author herself and some of her co-authors. The chapters 
in this dissertation are the result of collaborative work with various co-authors.  
In the first two chapters on farm restructuring, the Bulgarian dairy sector was 
selected as a case study. There are several reasons for this. First, the agricultural sector 
in Bulgaria is an important economic sector, which represents in some regions more 
than 40% of the rural employment in 2003. Within the agricultural sector the dairy 
sector is an important subsector as approximately one third of all farms are dairy farms. 
However, the farm structure in the dairy sector is very unfavourable with the majority 
of the farms having only one to two cows. Second, since the end of the 1990s Bulgaria 
started to implement changes in the legislation and production practices needed to be 
harmonised with EU requirements. This requires radical changes at the processor and 
at the farm level. In combination, these characteristics make that the Bulgarian dairy 
sector is an interesting sector and potentially rich source of insights to study the 
determinants of farm restructuring and in particularly the role of supply chain 
modernisation and institutional innovations on farm survival and growth.  
The two chapters on farm restructuring in the Bulgarian dairy sector are based on 
survey evidence collected in 2003 and 2009. The survey evidence was collected at two 
levels. In a first step, background information on the functioning of the supply chain and 
supply chain modernisation in the Bulgarian dairy sector was collected during semi-
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structured, in-depth interviews with dairy processing companies in 2003 and 2009. In a 
second step, household level data were collected through a random survey of dairy 
households in the North and the South Central region of Bulgaria in 2003. In 2009, the 
same households were interviewed, independently whether they were still active in 
dairy farming or not. 
Chapter II uses the information collected in 2003 on the period 1994-2003 to  
further the understanding of the impact of institutions and contractual exchange on 
economic development. In particularly, the analysis focuses on the influence of 
contractual exchange problems (measured as late payments) and institutional 
innovations (measured as interlinked contracting) on farm growth. Using the unique 
dataset based on a survey of 305 dairy producing and supplying households in Bulgaria 
over the period 1994-2003, it estimates econometrically the influence of contractual 
exchange problems (late payments) and institutional innovations (interlinked 
contracting) on farm growth in the dairy sector. It uses advanced panel data techniques, 
such as fixed effects and system GMM methods, which are able to control for time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The results show that late payments have a 
negative influence on farm growth, while contracting with interlinked programs has a 
positive effect on farm growth. This chapter is published in European Review of 
Agricultural Economics in 2011.  
Chapter III uses panel data collected in 2003 and 2009 to analyse the 
determinants of farm survival and growth in the Bulgarian dairy sector in the period 
2003-2009. In particularly, it focuses on the role of supply chain modernisation on 
structural change. Modern supply chains, which are characterised by stringent food 
standards and vertical coordination became the subject of considerable controversy. 
Fears have been voiced that in particularly small farmers would be excluded from these 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
6 
 
formal supply chains (e.g. Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 
2003). However, to date the policy debate is often been based on ad-hoc claims, while 
there is relatively little micro-level evidence to what degree these changes effectively 
contributed to the rapid restructuring of the agricultural sector in general and in the 
Bulgarian dairy sector in particular. This chapter provides detailed qualitative evidence 
on dairy supply chain modernisation and structural changes in the dairy supply chain in 
the period 2003-2009. The qualitative evidence is complemented by an econometrical 
analysis that uses a Heckman model based on the general firm growth literature to 
analyse the determinants of farm survival and growth in the period 2003-2009. The 
results show that the main reasons for farmers to leave the agricultural sector have 
ageing and off farm employment, while we do not find that farmers producing low 
quality milk in 2003 are more likely to leave the agricultural sector.  
The next two chapters of this dissertation focus on the impact of agricultural 
subsidies on land and labour markets in the EU.  
Chapter IV uses macro-level data to analyse the impact of agricultural subsidies on 
land rents in six EU new member states, where agricultural subsidies largely increased 
after EU accession. While the majority of the empirical studies analysing the impact of 
subsidies on land markets dealt with the land market in North America or the EU-15 
(see Swinnen et al., 2013 for an overview), there is only little evidence on the impact of 
agricultural subsidies on land markets in the EU new member states, with the notable 
exception of the study by Ciaian and Kancs (2009). This chapter empirically analyses 
the impact of direct payments on land rents, using annual data for six new member 
states (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia). The 
analysis yields two main conclusions. First, direct payments, which are currently largely 
decoupled from production, have a significant impact on land rents. Second, 
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capitalisation of direct payments is found to be higher in countries where the financial 
sector is less advanced and where farmers are thus more credit constrained, while 
capitalisation of direct payments is lower in countries where a significant share of 
agricultural land is used by (large) corporate farms. This confirms earlier theoretical 
findings by Ciaian and Swinnen (2006, 2009).  This chapter is published in Eurasian 
Geography and Economics in 2013. 
Chapter V combines both theoretical and empirical evidence to present a novel 
explanation for the remarkable empirical observation that increases in agricultural 
incomes (e.g. through substantial agricultural subsidies in rich countries) have not had a 
positive effect on agricultural employment. Several studies have assessed the impact of 
an increase in farm subsidies on agricultural employment. The results are inconclusive: 
some studies find a positive impact on employment (e.g. Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; 
Olper et al., 2012), others find no impact (e.g. Barkley, 1990; Glauben, et al., 2006) and 
yet others find a negative impact (e.g. Goetz and Debertin, 1996, 2001; Petrick and Zier, 
2011).  Explanations in the literature for this puzzling observation are that subsidies 
may be ineffective to support agricultural employment because of imperfections in 
input and output markets, causing off-setting indirect effects because of labour, capital 
or land reallocation (Goetz and Debertin, 1996, 2001). In this chapter an alternative 
explanation looking at medium and longer term adjustments is been proposed. This 
explanation is based on how subsidies and other factors that increase farm incomes 
affect intergenerational farm transfers. When farm income increases, part of the 
additional income is invested by credit constrained farmers in their children’s education 
and educated children are less likely to become farmers themselves. This chapter 
presents a two-period theoretical model of investment in schooling based on Acemoglu 
and Pischke (2001) and empirical evidence from the European Community Household 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Panel survey supporting this argument. This chapter is published in European Journal of 
Development Research in 2014.  
Finally, chapter VI concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2.  INSTITUTIONS, EXCHANGE AND FIRM GROWTH:  
EVIDENCE FROM BULGARIAN AGRICULTURE  
 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
Institutions and exchange are important for economic development (North, 1989). 
Problems of exchange, either in product or factor markets, may constrain firms’ 
investment and productivity growth and thus growth of the overall economy. 
Institutional innovations may emerge to address exchange problems – thus stimulating 
economic growth. For example, Williamson (1985) has shown how the nature of 
industrial organisation may change in response to problems of exchange and incentives. 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy 
provides an interesting natural experiment to study these important questions. 
Transition initially led to a disruption of the existing exchange relationships and later 
induced several institutional innovations to address some of these constraints.  
Two important cases – with relevance beyond transition – are late payments (as 
an example of exchange problems) and interlinked contracting in the supply chain (as 
                                                        
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Johan Swinnen and Nivelin Noev (see Van Herck et al. 
2012). 
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an example of institutional innovation). These specific cases are very important for 
other emerging and developing countries as well (World Bank, 2006; Swinnen, 2007). 
First, late payments are a well-known problem in transition countries and were 
claimed to have a negative impact on investment and firm growth. Johnson et al. (1999) 
surveyed managers of privately owned manufacturing firms in Poland, Romania, Russia, 
the Slovak Republic and Ukraine and in 1997 44% of these firms reported late 
payments. Gorton et al. (2000) find that in 1998 food processing companies considered 
late payments by customers as one of the most important obstacles to firm growth in 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Also in Hungary, Cungu et al. (2008) find that 
late payments were widespread and had a negative impact on investment by farmers. 
Gow and Swinnen (1998, 2001) explain late payments by processing firms as 
examples of “hold-up” problems.2 In transition countries, unclear property rights, weak 
legal institutions and the breakup of the previously vertically coordinated supply 
chains, largely increased the probability of non-compliance with contractual obligations 
and ex-post renegotiation of contractual terms by newly established processing firms 
(Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). Several studies have analysed the occurrence of hold 
ups and the role of formal and informal contract enforcement in overcoming hold-up 
problems in transition countries (Beckmann and Boger, 2004; Pyle, 2006; Koford and 
Miller, 2006; Macleod, 2007).    
Also in developing countries, hold up problems are a widespread problem. Bigsten 
et al. (2000), Fafchamps (2004) and Van Biesenbroeck (2005) document frequent late 
payments in the African manufacturing sector. Fafchamps (2004) finds that all surveyed 
                                                        
2 In this chapter we analyse contract breach by processing companies from the point of view of  the 
farmer. However, contract breach is a two-sided issue and also farmers can breach contracts (e.g. by not 
delivering the agreed quantity and/or quality) (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2009). Guo and Jolly (2008) 
analyse contract breach by farmers empirically based on a survey of 100 agribusiness companies in 
China. 
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firms experienced late payments and more than half of them experienced non-
payments. Van Biesenbroeck (2005) indicates that between 1992 and 1996, two thirds 
of the surveyed manufacturing firms in nine African countries reported late or non-
payments and generally they reported multiple incidences. In the agricultural sector, 
Fafchamps and Minten (2001) find that about 31% of all surveyed traders experienced 
late payments and about 7% experienced non-payment in the grain market in 
Madagascar. Even in rich countries, late payments are a widespread problem in times of 
economic crisis.  
Second, when in the mid-1990s new investors entered the market in transition 
countries, they were faced with the difficult task of establishing a sufficient supply base 
for quality production. In the food industry, financially distressed farmers could not 
provide the required quantity and quality. Therefore food companies introduced a 
series of contract innovations, including assistance programs, such as input supply 
programs, credit and investment programs (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; World Bank, 
2006). Enforcement was typically done by interlinking the input and output market 
(Gow and Swinnen, 2001).  
Case studies and interviews indicated that these vertical integration strategies led 
to improved access to finance, inputs and technology for farmers, improved product 
quality, agricultural output and productivity (Gow et al., 2000; Swinnen, 2006; Van 
Berkum, 2006; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Dries and Swinnen, 
2010). 
While several studies have identified these issues as being important, only few 
studies have quantitatively analysed their effects on firm growth (Shelanski and Klein, 
1995). In the agricultural sector only Dries and Swinnen (2004) have formally 
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demonstrated the impact of interlinked contracting on farm growth, while Cungu et al. 
(2008) have analysed the impact of late payments on farm investments.  
This analysis contributes to the existing literature in three ways: first, we study 
the effect of both late payments and contract innovations on the same farmers; second, 
we analyse these effects in an environment which is less favourable for firm growth 
than those studied by Dries and Swinnen (2004) (Poland) and Cungu et al. (2008) 
(Hungary), i.e. in Bulgaria in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Bulgaria was much slower 
in implementing reforms than Poland and Hungary and the sector we study was 
characterised by many very small farms; and third, we improve the existing empirical 
literature on this topic by using a panel data approach which is able to control for time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
We use a unique dataset based on a survey of 305 dairy producing and supplying 
households in Bulgaria in 2003 to estimate econometrically the influence of exchange 
problems (late payments) and institutional innovations (interlinked contracting) on 
farm growth in the dairy sector.  
The Bulgarian dairy sector is a good sector to study these issues for several 
reasons. First, the agricultural sector is an important economic sector in Bulgaria. More 
than 17% of the population was employed in agriculture in 2003 and in some rural 
regions even more than 40%, mainly on very small farms (Eurostat). The dairy sector 
was – and still is – an important subsector as approximately 30% of all farms are dairy 
farms. Second, the sector is characterised by many very small producers. In our survey 
region, more than 88% had only one to two cows in 2003 (Table 1). Third, it is also a 
good example of transition problems as reforms led to the disruption of exchange and to 
widespread late payments problems. Milk production and the number of dairy cows 
decreased by almost 50% in the first years. Fourth, unlike in Central Europe, production 
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and productivity only slightly recovered and in 2003 (at the time of the survey), 
production was still substantially below the pre-reform levels, while productivity was 
only slightly above the pre-reform level (Figure 1). Fifth, since the end of the 1990s, 
Bulgaria started to implement changes in the legislation and practices needed to be 
harmonised with EU requirements, including changes in production practices and food 
standards. This triggered initiatives to improve the quality of the milk and productivity 
of the farms. Sixth, Bulgaria also lagged behind in attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In 1996, the inflow of FDI into the Bulgarian economy was only US$ 106 million. 
The economic climate improved after the crisis in the late 1990s and by 2003, FDI had 
substantially grown to an inflow of US$ 1.4 billion, of which US$ 49 million was directed 
to the agri-food sector (Bulgarian Central Bank).  
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 provides a conceptual framework 
and discusses the importance of hold-up problems and contract innovations in 
transition; Section 3 describes the data and key indicators; Section 4 presents the 
empirical model and variables; Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The conceptual framework and empirical approach that is used to analyse the 
impact of late payments and institutional innovations (contracting with assistance 
programs) on farm growth is based on two previous studies. Dries and Swinnen (2004) 
analysed the impact of FDI in the Polish dairy sector on the growth of small local 
suppliers. This study itself draws upon a broader firm growth literature, which starts 
from the “law of proportionate effects” or Gibrat’s law. According to this law, a firm 
draws its growth rate each year randomly from a distribution of firm growth rates such 
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that firm growth is independent of current firm size. Although the stochastic model 
includes the key factors affecting firm growth and firm size, its fundamental weakness is 
that it does not include human capital variables, which are subsumed within the 
random process. According to Jovanovic (1982), these human capital variables are 
important in explaining firm growth and firm size. Young firms are assumed to know 
the mean and the standard deviation of the cost of all firms (efficiency), but not their 
own cost structure. In each production period, firms update their expectations based on 
previous experiences and each period they come closer to knowing their own cost 
structure (efficiency). Hence, those with high costs (low efficiency) will shrink their 
farm size (and eventually leave the sector) while those with low costs will expand their 
firm size. Jovanovic (1982) translates this in the testable hypothesis that firm growth 
decreases with age for a given firm size as firms have more accurate estimations of their 
efficiency and hence are less likely to shrink or expand their firm size. Several studies 
have tested Gibrat’s law and Jovanovic’s hypothesis (Evans, 1987; Das, 1995; Bigsten 
and Gebreeyesus, 2007, among others). Studies analysing Gibrat’s law and Jovanovic’s 
hypothesis in the agricultural sector include, for example, Weiss (1999) and Rizov and 
Mathijs (2003).  
Dries and Swinnen (2004) extend the general firm growth model by including 
variables that relate to the farm-processor relationship, such as specific types of 
contracting. Institutional innovations improve exchange and access to inputs and capital 
by farms, hereby allowing these farms to grow. Our analysis will test the Dries and 
Swinnen results in a country that is less advanced in the transition process. However, in 
addition we analyse the effects of exchange problems between farmers and processors.  
This relates to findings of Cungu et al. (2008) who find that late payments have 
constrained investments and slowed down farm growth in Hungary. Late payments 
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worsen firms’ cash flow and credit constraints, which, in turn, limits their access to 
inputs and investment capacity.3 In addition, firms that experienced late payments may 
expect late payments in the future. This makes farmers reluctant to do asset-specific 
investments and leads to suboptimal investment. Such concerns are especially 
important in the absence of institutions or a legal system to enforce timely payments, as 
is the case in transition countries. 
In order to investigate the impact of late payments and assistance programs on 
farm growth, we estimate an extended version of the model by Dries and Swinnen 
(2004): 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) ∙ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 denote the size of the farm 𝑖 in terms of its number of cows at 
respectively time 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1; 𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1 represents a vector of variables that are specific to 
the farm-processor relationship in 𝑡 − 1, including the main variables of interest, late 
payments and contracts with assistance programs; 𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 represents a vector of variables 
that control for farm characteristics in 𝑡; and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a lognormal distributed error term, 
possibly with a non-constant variance.  
After taking logarithms, equation (1) results in:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛 𝐹(𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
After expanding and including a vector of fixed effects (µ𝑖) and vector of time 
dummies (𝛿𝑡), equation (2) results in:  
                                                        
3 If a lending institution expects that a client will be confronted with a late payment, the lending 
institution will question the creditworthiness of client and the client will be less likely to obtain credit 
(Canner et al., 1991; Howorth and Reber, 2003). 
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𝑙 𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑙 𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑙𝑛( 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) +⁡∑𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑏=1
+∑𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖
𝑙
𝑐=1
+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
            (3) 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 are defined as in equation (1); and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is normally 
distributed with zero mean and possibly a non-constant variance.  
 
3 DATA AND KEY VARIABLES 
3.1 Data collection 
We collected data through a series of in-depth interviews with dairy processing 
companies and a random survey of their potential suppliers. Farm-level data were 
collected during a 2003 survey of dairy households in the North and the South Central 
region of Bulgaria, an area which represented 49% of all cows in the country and 45% 
of all Bulgarian milk-producing households. Within this region, the surveyed counties 
are Veliko Tarnovo, Pleven and Gabrovo in the North; and Plovdiv, Haskovo and Stara 
Zagora in the South. In these counties, 21 villages were chosen at random. A total of 305 
households that supplied milk to a dairy processor in the period 1994-2003 were 
surveyed. Our approach implies that, in addition to households that supplied milk over 
the entire period, both households that stopped supplying milk and households that 
started supplying milk to a dairy processor in the period 1994-2003 are included in the 
sample. By using this methodology, we tried to minimize sample selection bias due to 
exits and entries.  
In 2003, households with one or two cows officially represented more than 88% 
of the total number of “dairy farms” in the Central Region in Bulgaria, while in our 
sample these “farms” represent only 59% of the surveyed farms (Table 1). This is 
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because the focus of our research is to understand how late payments and assistance 
programs offered by dairy processing companies affect suppliers and therefore we 
excluded farm households that only produced for home consumption in the period 
1994-2003. Despite this selection, the majority of the interviewed farm households are 
very small compared to Western standards (Table 2). In 1994, 97% of the surveyed 
farms had less than 10 cows and even in 2003, 93% of the farms had less than 10 cows.  
The survey gathered detailed information on vertical coordination in the supply 
chain over the period 1994-2003. To minimise recall bias, we adjusted the design of the 
survey and carefully trained and monitored the enumerators to ensure that 
respondents gave the most accurate responses possible.4 In addition, to further control 
for potential recall bias, we performed robustness tests with a restricted sample, which 
includes only the most recent data. 
We also interviewed the management of 11 dairy processing companies, which 
together represented 21 % of total processed milk in Bulgaria. The survey was not 
limited to the central regions. However, the majority of the interviewed companies 
(nine companies) was active in the Central Region and several suppliers in the 
household survey delivered milk to the processing companies that we surveyed. Key 
characteristics of the companies are summarised in Table 3. 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 While retrospective reporting is likely to be less accurate than yearly reporting, because it is inherently 
more difficult to recall information about the past (Neter and Waksburg, 1964; Kennickell and Starr, 
1997), it is often used in these types of studies and other studies have used considerably longer series of 
recall data than ours (for example, De Brauw and Rozelle, 2008; Fleisher and Wang, 2005; Boucher et al., 
2007). 
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3.2 Key variables 
3.2.1 Late payments 
We collected data for several measures of late payments over the period 1994-
2003. First, we asked farmers whether they had experienced a delay in payment or a 
non-payment by the processing company buying their milk. Second, we asked farmers 
which were confronted with a payment delay to indicate what was the longest delay 
they experienced. Third, we asked farmers how long they usually needed to wait before 
being paid.  
More than 40% of all dairy supplying farm households reported payment delays in 
1994. After 1998 this number started to decrease. It fell to 10,8% in 2003. More than 
70% of the farmers that experienced a payment delay reported that the delay could be 
more than a month in 1994. In 2003, 53% of the farmers reported that the maximum 
delay was never longer than two weeks, and another 19% reported maximum delays 
between 15 and 30 days. Also the third indicator shows a considerable amelioration of 
the payment conditions after 1998. In 1994, 40% of the farmers needed to wait longer 
than 30 days before being paid, while in 2003 only 8% of the farmers needed to wait 
longer than 30 days before being paid. 
These findings are consistent with information from the interviews with the dairy 
processing companies. They confirmed that during most of the 1990s, a period 
characterised by difficult financial conditions, they delayed farmers’ payments to obtain 
working capital as payments by their customers were also delayed.  
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3.2.2. Contract innovations 
The managers of the interviewed dairy processing companies explained that the 
use of assistance programs had increased since the 1990s. In 2003, the most frequently 
used programs are credit (provided by 10 out of 11 processors or 91% of the 
processors) and input supply programs (82%). Bank loan guarantees (55%) and 
veterinary services (18%) are less frequently used. They indicated that some programs, 
such as technical assistance, were in principle available for all farmers, but mainly large 
farmers used it. For other programs such as credit and milk collection at the farm gate, 
the dairy processing companies imposed a minimum size (e.g. 500 litres per day). 
Our survey results confirm that mainly larger farmers benefited from assistance 
programs.  Only a small number of the surveyed farmers used programs, but the 
number is increasing. In 2003, 8% of the surveyed Bulgarian dairy households received 
assistance, up from only 2% in 1994. Most of them benefited from milk collection at the 
farm gate whereas almost no farmers in our survey received bank loan guarantees and 
credit for specific dairy investments (Table 4). These numbers are considerably lower 
than in more advanced transition countries, such as Poland and Slovakia, but higher 
than in Albania, at the same time (Dries et al., 2009).  
 
3.2.3 Farm growth 
Our survey data show that from the 305 farm households that were delivering to a 
dairy processor in the period 1994-2003, only seven farm households stopped 
delivering to a dairy processor by 2003. Each of these seven households stopped 
because of personal, non-economic reasons, such as ageing or health problems. 
Moreover, there was an increase in the number of households involved in dairy 
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production between 1994 and 2003. Approximately 20% of all surveyed households 
(62 households) started their activities in the second half of the 1990s (after 1994).  
Besides changes in the number of dairy farms, also the size distribution changed 
importantly. More than 42% of all farms increased in size in the period 1994-2003, 
while 23% of the farms decreased in size. In 1994, 69% of all farms had less than 3 cows 
and only 7% had more than 5 cows. In 2003, the number of farms with less than 3 cows 
reduced to 59% and 15% of the farms had a herd size of more than 5 cows.  
Over the period 1994-2003, 48% of all farms made investments. The main 
investments are related to increases in herd size such as building, modernising and 
enlarging the stable (27% of all farmers) and the purchases of cows and calves (27% of 
all farmers) (Table 5). To finance these investments, farmers mainly used internal 
finance and only 8% of the farmers that invested in the period 1994-2003 used external 
sources (loans from relatives or friends, bank loans) to finance their investment. This 
could indicate that access to external credit for investments was highly constrained, 
which is likely to aggravate the negative impact of late payments on farm growth. 
 
4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
We use two different estimation approaches, a fixed effects model and a GMM 
model. In order to instrument for the lagged size variable in the GMM model, we adjust 
the extended Dries and Swinnen model (equation 3) and use a model specification as in 
Bigsten and Gebreeysesus (2007).  
𝑙 𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + (𝛼1 + 1)𝑙 𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1
𝑘
𝑏=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡
𝑙
𝑐=1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
            (4) 
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where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, 𝜇𝑖and 𝛿𝑡 are defined as in equation (3); and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
the error term. 
To control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across farms, we estimate 
first a fixed effects model. However, the introduction of a lagged dependent variable as 
an explanatory variable causes problems in the fixed effects estimation. The estimation 
by a fixed effects model yields biased and inconsistent estimates since in the within 
estimation the regressor (𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) − 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )  is correlated with the error (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?), 
because 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) is correlated with 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 and hence with 𝜀?̅?, where 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑆𝑖)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 𝜀?̅? 
represent mean values. 
To address the bias in the fixed effects dynamic specification, we use an 
instrumental variable estimation model. Arrelano and Bond (1991) propose a 
generalised method of moments (GMM) that yields consistent and efficient estimation 
results using lagged levels of the explanatory and the dependent variable as 
instruments for the first differenced equation. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) use, in addition to the first-differenced moment conditions, also the 
moment conditions in levels using lagged first-differences of the explanatory and the 
dependent variables as instruments for the equation in levels. This approach called 
system GMM has a number of advantages. First, in the presence of serial correlation, the 
performance of system GMM is better than the GMM method proposed by Arrellano and 
Bond (1991). Second, by including the moment conditions in levels, we can also include 
time-invariant variables in our estimation (Gardebroek et al., 2010).  
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4.1 Variables 
Table 6 gives an overview of the variables used in the econometric model. All 
variables are obtained from the household survey. The dependent variable is 
FARMSIZE, which is the natural logarithm of the number of cows owned in 𝑡.  
The first set of explanatory variables measures the impact of the characteristics of 
the farm-processor relationship (𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡−1), including late payments and assistance 
programs. DELAY is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the farmer reports a 
payment delay by the dairy processor in a given year and a value of zero otherwise. In 
the robustness checks, we use a variable PAYTIME, which is the natural logarithm of the 
time until payment (in days+1) reported by the farmer in period 𝑡 − 1 to measure the 
impact of late payments. The expected sign of the variables DELAY and PAYTIME is 
negative, as explained above.  
PROGRAM measures the number of assistance programs that the farm receives 
from the dairy processor in period 𝑡 − 1 and takes a value between 0 and 9. It is 
possible that different types of assistance programs have a different impact on farm 
growth. Therefore, we classify assistance programs in three groups. CREDIT is a dummy 
that takes a value of one if the farmer receives a program related to credit provision in 
period 𝑡 − 1  and zero otherwise. CONSULT is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the farmer receives a program related to consultancy in period 𝑡 − 1  and zero 
otherwise. COLLECT is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the dairy 
processing company collects the milk at the farm gate in period 𝑡 − 1 and zero 
otherwise.5 The expected signs of these program variables are positive, as explained.  
                                                        
5 Table 4 includes more detailed information on the assistance programs in each group. 
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These variables are the main focus of our study. To account for the impact of other 
factors, we add a series of control variables. We include three additional variables 
related to the farm-processor relationship.  
CONTRACT is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the farmer has a 
written contract in period 𝑡 − 1 and zero otherwise. A written contract may have a 
positive impact on farm growth if it creates trust between the contracting partners, 
inducing more investment. An oral contract may provide less security and leaves more 
room open for interpretation (Guo and Jolly, 2008). In addition, an oral contract may be 
less useful for (legal) enforcement than a written contract. 
MCP is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the farmer is contracting with 
an intermediary or a milk collection point (MCP) in period 𝑡 − 1 and zero otherwise. 
Farmers that are delivering to a milk collection point (MCP) are likely to receive a lower 
price for their milk as the MCP receives a part of the margin. This may result in a lower 
profitability and slower growth.  
Finally, we include FDI, which is a dummy that takes a value of one if the dairy 
processor is foreign owned in period 𝑡 − 1 and zero otherwise. Farms contracting with 
foreign dairy processors may invest more because foreign processors may have better 
access to technology and a better reputation.  
The second set of control variables are related to the farm (𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑡).  
FARMAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years that the household is 
involved in dairy farming. Including this variable will allow to test Jovanovic’s 
hypothesis that older farms tend to grow slower.  
The time invariant variable, SOUTH, controls for regional differences in 
investment behaviour. SOUTH takes a value of one if the farm is situated in the south of 
Bulgaria and zero otherwise.  
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Finally, we also included INISIZE, which is the natural logarithm of the number of 
cows owned by the household in period 𝑡 − 1, to control for the fact that growth may 
depend on initial farm size (Gibrats’ law). 
 
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 7 presents the regression results of the fixed effects and the system GMM 
model.6 
The estimated coefficient of DELAY is consistently significant and negative across 
the different model specifications. Hence, late payments resulted in lower farm growth. 
In the system GMM model specification, the coefficient on DELAY is -0.139, meaning 
that when farmers experience a payment delay, this reduces farm growth in the next 
year by 13% compared to farmers that have not experienced a payment delay in the 
previous year.  
Assistance programs (PROGRAM) that dairy companies provide for their 
supplying farms are also found to have a highly significant positive impact on farm 
growth. Hence, farms that participate in assistance programs grow more than farms 
that do not participate in such programs. In the system GMM model specification, the 
coefficient on PROGRAM is 0.212, meaning that having one additional program 
increases farm growth by 21%.  
We performed several robustness checks.  
                                                        
6 In order to test for multicollinearity, we report for each model specification also a restricted model 
which excludes the control variables related to the farmer-processor relationship. These results are 
reported in column 1 and 3 of table 7 for respectively the fixed effects and the system GMM model 
estimation. The results reported in column 2 and 4 are the estimation results of the full model estimation 
of respectively the fixed effects and the system GMM estimation. 
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First, we estimate the model for different types of assistance programs (Model A in 
Table 8). Milk collection at the farm gate has a positive impact on farm growth. If milk is 
collected at the farm gate, farm growth increases by 9%. A program of credit provision 
also has a strong positive impact on farm growth. It increases farm growth by 29%. 
Second, to test the robustness of the impact of late payments on farm growth, we use 
instead of DELAY the variable PAYTIME, which is the natural logarithm of the time until 
payment (in days+1) reported by the farmer in 𝑡 − 1 (Model B in Table 8). Third, it 
could be argued that the processing company uses late payments as an instrument of 
contract enforcement in case of contract breach by the farmer. However, based on our 
company interviews, we know that processing companies use non-payment (and not 
late payments) as an instrument for contract enforcement in case of contract breach by 
the farmer.7 To test for the robustness of our results, we exclude the observations 
where the farmer reported that he was never paid (Model C in Table 8). Fourth, it is 
possible that especially the very small farms are not interested in contracts and that 
there is self-selection bias. Therefore we exclude the observations for which the farmer 
never had more than 2 cows (Model D in Table 8). Finally, despite the fact that we have 
put much effort to make sure that our recall data are as accurate as possible, we test the 
robustness of our results based on a restricted sample in which we exclude the first five 
years and base our estimations on the more recent period, i.e. the last five years (Model 
E in Table 8). The results in Table 8 show that our key findings are robust to all these 
changes in the specification.  
                                                        
7 According to our interviews with the processing companies, the most frequent type of contract breach 
by the farmers is quality cheating. The processing companies indicate that they have two ways to punish 
contractual violations by the farmers: first, in case that the violation is only minor, they reduce the price 
that they pay to the farmer and second in case of a major violation (e.g. antibiotics in the milk), they 
refuse the milk and do not pay the farmer for the delivery. 
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The estimated coefficients of the control variables also show some interesting 
additional insights. The variable CONTRACT has no significant impact on farm growth in 
the fixed effects or system GMM model specification. Farms that have a written 
agreement are not found to grow more than farms which have an oral contract. The 
results suggest that in the presence of poor legal contract enforcement, written 
contracts have little or no value as farmers will not be able to use the contract in legal 
actions. The estimated coefficient for FDI is also not significant, which implies that 
farms delivering to foreign dairy processors are equally likely to increase their farm size 
than households delivering to domestic companies. Also the variable MCP has no 
significant impact on farm growth, indicating that farmers delivering to a MCP do not 
grow slower than those supplying directly to the dairy. FARMAGE has a negative 
coefficient, but the results are not robust across all specifications. Finally, the regional 
dummy, SOUTH, has a significant positive effect, which implies that farms in the 
southern central region tended to grow faster than those in the northern region.  
The coefficient of SIZE in the system GMM estimations is significantly different 
from one. This suggests that we need to reject Gibrat’s law, which states that firm 
growth is independent of firm size. Instead we find that small farms tend to grow faster. 
Several studies on farm growth find evidence of an evolution towards a bimodal farm 
size distribution (Weiss, 1999; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). We tested for this, but we did 
not find significant coefficients on the polynomial size variables, which could relate to 
the composition of our sample.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter uses data on dairy producing and supplying households in Bulgaria to 
provide econometric evidence of the influence of late payments and contracting 
innovations on farm growth in the dairy sector over the period 1994-2003.  
Our study indicates that late payments had a negative impact on farm growth. Late 
payments worsen farms’ liquidity and credit constraints. This limits the access to inputs, 
which has a negative effect on produced quantity and quality. It affects the investment 
capacity of farmers and is likely to also affect the trust that the farmer puts in the 
relationship with his processor. Farmers may fear late or even non-payment in the 
future and in the presence of poor legal enforcement, they may invest less than 
otherwise, resulting in lower farm growth. Over the period 1994-2003, late payments 
became less important: while in 1994 more than 40% of all dairy supplying farm 
households reported late payments, this was only 11% of the households in 2003.  
In addition to this, the results suggest that contract innovations, in particular 
assistance programs that farms receive from dairy processors, have a significant 
positive effect on farm growth. This confirms findings of earlier studies. The number of 
farm households receiving this type of assistance was still low in 2003 (8% of the 
farms), but the number of farms with access to assistance programs was increasing in 
Bulgaria. 
There are limitations to the study which future research should address. First, 
ideally, one would use as a measure for farm size the total output of the farm (also 
including non-dairy activities). Changes in farm size generally involve changes in factor 
proportions and technology, as well as changes in the mix. Second, we did not account 
for variables such as farmers’ attitude to risk. We assumed that these are time invariant 
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and hence captured by the fixed effects. However, to some extent these parameters may 
vary over time and cause unobserved heterogeneity. Third, more detailed information 
on the magnitude, the frequency and the monetary value of the assistance programs 
would allow better estimations of the effects.  
Despite these limitations, we believe our analysis contributes to the literature as it 
is the first study to show that both late payments and contract innovations affect small 
farms’ growth in very difficult circumstances, which characterised Bulgaria in the 1994-
2003 period. These findings on the impact of payment problems and assistance 
programs are relevant beyond the Bulgarian dairy sector at the end of the 1990s and 
the beginning of the 2000s. Contracting problems such as late payments remain 
important in many countries. In addition, the importance of contract innovations and 
vertical coordination in global supply chains has attracted increasing global attention in 
development programs. Our findings confirm that these issues are important factors to 
consider for economic development programs.  
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Table 1: Share of farms in the survey and in the Central Region (CR) in Bulgaria by size class, 1994 and 2003 
  
Survey, 1994 Survey, 2003 
Central Region of Bulgaria, total, 
2003 
Number of cows  
# farms 
Share  Share  
# farms 
Share  Share  
# farms 
Share  Share 
cows per farm farms cows farms cows farms 
1 89 37,7 15,2 87 29,2 8,1 59254 68, 2 36,6 
2 75 31,8 25,7 89 30 16,5 17589 20,3 21,2 
3-5 56 23,7 35,5 77 25,9 25,7 7241 8,3 16,1 
6-9 9 3,8 10,3 25 8,4 15,7 1352 1,6 5,5 
>10 7 3.0 13,4 19 6,4 34.1 1400 1,6 20,6 
Total 236 100 100 297 100 100 86836 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003) for 
the Central Region in Bulgaria  
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Table 2: Share of farms in Bulgaria and selected other EU countries by size class in 
2003 (% of all farms) 
  1 or 2 cows 3 to 9 cows 
More than 10 
cows 
Bulgaria 87,2% 11,1% 1,1% 
Bulgaria survey  59,2% 34,3% 6,4% 
  
   Hungary 59,3% 31,1% 9,6% 
Poland 67,9% 25,8% 6,4% 
Romania 95,6% 4,2% 0,3% 
  
   Denmark 2,3% 4,2% 93,5% 
Germany 3,6% 13,6% 82,8% 
France 3,7% 4,3% 92,0% 
Netherlands 2,5% 2,7% 94,9% 
  
   Greece 25,8% 34,6% 39,7% 
Italy 14,1% 30,7% 55,1% 
Spain 23,7% 19,5% 56,8% 
Portugal 42,5% 24,8% 32,8% 
Source: Eurostat 
Chapter 2  – Institutions, Exchange and Firm Growth 
38 
 
Table 3: Key characteristics of the interviewed dairy companies 
  Danone Serdika90 Mlekimex Fama Iotovi Markelli Meggle Merone PRL 
Mandra 
Obnova 
Milky 
World 
Processed milk             
(mio ltr./year)  
36 24 20 19 11 10 6 4 3 2 1 
Newly 
Established  
No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
FDI Yes No No No No No Yes No No No No 
  If yes, since 
when 
1993 - - - - - 2000 - - - - 
  If yes, home                 
  country 
France - - - - - Germany - - - - 
Does the 
company offers 
the following 
program and 
since when? 
           
Credit program 
Yes 
(1997) 
Yes (1997) 
Yes 
(1997) 
Yes 
(1994) 
Yes 
(2001) 
Yes 
(1999) 
Yes 
(2001) 
Yes 
(2000) 
No 
Yes 
(1998) 
Yes 
(1999) 
Input supply 
program 
Yes 
(1998) 
Yes (1997) 
Yes 
(1997) 
Yes 
(1994) 
Yes 
(1995) 
Yes 
(1998) 
Yes 
(2001) 
Yes 
(1992) 
No No 
Yes 
(1999) 
Extension 
service 
Yes 
(2000) 
Yes (1997) 
Yes 
(1999) 
No No No 
Yes 
(2001) 
Yes 
(1992) 
Yes 
(2002) 
Yes 
(2000) 
Yes 
(1999) 
Veterinary 
service 
Yes 
(1995) 
No 
Yes 
(1997) 
No No No No No No No No 
Bank loan 
guarantee 
Yes 
(1999) 
No 
Yes 
(1998) 
Yes 
(1994) 
Yes 
(1995) 
No No No No No 
Yes 
(1999) 
Milk payments in 
advance 
Yes 
(1994) 
No No 
Yes 
(1994) 
Yes 
(1995) 
No 
Yes 
(2001) 
Yes 
(1992) 
No 
Yes 
(1998) 
Yes 
(1999) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy processing companies survey sample 
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Table 4: Farms in the survey with contract-based assistance programs, 1994-2003  
(Number of farms) 
    1994 1997 2000 2003 
COLLECTION 5 7 13 22 
Milk collection at the farm 5 7 13 22 
 
  
    CONSULTANCY 3 5 5 7 
Agricultural extension service 3 5 5 6 
Veterinary assistance  0 0 0 1 
 
  
    CREDIT   7 8 10 17 
Forward credit for dairy specific investments 1 1 1 2 
Forward credit for general agricultural 
investments 1 1 1 1 
Forward credit for buying cows 1 2 2 4 
Forward credit for buying inputs 1 1 2 4 
Bank loan guarantees 1 1 1 1 
Forward credit to buy forage, animal medicine, etc. 
  
2 2 3 5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 5: Investments by farmers in the survey by type and financing source, 1994-
2003  
    
Investment    
(Number of farmers) 
Used loans     
(Number of farmers) 
Stable (new, modernise or 
enlarge) 
83 6 
Cows or calves* 81 4 
Land  5 2 
Cooling tank 13 4 
Milk line 1 0 
Other 31 0 
All investments 148 12 
Note that investment in cows or calves only includes the farmers that have bought a cow or a calf  and not 
farmers that have kept one of their own calves to raise themselves (with a loss of milk production of the 
mother cow) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 6:  Description of the variables in the dynamic firm growth model, 1994-2003 
Variable name Description Mean Std. dev. 
Outcome variables    
FARMSIZE Natural logarithm of the herd size in period t  0.82 0.67 
    
Farm-processor relationship variables 
DELAY Dummy for experiencing a late payment in t-1 0.33 0.47 
PAYTIME Natural logarithm of the time until payment of the farm in t-1(in days+1) 2.84 0.52 
PROGRAM Number of assistance programs received by the farm in t-1 0.09 0.59 
COLLECTION Dummy for farmers receiving the assistance  program “milk collection at 
the farm” in t-1  
0.04 0.12 
CONSULT Dummy for farmers receiving an assistance program that is related to 
consultancy in t-1 
0.01 0.1 
CREDIT Dummy for farmers receiving an assistance program that is related to 
credit in t-1 
0.02 0.13 
CONTRACT Dummy for having a written contract in t-1 0.04 0.21 
MCP Dummy for delivering to an intermediary (or milk collection point) in t-1 0.90 0.31 
FDI Dummy for foreign ownership of the dairy company to which the farm 
delivers in t-1 
0.14 0.35 
Farm variables    
FARMAGE Natural logarithm of the number of years that the household is involved in 
dairy farming in period t (in years+1)  
2.21 0.70 
SOUTH Dummy if the farm is located in the south region (time invariant) 0.44 0.50 
Other control variable    
INISIZE Natural logarithm of the herd size in period t-1  0.78 0.65 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 7: Estimation results of a dynamic firm growth model using a fixed effects and system GMM estimation method, 
1994-2003 
 Fixed effects System GMM 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
Farm-processor var.         
DELAY -0.079 (-3.07)*** -0.088 (-3.21)*** -0.192 (-3.55)*** -0.139 (-3.03)*** 
PROGRAM 0.160 (4.18)*** 0.157 (3.99)*** 0.200 (3.26)*** 0.212 (3.67)*** 
         MCP - - -0.004 (-0.14) - - -0.005 (-0.11) 
CONTRACT - - -0.012 (-0.27) - - 0.047 (0.82) 
FDI - - -0.051 (-1.60) - - 0.004 (0.10) 
        Farm var.        
FARMAGE 0.038 (1.01) 0.038 (1.01) -0.004 (-0.08) -0.019 (-0.47) 
SOUTH - - - - 0.391 (3.13)*** 0.250 (2.86)*** 
        INISIZE 0.725 (35.61)*** 0.726 (35.63)*** 0.880 (21.86)*** 0.880 (28.77)*** 
        Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Constant 0.174 (2.74)*** 0.182 (2.60)*** 0.033 (0.26) 0.090 (0.84) 
     R² 0.86 0.86 -  
Observations 2361 2361 2361 2361 
Instruments - - 85 130 
Sargan - - 88.04 (0.08) 132.25 (0.10) 
m1 - - -9.01 (0.00) -9.35 (0.00) 
m2 - - 0.77 (0.44) 0.72 (0.47) 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1% 
Note for the fixed effects estimation the standard errors are clustered. For the system GMM, the standard errors are robust finite samples corrected on two-
step estimates derived from Windmeijer (2000). The instruments used in the differenced equation are t-2 lags and earlier lags of the dependent variable, t-
1 lags of the predetermined variables and the differences of the exogenous variables. The instruments used in the level equation are lagged differences of 
the dependent variables and differences of the predetermined variables. The Sargan-Hansen test and the serial correlation test are reported as respectively 
Sargan, m1 and m2 and the latter two represent respectively the AR(1) and AR(2) tests under the null of no serial correlation. The p values of these 
different tests are reported in brackets 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 8: Robustness checks of the system GMM estimation of the dynamic firm growth model, 1994-2003 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
 Coef. z value Coef. z value Coef. z value Coef. z value Coef. z value 
Farm-processor var.            
DELAY -0.125 (-2.48)** - - -0.151 (-3.07)*** -
0.167 
(-2.37)** -0.140  (-2.51)** 
PAYTIME  - - -0.069 (-2.19)** - - - - - - 
PROGRAM - - 0.251 (3.63)*** 0.218 (3.68)*** 0.163 (2.37)** 0.226 (1.74)* 
COLLECTION 0.084 (2.50)** - - - - - - - - 
CONSULT -0.133 (-1.12) - - - - - - - - 
CREDIT 0.257 (2.38)** - - - - - - - - 
           MCP 0.018 (0.42) 0.001 (0.03) 0.007 (0.16) -
0.038 
(-0.50) -0.042 (-0.86) 
CONTRACT 0.008 (0.13) 0.007 (0.12) 0.037 (0.63) 95 (1.12) 0.012 (0.18) 
FDI -0.010 (-0.23) 0.054 (1.52) -0.001 (-0.01) 0.006 (0.11) -0.031 (-0.76) 
Farm var.          
FARMAGE -0.073 (-1.68)* -0.006 (-0.18) -0.013 (-0.33) -
0.007 
(-0.11) -0.148 (-4.25)*** 
SOUTH 0.158 (1.79)* 0.167 (1.73)* 0.224 (2.56)** 32 (2.75)*** 0.164 (1.75)* 
          INISIZE 0.872 (26.02)*** 0.893 (26.01)*** 0.883 (27.48)*** 0.849 (22.94)*** 0.840 (16.82)*** 
          Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.198 (1.78)* 0.231 (1.76)* 0.075 (0.70) 0.138 (0.76) 0.491 (4.17)*** 
        Observations 2361 2361 2326 1310 1401 
Instruments 157 130 130 130 91 
Sargan 161.94 (0.08) 131.12 (0.12) 141.07 (0.04) 120.80 (0.29) 92.58 (0.13) 
m1 -9.42 (0.00) -9.20 (0.00) -9.20 (0.00) -7.42 (0.00) -7.64 (0.00) 
m2 0.64 (0.52) 0.87 (0.38) 0.87 (0.38) 1.37 (0.17) -0.33 (0.74) 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1% 
Note. The standard errors are robust finite samples corrected on two-step estimates derived from Windmeijer (2000). The instruments used in the 
differenced equation are t-2 lags and earlier lags of the dependent variable, t-1 lags of the predetermined variables and the differences of the exogenous 
variables. The instruments used in the level equation are lagged differences of the dependent variables and differences of the predetermined variables. 
The Sargan-Hansen test and the serial correlation test are reported as respectively Sargan, m1 and m2 and the latter two represent respectively the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests under the null of no serial correlation. The p values of these different tests are reported in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Figure 1: Evolution of number of cows, milk production and milk yield in Bulgaria, 
1984-2009 (in % change compared to the average in the period 1984-1989) 
 
Note that yield is a three year moving average.  
Source: FAOstat  
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CHAPTER 3.  SMALL FARMERS, STANDARDS AND VALUE CHAINS:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE BULGARIAN DAIRY CHAIN DURING 
EU ACCESSION 
 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
In the past decade, the Bulgarian dairy sector was characterised by a massive 
restructuring. National statistics show that between 2003 and 2010 the number of dairy 
farms declined by 53%, from 193.684 farms in 2003 to 90.561 farms in 2010 (Table 1). 
Notably, small dairy farms with less than three cows have stopped their activities 
whereas the number of farms with ten or more cows almost doubled (Table 2). 
However, despite these changes, the majority of the Bulgarian dairy farms are small-
scale producers. In 2010, farms with less than three cows still represented 82% of the 
dairy farms and slightly more than 30% of all dairy cows.  
Several studies have analysed the factors that affect structural change in the 
agricultural sector in general and in the dairy sector in particular (see for example 
                                                        
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Johan Swinnen. 
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Kimhi and Bollman (1999), Goetz and Debertin (2001), Rizov and Mathijs (2003), 
Hoppe and Korb (2006), Breustedt and Glauben (2007) for determinants of structural 
change in general; and for example Chavas and Magand (1988), Zepeda (1995), 
Rahelizatovo and Gillespie (1999), Foltz (2004), Dries and Swinnen (2004), Bragg and 
Dalton (2004), Stokes (2006), Susanto et al. (2010), Jia et al. (2012) for determinants of 
structural change in the dairy sector). Important determinants of farm exit and growth 
are prices, profitability, yield, age and education of the farm holder, off-farm 
employment alternatives and government programs, among others. In addition, some 
studies also included supply chain characteristics as determinants of structural change 
(Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Van Herck et al., 2012; Falkowski, 2012).  
In the recent years, the integration of the agricultural economies from the New 
Member States (NMS) in a single and integrated European market accelerated the 
process of supply chain modernisation. Modern supply chains, which are characterised 
by stringent food standards and vertical coordination became the subject of 
considerable controversy. Fears have been voiced that in particularly small farmers 
would be excluded from these formal supply chains (e.g. Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; 
Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). Also in Bulgaria, several studies identified supply 
chain modernisation and the introduction of more stringent food safety and quality 
standards as the main determinants of the rapid structural change in the Bulgarian 
dairy sector after EU accession (Yotkova et al., 2009; Ivanov, 2007, 2009). However, to 
date the policy debate is often been based on ad-hoc claims, while there is relatively 
little micro-level evidence to what degree these changes effectively contributed to the 
rapid restructuring of the agricultural sector in the NMS in general and in the Bulgarian 
dairy sector in particular. 
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Theoretically, the  introduction of a minimum food safety and quality standard is 
expected to affect firm exit, both under perfect and imperfect competition as illustrated 
by, for example, Leland (1979), Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1995).2 In 
case the introduction of a minimum food safety and quality standard is associated with 
investments in equipment and infrastructure, it is expected to lead to an increase in the 
fixed sunk costs of producers. The impact on the profitability of producers can be 
positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes of the price elasticities of supply 
and demand, and the implementation costs. In fact, in case the implementation costs are 
different for different producers, the impact of a minimum food safety and quality 
standard can be different across producers. The producers that will not make the 
required investments to upgrade their quality and will leave the sector are producers 
for whom dairy farming is no longer profitable under the new standard or producers for 
whom dairy farming is still profitable but who are too credit constrained to make the 
necessary investments. As a result, the introduction of more stringent food safety and 
quality standards is expected to affect the structure of the Bulgarian dairy sector and 
there are claims that this has been the main driver of the rapid restructuring of the 
Bulgarian dairy sector in the past decade (Yotkova et al., 2009; Ivanov, 2007, 2009). In 
particularly, small farms are expected to be affected as they lack access to financial 
                                                        
2 Pioneer work by Leland (1979) shows that under the assumption of competitive markets, a minimum 
quality standard deters firm entry and causes low-quality producers to exit the market. More recent 
research shows that the impact on firm exit depends on the competitive structure of the market. Under 
imperfect competition, Ronnen (1991) shows that a minimum standard increases the quality of products 
provided by all firms and that mainly the firms that did not improve their quality, independently on 
whether the standard was binding for them or not, will exit the market.  In addition, the impact will be 
different depending on how the standard affects the cost function. Crampes and Hollander (1995) show 
that when the variable cost function is convex with respect to quality and there are no quality-dependent 
fixed costs, imposing a minimum standard provides mainly incentives for high-quality firms to leave the 
sector.   
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means to make the necessary investments and technical knowledge to comply with the 
minimum food safety and quality standards.  
The objective of this study is to analyse the determinants of farm survival and 
growth in the Bulgarian dairy sector in the period 2003-2009, a period which was 
characterised by EU accession in 2007. It extends the work by Dries and Noev (2006), 
Noev et al. (2009) and Van Herck et al. (2012) who studied the Bulgarian dairy sector 
before EU accession. Our empirical analysis uses data from the Bulgarian dairy sector at 
several levels. More specifically, we collected data through a series of in-depth 
interviews with the management of several dairy companies as well as through a panel 
survey of 296 households in the North and South Central Region of Bulgaria in the 
period 2003-2009.  
There are several reasons why we opted to study the Bulgarian dairy sector. First, 
in Bulgaria the agricultural sector is still an important economic sector. More than 17% 
of the population was employed in the agricultural sector in 2003 and in some rural 
regions this was even more than 40%, mainly on very small farms (Eurostat). The dairy 
sector was – and still is – an important subsector as approximately one third of all farms 
are dairy farms. Second, since 2003, the sector was characterised by a massive outflow 
from agricultural employment and the number of dairy farms decreased on average by 
8% per year over the period 2003-2010 (Table 1). Third, the sector is characterised by 
many very small producers. In our survey region, more than 88% of the farms had only 
one or two cows in 2003 (Table 2). Finally, while Bulgaria was in the process of gaining 
accession to the EU since the end of the 1990s, the integration of its agricultural 
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economy in the EU was far behind other NMS such as Poland.3 Changes in the legislation 
and practices needed to be harmonised with EU requirements, including changes in 
production practices and food standards. This requires radical changes at the processor 
and at the farm level.  
The paper is organised as follows. First, we discuss the related literature that 
studies the determinants of structural change in the dairy sector. Second, we discuss the 
data used in our analysis. Third, we present qualitative evidence on standards and 
supply chain modernisation in the Bulgarian dairy sector in the period 2003-2009. 
Then, we discuss farm restructuring in the Bulgarian dairy sector in the period 2003-
2009 and econometrically analyse the determinants of farm survival and growth based 
on a two-step Heckman model to control for attrition bias. Finally, in the last section, we 
conclude.   
 
2 RELATED LITERATURE 
Several studies have analysed farm survival and/or growth in the dairy sector. The 
majority of these studies focuses on the determinants of structural change in the United 
States (e.g. Sumner and Leiby, 1987; Chavas and Magand, 1988; Zepeda, 1995; 
Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 1999; Jackson-Smith, 1999; Bragg and Dalton, 2004; Foltz, 
2004; Stokes, 2006; Susanto et al.; 2010). In addition, there are also several studies on 
structural change in the European dairy sector (e.g. Weiss, 1999; Kostov et al. 2006; 
                                                        
3 We refer to Poland as two other studies analysing the impact of supply chain modernisation on 
structural change in the dairy sector in the NMS focus on Poland (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Falkowski, 
2012). However, there are important differences between the dairy sector in Poland and Bulgaria. The 
Bulgarian dairy sector is characterised by a dualistic farm structure with a small number of large scale, 
commercial farms on the one hand and a large number of small scale, semi-subsistence household farms 
on the other hand. In contrast, the Polish dairy sector is less dualistic and consists mainly out of small and 
medium scale household farms.  
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Peerlings and Ooms, 2008; Tonini and Jongeneel, 2009; O’Donnell et al., 2011; Huettel 
and Jongeneel, 2011; Zimmermann and Heckelei, 2012). In general, these studies  
distinguish between different categories of variables that affect farm survival and 
growth.  
First, farm characteristics, such as farm size, age, production mix, milk prices, 
price volatility, feed costs and other costs, are expected to affect structural change. For 
example, with respect to farm size, most studies have found that the initial farm size 
matters in the exit decision of farmers and in particular small farms tend to exit the 
dairy sector (e.g. Chavas and Magnand, 1988; Zepeda, 1995; Tonini and Jongeneel, 
2006; Falkowski, 2012). Other studies have also examined the impact of initial farm size 
on farm growth by testing the “law of proportionate effects” or Gibrat’s law, which 
states that farm growth is independent of farm size (Weiss, 1999; Dries and Swinnen, 
2004; Kostov et al., 2006;  Bakucs and Fertő, 2009; Van Herck et al., 2012).  
Second, with respect to household farms, household characteristics and human 
capital variables, such as household size, off-farm employment, age and education of the 
household members are found to influence farm survival and growth (e.g. Sumber and 
Leiby, 1987; Weiss, 1999; Bragg and Dalton, 2004). 
Third, government policy is likely to affect structural change in the dairy sector. 
Government policies that have been analysed are, among others, price policies and 
termination policies in the US (Zepeda, 1995; Foltz, 2004), quality policy measures in 
China (Jia et al., 2012) and quota regulations in Europe (Peerlings and Ooms, 2008; 
Tonini and Jongeneel, 2009; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011; O’Donell, 2011). In addition, 
there are also studies that analyse the impact of non-agricultural policies on structural 
change in the dairy sector. For example, Susanto et al. (2010) study the impact of a 
potential change in the US immigration policy on dairy farmers’ exit intentions.  
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Fourth, also demographic and macroeconomic factors, such as population growth, 
unemployment rates and interest rates, affect structural change (Zepeda, 1995; 
Rahekizatovo and Gillespie, 1999; Zimmerman and Heckelei, 2012).  
Finally, some studies also include supply chain characteristics, such as ownership 
structure of the dairy company to which the farmer is delivering (Dries and Swinnen, 
2004), marketing channel (Falkowski, 2012), assistance programs (Dries and Swinnen, 
2004; Van Herck et al., 2012) and payment conditions (Van Herck et al., 2012).  
 
3 DATA  
We collected panel data through a series of in-depth interviews with the 
management of several dairy companies and a survey of potential suppliers to these 
companies in 2003 and 2009.  
 
3.1 Rural households 
Household-level data were collected in a panel survey of rural households in the 
North and the South Central region of Bulgaria, which are the major milk-producing 
regions in the country. In 2003, the Central Region represented 49% of all dairy cows in 
the country and 45% of all dairy farms (Table 1). The first round of the survey took 
place in 2003 (pre-EU accession) and the second round in 2009 (post EU-accession). 
Villages were randomly selected. In total, 20 villages in five districts (Veliko Tarnovo 
and Pleven in the North; and Plovdiv, Haskovo and Stara Zagora in the South) were 
selected. Within these villages, 296 randomly selected farm households, which supplied 
milk to a dairy company in 2003, were interviewed. 
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In 2003, households with one or two cows officially represented more than 88% 
of the total number of dairy farms in the Central Region in Bulgaria, while in our sample 
these farms represent only 59% of the surveyed farms (Table 2). Because the focus of 
our research is to understand how standards and supply chain adjustment processes 
affected structural change for different types of farms, our survey concentrated on those 
farm households that delivered at least some milk to dairy companies at the start of the 
period covered by the survey (2003). Therefore, our sample included a larger share of 
larger dairy farms. Despite this selection focus, the majority of the interviewed farm 
households are still small compared to Western standards. In 2003, 94% of the farms in 
our sample had less than 10 cows and in 2009 83% of the farms had less than 10 cows 
(Table 2).  
In 2009, the same households were visited and re-interviewed. From the 296 
households that were interviewed in 2003, we traced back and re-interviewed 226 
households. From those 226 households, 109 households stopped producing milk, 15 
households still produce milk for direct sales and home consumption, but stopped 
delivering milk to a dairy company and 102 households still produce milk to deliver to a 
dairy company (Table 3). Several of these households (23 out of the 226 households) 
had changed household head while continuing farm operations, because the 2003 
household head either died or quit being involved in the farm operation. In all cases 
another household member (either the partner or one of the children) took over the 
farming activities.  
From the original sample of 296 households in 2003, we did not trace back 70 
households in 2009, which corresponds to an annual attrition rate of 4%. To collect 
information on these 70 households that we could not trace back in 2009, we asked 
neighbours and key informants (e.g. major of the village, local veterinary, employee of 
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the local corporate farm or cooperative, …) whether they knew what happened to these 
households and their dairy activities. Based on these interviews we found that the 
households either moved (41 households) or passed away (29 households) (Table 4). 
All households stopped their dairy activities and for 63 households the informants also 
knew what happened to the dairy cows of the households. The cows were either sold 
(50 households), slaughtered (8 households) or given away (5 households). In the 
econometric analysis we will use this information to test for attrition bias which could 
affect the robustness of our results.  
To capture new entrants in the sector, we did an accompanying survey, where we 
asked key informants how many new dairy farms had started after 2003 and how many 
of these were delivering to a dairy company.4 Overall, there was very little entry in dairy 
farming (outside generational transfers within households). Out of the 20 villages, in 9 
villages, there were no new farm households delivering to a dairy company. In 10 other 
villages, there were one or two newly-established household farms, which were 
delivering to a dairy company. Moreover, typically these farms had only one or two 
cows.   There was one exception but this was due to a very specific reason. In the village 
Resen there were 15 new dairy farm households. These households were not engaged 
                                                        
4 In each village, we interviewed key informants such as the major and its administrative staff, the local 
veterinary and (former) employees of the (successor of the) cooperative. The survey included questions 
on general village characteristics (e.g. population, unemployment rate), the agricultural sector (e.g. 
number of farmers, land use, subsidies), the dairy sector (e.g. number of households active in dairy 
farming, number of farmers that started their activities after 2003), economic activities and living 
conditions (e.g. opening of factory in the neighbourhood) and infrastructure (e.g. distance to closest 
town). Since the communities are relatively small, these key informants are in general well informed on 
who is involved in dairy farming in the village and what has changed in the sector over the past years. 
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in dairy activities in 2003, but were delivering to a dairy company in 2009. The reason 
was the liquidation of the local cooperative between 2003 and 2009.5  
In summary, with the exception of one village (due to very specific local 
conditions) the emergence of newly-established household farms is only marginal at 
best (both in terms of numbers and quantity). Hence, using the panel data with the 
farms that were already delivering to a dairy company in 2003 appears a good 
representation of the actual situation. In the econometric analysis, we exclude – as a 
robustness check - the village of Resen, where there has been a high number of farm 
entries compared to the other villages (due to the liquidation of the local cooperative). 
 
3.2 Dairy processing companies 
Seven dairy companies were selected for in-depth interviews with the 
management in 2009. Five of the dairy companies (Danone, BCC Handel, Iotovi, 
Trunchovica and Obnova Mandra) interviewed in 2009 were also interviewed in 2003. 
Two of the dairy companies (Milky Lux and Milki Eks) were only interviewed in 2009 
and asked to provide recall information on 2003.6 Key characteristics of the companies 
are summarised in Table 5. The companies vary in size and ownership. One company is 
large (45 million litres), three companies are medium size companies (10–30 million 
                                                        
5 After the liquidation of the cooperative, many households in the village received one or two cows. Some 
households slaughtered the cow(s). Others (15 households in 2009) kept the cow(s) and used part of the 
milk for self-consumption while they sold their surplus production to the dairy company. 
6 In 2003, eleven dairy companies have been interviewed. Five of them have been re-interviewed in 2009. 
Out of the six dairy companies that were not re-interviewed in 2009, three companies merged and the 
newly established company declined to participate in the study. The other three dairy companies either 
stopped their activities in Bulgaria or have been declared bankrupt. Therefore, in order to complement 
the panel data information that we collected from the five dairy companies that we interviewed in 2003 
and 2009, we selected in 2009 two additional dairy companies, which we asked to provide recall 
information for 2003 in addition to the information for 2009.   
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litres of milk) and three are small (0.5-3 million litres). In terms of ownership, two of 
the companies (Danone and Milki Eks) are foreign owned, while five are domestic. 
The companies sourced the vast majority of their milk supplies from individual 
farms (households): they sourced 84% of their milk supplies from individual farms (the 
focus of our analysis) and 16% from dairy cooperatives and corporate farms – and this 
share remained stable over the 2003-2009 period (Table 5).7 Within the category 
individual farms we distinguish between households where the milk is directly collected 
at the farm gate by the dairy company and households which deliver their milk to the 
dairy company through local middlemen – so called milk collection points (see section 
4.2 of this chapter).  
The in-depth interviews included questions on the company activities, the 
structure of their supply base, the quality of the milk they procure and possible 
assistance programs for their suppliers. 
 
4 STANDARDS AND DAIRY SUPPLY CHAIN MODERNISATION 
4.1 Changes in standards 
The 2003-2009 period captures the period of preparation for EU accession (until 
2007) and integration into the EU. Over this period, Bulgarian food quality 
requirements were gradually aligned with the more stringent EU standards. The 
relevant regulations to manage food safety and quality in the dairy sector are the 
                                                        
7 Over the period covered by the survey, there was a decline in the number of cooperatives in the 
Bulgarian dairy sector. Between 2003 and 2010 the number of cooperatives declined from 247 to 134. 
However, this decline was compensated by an increase in the number of corporate farms from 152 in 
2003 to 287 in 2010 (Ministry of Agriculture and Food). As a result, the share of milk that dairy 
companies purchase from cooperatives and corporate farms together remains constant. 
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Regulations on the specific rules for hygiene of foodstuffs and food of animal origin 
((EC) 852/2004 and 853/2004).  
Regulation (EC) 852/2004 lays down specific hygiene rules for foodstuffs and 
covers the implementation of the “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)” 
principles.8 In theory, these principles should apply to each actor in the food supply 
chain. However, in practice, these rules are mainly affecting dairy companies and 
retailers in the dairy supply chain as the legislation recognises that the application of 
HACCP principles is generally not feasible at the farm level. Specific requirements 
important to the dairy sector relate to microbiological criteria for foodstuffs, 
temperature controls and maintenance of the cold chain, requirements for sampling and 
analysis and requirements for traceability and record-keeping.    
Regulation (EC) 853/2004 lays down specific hygiene rules for food of animal 
origin and covers the requirements for raw milk production at the farm level, for 
processing dairy products and for packaging and labelling dairy products. These 
regulations apply not to milk that is been used for home consumption or direct sales of 
small volumes to end consumers or local retailers. The requirements for raw milk 
production at the farm level include three type of requirements. First, there are 
requirements on the health of the animals (subchapter I of Chapter I of Section IX of 
Annex III). For example, animals should not show any symptoms of infectious diseases, 
should be in good general state of health and should be free of brucellosis and 
tuberculosis. Second, there are requirements on the hygiene on milk production 
holdings, which include requirements on the hygiene in the premises and on 
                                                        
8 Hazard analysis and critical control points or HACCP principles are a set of measures that a food 
producer can implement to systematically reduce the risks from biological, chemical, and physical 
hazards in the production processes that can cause the finished product to be unsafe. The principles are 
designed to prevent risks related to food safety or quality rather than to control food safety or quality.  
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equipment; hygiene during milking, collection and transport; and staff hygiene 
(subchapter ÏI of Chapter I of Section IX of Annex III). For example, the premises for the 
storage of milk should be protected against vermin, have an adequate separation from 
the premises where animals are housed and have suitable refrigeration equipment. 
Another example of a requirement in this category is the maintenance of the cold chain. 
After milking, milk should be cooled immediately to not more than 8 °C in case of daily 
collection (or 6°C in case the collection is not daily) and during transport, the cold chain 
should be maintained such that on arrival at the establishment of destination, the 
temperature of the milk should not be more than 10°C. Third, there are microbiological 
criteria for the quality of raw milk. Raw milk should not contain more than 100.000 
micro-organisms per millilitre at a plate count and not more than 400.000 somatic cells 
per millilitre at a somatic cell count at 30°C (subchapter III of Chapter I of Section IX of 
Annex III).  
However, in Bulgaria there were two transitional periods during which there were 
derogations from the requirements set out in subchapters II and III of Chapter I of 
Section IX of Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 for dairy farms which produce 
non-EU standard milk. First, until the end of 2007, target reductions were from 500.000 
to 300.000 micro-organisms per millilitre raw milk and from 500.000 to 400.00 somatic 
cells per millilitre raw milk. In the second transitional period, from January 2008 until 
the end of December 2009, the target reduction was from 300.000 to 100.000 micro-
organisms per millilitre raw milk and less than 400.000 somatic cells per millilitre raw 
milk. As many quality problems remained, Bulgaria was granted several extensions of 
the last transitional period and ultimately the transitional period was extended until the 
end of 2015, when all farms and dairy companies need to fully comply to all EU 
regulations related to food safety and quality.  
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At the level of dairy companies, the derogations led to the existence of three types 
of dairy companies. First, there are companies who process all raw milk according to EU 
standards. These companies are licensed to export to the EU. Second, there are 
companies with two separate processing lines, one that meets and one that does not 
meet the EU food safety and quality standards. These companies can export the dairy 
products from the first line to the EU, while the products from the second line are solely 
destined for the domestic market (or export outside the EU). Third, there are dairy 
companies who do not meet EU standards. Their products are destined for the domestic 
market (or export outside the EU). Over the period 2003-2009, the number of dairy 
companies processing EU compliant milk increased. In 2003, only 14 (out of the 330 
dairy companies active in Bulgaria) were licensed to export to the EU, while in 2009 this 
number increased, but was (two years after EU accession) still limited to 65 dairy 
companies (out of 224 dairy companies active in Bulgaria) (National Dairy Board, 2008; 
USDA, 2010). In our sample, none of the interviewed dairy companies exported to the 
EU in 2003 and except Danone, none of the dairy companies interviewed produced EU 
quality milk. In 2009, three dairy companies exported to the EU (Danone, BCC Handel 
and Iotovi), while five dairy companies report that - at least a part of - their production 
fulfilled EU standards (Table 5).  Substantial improvements in the quality of milk at the 
processing level were driven by investments in machinery and equipment, which have 
been partially financed by national and European support schemes, such as SAPARD.9 In 
the period 2003-2009, five out of the seven dairy companies we interviewed applied for 
                                                        
9 SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) was a support program 
funded by the EU to help the NMS deal with the problems of the structural adjustment in their agricultural 
sectors. 
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financial support to improve the quality of their production. Four companies eventually 
received this support and invested in machinery and equipment (Table 5). 
At the level of the dairy farms, the derogations led to three categories of dairy 
farmers. First, there are group I holdings compliant with the EU requirements for 
equipment and the raw milk criteria. Second, there are group II holdings compliant with 
the EU requirements for equipment only, but not the raw milk criteria.  Third, there are 
group III holdings not compliant with the EU requirements for equipment and the raw 
milk criteria. In 2010, there were 2.589 farms in group I (46% of the total raw milk 
production), 804 farms in group II and 87.168 farms in category III. By 2013 the 
numbers changed to 3.094 farms in group I (68% of the total raw milk production), 476 
farms in group II (3% of the total raw milk production) and 27.718 farms in group III 
(29% of the total raw milk production).  In our sample, 16 farms were classified in 
group I, 2 farms were classified in group II and the remaining farms were classified in 
group III in 2009.   
Although the overall implementation of EU food safety and quality standards has 
been slow, most dairy companies introduced already in the beginning of the 2000s a 
strategy to increase the quality of their production. At the processing level, dairy 
companies made substantial investments in infrastructure and equipment.  In addition, 
they also developed a strategy to increase the quality of the raw milk at the farm level. 
In general, this strategy included changes in the organisation of milk collection and 
more vertical integration by the provision of farm assistance programs.  
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4.2 Changes in the organisation of milk collection 
Milk collection in Bulgaria is organised in two ways. Traditionally, milk is 
delivered by farm households to a milk collection point (MCP), often operated by a farm 
household itself (Dries and Noev, 2006; Noev et al., 2009). The second approach is to 
collect milk directly at the farm gate by the dairy company. This allows the dairy 
company to more closely monitor the quality of the milk produced and to link the 
quality to specific farms. Table 5 summarises these changes based on the company 
survey. The share of milk procured directly at the farm gate from individual farmers 
increased from 52% in 2003 to 60% in 2009. The growth of direct procurement is also 
confirmed by our farm survey results which show that the share of household farms 
where the dairy company collects the milk at the farm gate increased from 11% in 2003 
to 34% in 2009.10 This shift towards more direct procurement is also illustrated by the 
decreasing number of dairy companies that have a MCP in the village. While in 2003, 
there were in total 48 MCPs in the villages where we surveyed dairy households, this 
number decreased to 25 MCPs in 2009 (Figure 1). Some dairy companies, such as 
Danone, BCC Handel and Trunchovica, have substantially increased the share of milk 
that they procure directly from individual farmers. In fact, Danone and Trunchovica no 
longer procure through MCPs in 2009.  
This decision had important implications for the households in our sample. In 
2003, Danone was the only FDI company procuring from households in our sample. 
Danone procured from 106 households, of which 101 households were delivering 
trough a MCP. Therefore, one may expect that the decision of Danone to stop procuring 
                                                        
10 Percentages for 2003 and 2009 are calculated based on the number of households that are delivering 
milk to a dairy company in, respectively, 2003 (296 households) and 2009 (102 households).  
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
61 
 
from MCPs had an important impact on farm survival in our sample. However, the 
survival rate of the farmers that delivered to a MCP of Danone in 2003 (30%) is not 
significantly different from the survival rate of those that delivered to a MCP of a 
domestic dairy company in 2003 (33%) (t-value: 0,91) (Table 3). In the empirical 
analysis, we will also more formally test whether delivering to Danone in 2003 affected 
farm survival. 
However, despite the growth of direct procurement, for other dairy companies 
MCPs still remain important in order to ensure a sufficient supply of raw milk. The 
managers of dairy companies indicated that competition for the procurement of raw 
milk was tough and some indicated that in order to have sufficient supply they even 
increased their procurement from MCPs compared to 2003. For example, the 
management of Milky Lux indicate that they did not use MCPs in the past, but in order to 
have sufficient supplies in 2009, they procured 50% of their milk supply from MCPs. 
Also the management of Iotovi indicated to have increased its milk procurement from 
MCPs from 10% in 2003 to 30% in 2009 for the same reason.  
To improve the quality of milk delivered in MCPs, dairy companies invested in 
cooling tanks in MCPs. In our survey, 8 of the 13 farm households that operated a MCP 
at home received cooling equipment from the dairy company for an average value of 
3608 Leva (or 1804 Euro) per MCP in the period 2003-2009.  
 
4.3 Changes in the provision of farm assistance programs 
As in other East European countries (see Dries et al. 2009), dairy companies 
introduced farm assistance programs, such as credit and input supply programs, bank 
loan guarantees and extension and veterinary services in order to improve the quality 
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of the milk produced. In general, these programs improve farmers’ access to inputs, 
capital and know-how. Both in 2003 and 2009, all seven interviewed dairy companies 
offered at least one type of program (credit supply, input supply, bank loan guarantees, 
or extension and veterinary services) and the importance has increased over the period 
2003-2009. All (7) dairy companies offered credit, compared to 5 in 2003, 6 provided 
input supply programs (4 in 2003); 5 offered bank loan guarantees (4 in 2003) and 5 
provided extension and veterinary services (3 in 2003). 
However, from the farmers’ perspective these numbers suggest a too optimistic 
picture, since not all suppliers have access to these programs even if the companies 
offer them. The managers of the interviewed dairy companies explained that some 
programs, such as extension and veterinary services, are in principle available for all 
suppliers, but are mainly used by large farmers.  For other programs, such as credit and 
input supply programs, the dairy companies often impose a minimum size (e.g. a milk 
production of minimum 50 litre per day) themselves.  
Our survey results clearly confirm that the provision of farm assistance programs 
is limited, but overall there has been an increase in their use over the period 2003-2009 
in particularly for credit supply programs (2% of the households delivering to a dairy 
company in 2003; 16% of the households delivering to a dairy company in 2009) and 
extension and veterinary services (2% of the households in 2003; 8% in 2009) (Table 
6). Further, our survey results confirm that farm assistance programs are mostly offered 
to households with a larger herd size. For example, in 2003, 21% of the households with 
a herd size of 10 or more cows received credit from the dairy company compared to 
only 1% of the households with a herd size of less than 10 cows. In 2009, these 
percentages increased to 50% of the households with a herd size of 10 or more cows 
and only 7% of the households with a herd size of less than 10 cows.  
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4.4 Impact on milk quality 
Supply chain modernisation and the associated changes in the organisation of milk 
collection and provision of farm assistance programs are reflected in the quality of the 
milk deliveries. Table 5 illustrates how the quality of the milk delivered to the seven 
interviewed dairy companies improved over the period 2003-2009. In 2003 only 23% 
of the milk was of the highest quality (EU quality). This share increased to more than 
72% in 2009. Overall, especially milk procured directly from individual household 
farms or corporate farms fulfils the EU microbiological standards, while milk procured 
from MCPs in general does not fulfil EU requirements (Table 5). However, even for milk 
procured from MCPs, the share of milk that fulfils the EU microbiological standards 
increased.  
Quality control of the raw milk has increased significantly in the period 2003-
2009. In general, quality tests were performed by dairy companies and MCPs.  
The dairy companies perform a range of quality tests on the milk they procure 
directly from individual farmers and the milk they procure from MCPs.11 Some larger 
dairy companies own their own testing facilities, while smaller dairy companies send 
their samples to certified laboratories, especially for the germ and cell count tests. In 
2009, all 7 dairy companies indicated that they regularly (once to two times per month) 
tested the microbiological indicators - germ and cell count (5 in 2003), all 7 dairy 
companies tested the fat content (7 in 2003), 6 dairy companies tested the solids non-
fat (3 in 2003) and 6 companies tested for the presence of prohibited residues such as 
antibiotics (3 in 2003). Hence, in 2003, two dairy companies (Trunchovica and Mandra 
                                                        
11 In addition, some dairy companies also indicated that occasionally (once per year) they test the milk 
quality of the individual suppliers of the MCPs.  
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Obnova) did not even perform regular tests for microbiological features of the milk and 
only performed organoleptic tests and a test to determine the fat content.  
The MCPs also perform some quality tests, which are more rudimentary than the 
tests by the dairy processors. In 2003, these tests were often limited to only the 
organoleptic indicators (sight, smell and taste) and fat content, while in 2009, MCPs are 
in general equipped to test in addition to the organoleptic indicators and fat content for 
solids non-fat, density and temperature. To test the microbiological indicators (cell and 
germ count), milk samples from the bulk cooler of the MCP are sent to certified 
laboratories.12  
Over time, there are significant changes in milk quality at the farm level (Table 7). 
In 2003, milk quality was mainly tested based on three indicators: fat content (77% of 
the households delivering to a dairy company in 2003), solids non-fat (53%) and 
density (58%). Only in few cases other indicators, such as germ count (2%), cell count 
(2%) and temperature (5%) have been tested. By 2009, the number of tests on milk 
quality increased substantially and the share of households for which the germ count 
(74% of the households delivering to a dairy company in 2009), cell count (68%) and 
temperature (70%) have been tested increased significantly. In addition, also the share 
of households for which the fat content (80%), solids non-fat (66%) and density (74%) 
of their milk have been tested, has increased. However, while farmers are aware of the 
fact that their milk is being tested, the results of the tests remain unknown for a 
substantial number of them, especially when the milk was tested at the level of the MCP. 
For example in 2009, 75 farm households reported that their milk has been tested on 
                                                        
12 In addition, some farmers report that they occasionally (at least once per year) send individual milk 
samples to certified laboratories to test the microbiological indicators.  In 2003, 9% of the farmers of 
delivering to a dairy company in 2003 reported to have send a milk sample to a certified laboratory, while 
in 2009 this number increased to 24% of the farmers delivering to a dairy company in 2009.   
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the germ count. However, only 37 farm households (or 49% of the households that 
reported that their milk has been tested) have been informed on the results of the test. 
On the one hand, farm households were not interested in the results. On the other hand, 
MCPs were not always willing to provide this information to their suppliers. 
Further, we find that quality requirements became more important in the 
contracts between farmers and dairy companies. For example, while in 2003, only 10% 
of the households delivering to a dairy company in 2003 had a contract which included 
minimum quality requirements, this number increased in 2009 to 42% of the 
households delivering to a dairy company in 2009. In addition, we find that also quality 
premiums became more important: in 2009, 22% of the households received a quality 
premium increasing from only 10% in 2003. In 2003, the quality premiums were mainly 
solely based on fat content (77% of the cases). In 2009, quality premiums are still 
mainly based on fat content (89% of the cases), but in addition also increasingly on 
other factors such as density (33%) and microbiological indicators (33%).  
Despite these changes there are still substantial problems that need to be solved in 
order improve the quality of the milk produced and assure compliance to EU food safety 
and quality standards. In 2009, 84 farms delivering to a dairy company are not 
categorised as a group I or group II farm, meaning that their equipment and farm 
structure did not fulfil all necessary requirements. For example, many farmers still use 
milk aggregates which are unsuitable for milk storage, such as plastic bottles. In 2009, 
23% of the farmers delivered milk in plastic recipients. Although, this figure is high, it is 
an improvement compared to 2003, when 47% of the farmers delivered milk in this 
manner.    
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5 FARM RESTRUCTURING: CAUSES OF DECLINE AND GROWTH 
5.1 Survey evidence 
Our survey evidence is consistent with the aggregate data, confirming the massive 
outflow from dairy farming (Table 1). A total of 117 households (or 52% of the 
households interviewed in 2009) still produced milk in 2009 (Table 3). However, the 
number of households that still delivered milk to a dairy company is lower as out of the 
117 households producing milk in 2009, 15 households were exclusively producing 
milk for own consumption or sales in the village. Out of these 15 households, six 
households produced for sales in the village, the other nine produced exclusively for 
own consumption in 2009. Hence, a total of 124 households (or 55% of the households 
interviewed in 2009) stopped delivering milk to a dairy company in the period 2003-
2009 and 109 households (or 48% of the households interviewed in 2009) stopped all 
milk production.13  
For those households that continued producing milk in 2009, we find that 40 
households (or 34%) increased their farm size, while 49 households (or 42%) 
decreased their farm size and 28 households (or 24%) did not change their farm size 
over the period 2003-2009. This resulted in a substantial change in the size distribution. 
In fact, we find evidence of that the dairy sector is moving towards a bimodal farm 
structure, with small semi-subsistence farm households producing mainly for home 
consumption or direct sales in the village on the one hand and larger full-time farm 
                                                        
13 In fact, the total number of households that stopped producing milk is probably higher as we did not 
include in this figure the households which we could not trace back in 2009. In case we include also these 
households, 179 households (or 60% of the households interviewed in 2003) stopped producing milk in 
the period 2003-2009.  
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households on the other hand.14 Both the group of very small farm households (1 cow) 
and the group of larger farm households (6 or more cows) has increased substantially. 
The medium group (2 to 5 cows) has reduced in size, indicating that some farm 
households in this medium group reduced their farm size to only one cow, while others 
increased their farm size to a more commercial farm size (Figure 2).  
This evolution with small farms decreasing their farm size and become semi-
subsistence farmers, mainly producing for home consumption and sales in the village 
before stopping their dairy activities on the one hand, and commercial farmers on the 
other hand is also reflected in the evolution of direct sales in the village. Overall, the 
share of farm households involved in direct sales in the village has increased 
substantially: from 27 farm households (or 9% of the farm households in 2003) to 43 
farm households (or 37% of the farm households with milk production in 2009).  
The increase in direct sales in the village could also be interpreted as an indication 
that the quality standards imposed by the dairy companies have led to the exclusion of 
farm households from the formal dairy supply chain. However, it is worth noting that 
the number of households that produce exclusively for home consumption and direct 
sales is limited (15 households). The other farm households still deliver a substantial 
share of their production to dairy companies (on average 87% in 2003;  80% in 2009). 
Moreover, there is qualitative evidence that indicates the introduction of tighter 
standards was not an important reason for most households to stop delivering to a 
dairy company. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics on the main reason to stop 
                                                        
14 The existing evidence on the presence of a bimodal farm structure in the dairy sector of developed 
countries is mixed. Some authors, such as Weiss (1999) and Dries and Swinnen (2004) provide evidence 
of an evolution towards a bimodal farm structure in respectively the Austrian and the Polish farm sector. 
However, others, such as Shapiro et al. (1987), Sumner and Wolf (2001) and Bakucs and Fertő (2009), 
have analysed the farm distribution in respectively Canada, the US and Hungary find no evidence that the 
farm size distribution is evolving to a bimodal distribution.    
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
68 
 
delivering to a dairy company. Remarkably, the introduction of tighter standards was 
not an important reason. In fact, the main reason to stop delivering to a dairy company 
was “We are too old or we have health problems such that we are no longer able to keep 
cows or to produce milk on a commercial basis” (79 households). The second most 
important reason was “Other agricultural productions are more profitable/milk prices 
are too low” (24 households), while the third most important reason was “We found 
other (non-farm) employment” (17 households). Only one household mentioned low 
milk quality as the main reason to stop delivering to a dairy company (Table 8). These 
changes are also reflected in the choice of the professional activity of the households 
that stopped delivering to a dairy company in the period 2003-2009. The majority of 
these household heads is either a pensioner (86 household heads) or an employee in a 
state or private company (23 household heads), while only 10 household heads 
remained active in farming and 5 became unemployed in 2009 (Table 9, panel a). 
Moreover, even for those households for which low profitability of dairy production was 
the main reason to stop delivering to a dairy company, which could be interpreted as a 
sign of low quality production, the majority of the household heads declared to be a 
pensioner in 2009 (Table 9, panel b). Only 6 household heads remained either active as 
a farmer or became unemployed in 2009.15  
In the rest of this section we further analyse the determinants of the restructuring 
process by econometrically estimating the impact of various factors, among which the 
                                                        
15 One potential reason why low profitability was mentioned by some households as a reason to stop 
delivering to a dairy company or even to stop producing milk are low milk prices as a consequence of the 
EU wide milk crisis in the period 2008-2009. In fact, the majority  of the households that mentioned low 
profitability as the main reason to stop delivering to a dairy company stopped delivering to a dairy 
company in 2008 (7 households) or 2009 (6 households).  
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quality of the milk produced, off farm employment and ageing of farm households, on 
the survival and growth of local suppliers.  
 
5.2 Econometric model 
In order to estimate the impact of the determinants of farm exit/ survival and 
growth in the Bulgarian dairy sector, we follow the approach of Dries and Swinnen 
(2004) and Jia et al. (2012) to estimate a model based on the general firm growth 
literature (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Evans, 1987), which is extended by including 
variables specific to the dairy company, the farm and the household.16 We estimate the 
following growth function:  
ln(𝑆𝑖,𝑡)−ln(𝑆𝑖,𝑡0)
𝑑
= 𝛼0 +⁡∑ 𝛼𝑎𝑋𝑖,𝑡0 +⁡∑ 𝛽𝑏𝑌𝑖,𝑡0
𝑙
𝑏=1
𝑘
𝑎=1 +⁡    
  𝛾1 ln(𝑆𝑖,𝑡0) +⁡𝛾2[ln⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡0)]
2
+⁡𝛾3[ln⁡(𝑆𝑖,𝑡0)]
3
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡⁡   (1) 
 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡0 ⁡denote the size of the farm in terms of the number of cows at 
respectively time 𝑡 (2009) and 𝑡0 (2003); 𝑑 represents the difference between 𝑡 and 𝑡0 
(i.e. six years); 𝑋𝑖,𝑡0  represents a vector of k variables that characterise the dairy 
production activities of the household in 𝑡0; 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0represents a vector of l variables that 
control for household characteristics in 𝑡0 and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the disturbance term, which is 
                                                        
16 Note that since we are mainly interested in the impact on commercial dairy farming, a household that 
stopped delivering to a dairy company, but is still producing for direct sales or home consumption, is not 
considered to have “survived” the period 2003-2009. As a result, we will work with a sample of 226 
households, of which 102 households are still delivering to a dairy company in 2009 (“survived” the 
period 2003 – 2009) and 224 households stopped delivering to a dairy company in 2009 (“did not 
survived” the period 2003 – 2009). However, as a robustness check we will include the households that 
stopped delivering to a dairy company, but are still producing for direct sales or home consumption as a 
household that “survived” the period 2003-2009.  
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assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and a possible non-constant 
variance. 
In order to control for sample attrition bias, which would emerge when taking 
only into account farm growth of dairy farms that still exist in 2009, we use a two-step 
Heckman model of firm survival and growth model. This type of model is applied on the 
agricultural sector by, among others, Weiss (1999), Rizov and Mathijs (2003) and Dries 
and Swinnen (2004). In the first step of the two-step approach, a selection model is 
estimated to determine the probability of farm survival using all observations. Based on 
the parameter estimates of the estimated probit model, a vector of inverse Mills ratios is 
generated. In the second step, the farm growth equation is estimated by ordinary least 
squares using only the surviving farmers. Farm growth is then regressed on the 
explanatory variables and the vector of inverse Mills ratios, which allows to estimate 
consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates. 
The dependent variable in the first step of the Heckman model (selection 
equation) is SURVIVAL (see Table 10 for an overview of the variables used in the 
econometric model). SURVIVAL is a dummy that takes a value of one in case the 
household is still delivering milk to a dairy company in 2009 and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable in the second step of the Heckman model (growth equation) is 
GROWTH. GROWTH is defined as the difference of the natural logarithm of the number 
of dairy cows that a household owned in 2009 and the natural logarithm of the number 
of dairy cows that a household owned in 2003, divided by the number of years between 
the two rounds of the survey (i.e. six years).  
The first set of explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡0 ,⁡includes the variables that characterise  
the relationship with the dairy company to which the farm delivered in 2003. All 
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variables refer to 2003 (𝑡0) in order to reduce potential reverse-causality problems and 
minimise the endogeneity issue.17 
In order to analyse the impact of food quality on structural change in the Bulgarian 
dairy sector, we use factor analysis to construct a quality index (QUALITY_INDEX) based 
on a number of variables that are likely to affect the quality of the milk produced on the 
farm.18 We include variables related to farm structure and equipment used, type of milk 
deliveries and milk price; and animal management. In table 11, we discuss the different 
variables included in the quality index.  Based on theoretical findings (e.g. Leland, 
1979), we expect that in general farmers that produce high quality milk are more likely 
to survive and increase their farm size, especially in an environment like the Bulgarian 
dairy sector where quality standards have become more important over time.  
FDI is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household delivered milk 
to a foreign dairy company in 2003 and zero otherwise. The expected impact of FDI on 
farm survival and growth is uncertain ex ante. Some authors find that the impact is 
negative, especially for small farmers which are excluded from the supply chain (Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2000; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). Others have pointed out that 
foreign companies by providing farmers access to finance, inputs and technology may 
have contributed to farm survival and growth. Finally, there are authors that find no 
                                                        
17 This is done at the price of not using the most recent information. An alternative would be to follow an 
instrumental variable approach. However, unfortunately, our data did not provide us with suitable 
instruments. 
18 In principle, we could use as a measure for milk quality only those variables that are directly related to 
milk quality in 2003, such as the number of incidents that a household delivered milk below the minimum 
standard or the milk price. However, in 2003 these variables were mainly based on one dimension of milk 
quality, namely fat content. Therefore, we constructed the variable QUALITY_INDEX based on a factor 
analysis which includes variables related to equipment, hygiene and animal health. Since these variables 
are expected to affect also the microbiological quality of the milk, QUALITY_INDEX is a more 
multidimensional measure of milk quality. In a robustness check, we include instead of the quality index 
three variables that are directly correlated to milk quality in 2003, namely the number of incidents that a 
household delivered milk below the minimum standard, whether a farmer received a quality premium or 
not and the milk price.   
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effect on farm survival and growth (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Van Herck et al., 2012). 
They attribute this to spill-overs that foreign companies have on domestic companies, 
which rapidly adopted the innovative strategies introduced by foreign  companies, such 
as farm assistance programs and prompt payments. By including FDI as an explanatory 
variable, we also test whether the decision of Danone, the largest dairy company in 
Bulgaria and the only foreign dairy company in our sample in 2003, to stop procuring 
milk from MCPs had an impact on farm survival and growth. As the effect may depend 
on the initial size of the dairy farm, we also include an interaction term of FDI and 
COWS2003, the initial dairy farm size.  
COWS2003 is the natural logarithm of the number of cows in 2003. This variable is 
included to test Gibrat’s law, which states that firm growth is independent of the 
current firm size. To capture a potential non-linear relationship between initial farm 
size and farm growth, we also include COW2003SQ, the squared value of COWS2003, 
and COWS2003CU, the cubic value of COWS2003. 
FARMAGE is the natural logarithm of the age of the farm in 2003. This variable is 
included to test Jovanovic’s hypotheses, which states that older firms are more likely to 
survive, but less likely to grow (Jovanovic, 1982). Young firms are assumed to know the 
mean and the standard deviation of the cost of all firms (efficiency), but not their own 
cost structure. In each production period, firms update their expectations based on 
previous experiences and each period they come closer to knowing their own cost 
structure (efficiency). Hence, those with high costs (low efficiency) will shrink their firm 
size (and eventually leave the sector) while those with low costs will expand their firm 
size. Jovanovic (1982) translates this in the testable hypotheses that firm survival 
increases with age, while firm growth decreases with age for a given firm size as older 
firms have more accurate estimations of their efficiency.  
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YIELD is the average daily milk yield (in litre per cow) in 2003. In general, more 
productive dairy farms are more likely to survive and increase their farm size (see e.g. 
Foltz, 2004; Zimmerman and Heckelei, 2012; Falkowski, 2012).  
LANDOWNED is the size of the agricultural land owned by the household in 2003. 
The effect of the amount of agricultural land owned by the farm household on farm 
survival and growth is ambiguous. On the one hand, having more owned land may allow 
the household to switch more rapidly between different types of production or in case 
the land is rented out, it provides the household with an additional source of income. 
Both effects may have a negative effect on farm survival and growth. However, on the 
other hand, households could also use the land they own to cultivate their own fodder, 
which may have a positive effect on farm survival and growth.19  
The vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑡0includes variables that control for household characteristics in 
2003. All variables, except for CHANGEHH refer to the time period 𝑡0. 
PENSION is the number of adults in the household that are a pensioner in 2003. In 
general, pensioners have less incentives to invest and therefore PENSION is expected to 
have a negative impact on farm survival and growth.  
OFFFARM is the number of adults in the household that are working off-farm in 
2003. Alternative income sources may have two opposing effects on farm survival and 
growth. The first is a lost-labour effect that may potentially lead to decrease in family 
labour availability for farm work (e.g. Weiss, 1999; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). The 
second effect is a liquidity-relaxing effect that is especially important in the presence of 
credit constraints and may potentially lead to increased expenses on farm investments, 
                                                        
19 Note that in some cases owned land is rented out and not immediately available for the households to 
cultivate.  
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making off-farm and farm work complements instead of substitutes (e.g. Kimhi and 
Bolman, 1999; Kimhi, 2000; Hertz, 2009).  
ADULTS is the total number of adults in the household (individuals older than 15 
years) in 2003. This variable is expected to have a positive impact on farm survival and 
growth because it is an incentive as well as a necessary labour resource for the 
continuation and growth of the family farm (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000).  
EDU is the number of years of education of the household head in 2003. The 
impact of education on farm survival is ambiguous. A better educated farmer is 
expected to adopt new technologies more rapidly and allocate resources more 
efficiently, which suggests a positive impact of education on farm survival. However, 
better educated individuals are more likely to find employment elsewhere, which 
reduces the attractiveness of staying in the agricultural sector. This implies a negative 
effect of education on farm survival. With respect to farm growth, education is expected 
to have a positive impact.  
CHANGEHH is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household head 
changed in the period 2003-2009. We control for a change in the household head as this 
change may be associated with a difference in managerial abilities and behaviour. The 
impact on farm survival and growth is ambiguous. A new farm household head is less 
experienced in making decisions and therefore one might expect a negative effect on 
farm survival and growth. However, on the other hand, a change in the management 
may also have a positive effect on farm survival and growth as it may be associated with 
new ideas and knowledge.  
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5.3 Results 
The results of the two-step Heckman model, used to estimate the econometric 
model described by (1), are presented in Table 12. Model A presents the regression 
results including village fixed effects, while model B presents the regression results 
without including village fixed effects.  
For each model specification, the first column shows the results of the survival 
equation, while the second column presents the results of the growth equation. We 
discuss the empirical results in two parts. First, we discuss the determinants of farm 
survival (selection equation or the first step of the Heckman estimation). Second, we 
investigate the determinants of farm growth (growth equation or the second step of the 
Heckman estimation). 
 
5.3.1 Farm survival 
There are three key findings regarding the determinants of farm survival. 
First, we find no evidence that farms that produced high quality milk in 2003 are 
more likely to have survived the period 2003-2009. This result does not support the 
public perception that food quality standards have been the main driver behind the 
recent far-reaching structural change in the dairy sector in the period 2003-2009 and 
that in particularly those farms with low quality milk are excluded from the formal 
dairy supply chain. A potential explanation is that, although food and safety standards 
became more stringent with respect to the microbiological quality of the milk produced 
over the period 2003-2009, Bulgaria was granted an extension of the second 
transitional period to completely align with EU quality and safety standards. This means 
that  dairy farms not fulfilling all EU quality and safety requirements were still allowed 
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
76 
 
to sell their milk in 2009. In combination with a high demand for raw milk, most 
Bulgarian dairy companies still heavily rely on milk procurement from MCPs, where 
milk is in generally not fulfilling the EU quality and safety requirements (Ivanov, 2007). 
With respect to foreign investment, we also do not find a significant impact on farm 
survival, which confirms the results of Dries and Swinnen (2004) on the Polish dairy 
sector at the end of the 1990s.20  
Second, it seems that other factors than milk quality had an important impact on 
farm restructuring in the period 2003-2009. Our results show that farms with more 
pensioners and access to alternative income sources are more likely to leave the 
agricultural sector. This confirms earlier results by Weiss (1999) and Dries and 
Swinnen (2004). They find that off farm employment alternatives are a stepping-stone 
out of the agricultural sector. This suggests that off farm income is not used to invest in 
the farm and hence that access to credit may be less constraining than often argued.21 
However, the negative impact of off farm employment on farm survival could also 
indicate that some farmers already anticipated the introduction of the EU food safety 
and quality standards, judged that dairy farming will no longer be profitable for them 
under the new standards and already searched for alternative employment. Although 
we cannot strictly exclude this possibility, there are some indications that this is not the 
main driver of off farm employment. In case the anticipation of more stringent food 
                                                        
20 Note that it could be that might be the case that the supplier's base of the foreign dairy company is 
clustered at the village level. In this case we may capture the impact of FDI with the village fixed effects. 
However, the results on FDI remain robust when we estimate model B which excludes the village fixed 
effects.  
21 This finding is also illustrated by qualitative results from our household survey. In order to measure the 
importance of credit constraints, we asked all farm households “What is the most important constraint 
for your household to invest in dairy farming?”. In total, 202 farm households mentioned that either they 
are no interested to make any investments in dairy farming or they face no constraints to invest. Out of 
the 24 households that indicated that they would like to invest in dairy farming but face certain 
constraints, only 3 households mentioned “no access to credit to buy inputs or make investments” as the 
most important constraint. 
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standards would be an important driver of off farm employment, we would expect that 
in particularly farm households with low quality milk would engage in off farm 
employment. However the correlation between both variables (QUALITY_INDEX and 
OFFFARM) in the sample is very small: the correlation coefficient is -0.09, which 
indicates that it are not necessarily farms with low quality milk that engage in off farm 
employment. 
Finally, we find that larger farmers and older farms are more likely to survive the 
period 2003-2009 and the associated farm restructuring process, which confirms the 
results of Rizov and Mathijs (2003) in the Hungarian agricultural sector. Further, we 
find a negative impact of having more owned land on farm survival, which suggests that 
households with more owned land in 2003 have more non-earned, rental income 
and/or have more possibilities to switch to another agricultural production. Finally, we 
find a positive impact of household size on farm survival, while a change of the 
household head has a negative impact on farm survival. 
 
5.3.2 Farm growth 
There are two key findings regarding the determinants of farm growth. 
First, we find that milk quality has a positive impact on farm growth. In 
particularly, using the results from our robustness checks we find that farm households 
where the milk is procured directly at the farm gate are more likely to increase their 
farm size than farm households that are delivering to a MCP. This suggest that the 
institutional innovations that are associated with integration in modern supply chains, 
such as the provision of farm assistance programs and security of milk collection, had a 
significant positive impact on farm investments and growth. This confirms earlier 
findings by Dries and Swinnen (2004) and Van Herck et al. (2012).  
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Finally, we find a significant coefficient on the three farm size variables when 
analysing farm growth. First, we find a negative impact of COWS2003 on farm growth, 
which is inconsistent with the prediction of Gibrat’s law that firm growth is 
independent on the initial firm size, but consistent with previous findings by Weiss 
(1999), Dries and Swinnen (2004) and Van Herck et al. (2012). Second, the significant 
coefficient on COWS2003SQ and COWS2003CU indicates evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between farm size and farm growth. Based on the coefficients, we can 
estimate the turning points at a herd size of 3 cows (minimum) and 8 cows (maximum). 
This confirms that the group of very small farmers and the group of large “commercial” 
farmers is growing at the expense of a group of medium sized farmers. Some of the 
farmers in this group have reduced their farm size and became semi-subsistence 
farmers, while others have increased their farm size substantially and became 
“commercial” farmers.  
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
In addition, we did several robustness checks. In the first three robustness checks 
for which the results are reported in Table 13, we tested for the robustness of our 
results by adjusting the sample size.  
First, we test for attrition bias by estimating an extended model in which we 
included also the households that we were not able to trace back. In this estimation, we 
assume that all households that we did not trace back stopped delivering milk to a dairy 
company, which is suggested by the questionnaires that we have taken from the 
neighbours and key informants in the village. The results of this estimation are 
presented in Model C of Table 13.  
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Second, we estimate a restricted model in which we excluded the village Resen. In 
this village there was a higher farm entry rate than in the other villages.  The results of 
this estimation are presented in Model D of Table 13.  
Third, we estimate a model in which we extend the definition of farm survival. 
Instead of only including farms that are still delivering to a dairy company as a farm 
survival, we include in this robustness check also the farms that stopped delivering to a 
dairy company, but that are still producing for direct sales or home consumption as a 
farm survival. As a result, we will work in this robustness check with a sample of 226 
households, of which 117 households are still producing milk in 2009 (“survived” the 
period 2003 – 2009) and 209 households that stopped producing milk in the period 
2003-2009 (“did not survived” the period 2003 – 2009). The results of this estimation 
are presented in Model E of Table 13. 
In the next three robustness checks for which the results are reported in Table 14, 
we included alternative measures for the farm size and quality variables.  
First, we estimate a model in which we use the actual milk production as an 
indicator for the size of the farm. The outcome variable in this model is GROWTH_MP, 
which is the difference of the natural logarithm of the milk production (in litres) in 2009 
and the natural logarithm of the milk production (in litres) in 2003, divided by the 
number of years between the two rounds of the survey (i.e. six years). The size variables 
that we will include are MP2003, which are the natural logarithm of milk production (in 
litres) in 2003, and its squared and cubic form MP2003SQ and MP2003CU, respectively. 
The results of this estimation are presented in Model F of Table 14. 
Second, instead of our quality index, we include three variables that are directly 
correlated to milk quality.  BELOWSTANDARD is a variable that measures the number 
of incidents during which the household delivered milk below the minimum standard to 
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the MCP or dairy company in 2003 and zero otherwise.22 In general, milk quality is been  
based on organoleptic indicators and fat content in 2003. In case a household delivers 
milk below the minimum standard, this milk is reject by the MCP or dairy company. 
MILKPREMIUM is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household received 
in 2003 a quality premium on top of the milk price from the dairy company for 
producing high quality milk and zero otherwise. In general, farmers receive a quality 
premium in case their milk exceeds certain requirements. In general, these quality 
premiums are based on fat content and – although to a lesser extent - solids-non-fat. 
Usually, a milk sample is tested at the beginning of each season and the premium is paid 
during the rest of the season. MILKPRICE is the average milk price that the farm 
household received in 2003, which is calculated based on the average milk price in the 
winter and the summer season. For five out of the seven dairy companies that we 
interviewed milk quality is the most important determinant for milk prices. For the 
other two companies the most important determinant is the quantity that a supplier can 
deliver, while milk quality is only the second most determinant. BELOWSTANDARD is 
expected to be negatively correlated with farm survival and growth, while 
MILKPREMIUM and MILKPRICE are expected to be positively correlated with farm 
survival and growth.23 In addition, we also include the variable DIRECT, which is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the dairy company collects milk directly at 
the farm in 2003 and zero otherwise. In order to test the robustness of this variable, we 
                                                        
22 Note that as a robustness check we also included a dummy variable with a value of one if the milk of a 
farm household was classified at least once below standard in 2003 and zero otherwise. However, this did 
not affect our main findings and the results are available upon request. 
23 The quality variables could potentially be highly correlated, which could cause multicollinearity 
problems.  However, the correlation between the quality variables in the sample is small (Table15).  In 
addition, we also tested for the potential multicollinearity problems by running restricted models. 
However, this did not affect our main findings and the results are available upon request. 
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include in a robustness check, the variable PROGRAM instead of DIRECT.24 PROGRAM is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household received at least one 
assistance program from the dairy company and zero otherwise. Assistance programs 
offered by dairy companies include credit and input supply programs, bank loan 
guarantees and recommendations; and extension services and veterinary assistance. 
We expect a positive impact of DIRECT and PROGRAM on farm survival and growth 
because previous studies showed their positive effects (see among  others Gow et al., 
2000; Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Van Herck et al., 2012; Falkowski, 2012).25 The results 
of the estimations which include respectively, DIRECT and PROGRAM, are presented in 
Model G and Model H of Table 14.  
The results in Table 13 and 14 show that our key findings are robust to all these 
changes in the specification. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
In the past decade, the Bulgarian dairy sector was characterised by a massive 
restructuring and between 2003 and 2010, the number of dairy farms more than 
halved. Several studies identified supply chain modernisation and the introduction of 
more stringent food safety and quality standards as the main determinants of the rapid 
structural changes in the Bulgarian dairy sector after EU accession. However, to date the 
                                                        
24 The variables DIRECT and PROGRAM are highly correlated (Table 15). Therefore, we run two restricted 
models which include respectively DIRECT and PROGRAM as including both variables in one regression 
would cause multicollinearity problems. 
25 Notice that although we use data from 2003, there are potential endogeneity problems with respect to 
the variable DIRECT and PROGRAM. However, by controlling for the initial dairy farm size (COWS2003), 
we control for initial dairy farm size, which is the most important factor that determines whether milk is 
collected directly at the farm according to our interviews with the management of the dairy companies.  
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policy debate is often been based on ad-hoc claims, while there is relatively little micro-
level evidence on the determinants of the structural changes in the Bulgarian dairy 
sector. 
 This paper analyses farm restructuring in the Bulgarian dairy sector and its main 
determinants using a unique panel survey of 296 households in the North and South 
Central Region of Bulgaria in the period 2003-2009. There are three main results.  
First, we find evidence of a large outflow of labour from dairy farming activities 
and 55% of the farm households, which we interviewed in 2009 and that were 
supplying to a dairy company in 2003, stopped supplying in the period 2003-2009.  
Second, the survey results show that the main reasons for quitting dairy farming 
are ageing of the household and health problems. In addition to demographic changes, 
off farm employment alternatives are found to have contributed positively to the 
decrease in dairy farms in the period 2003-2009.  In contrast, we did not find that 
supply chain modernisation and milk quality were important determinants of farm 
survival in the period 2003-2009. A potential explanation is that although food quality 
and safety standards became more stringent with respect to the microbiological quality 
of the milk over the period 2003-2009, they were in 2009 still not fully aligned with the 
EU food safety and quality standards as Bulgaria was granted an extension of the second 
transitional period until the end of 2015. In addition, in 2009, Bulgarian dairy 
companies were facing difficulties to collect sufficient milk and still heavily relied on 
milk procurement from MCPs. In order to improve the quality of the milk procured from 
MCPs, dairy companies have invested heavily in the modernisation of this intermediary. 
For example, in order to ensure the cold chain there have been important investments 
in the provision of cooling tanks in the MCPs.  
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Third, we find that milk quality had a positive effect farm growth and in 
particularly, farm households that were integrated in modern supply chains and 
received assistance from the dairy company in 2003 were more likely to increase their 
farm size compared to farm households that are delivering to MCPs. This suggest that 
institutional innovations which are associated with integration in modern supply 
chains, such as the provision of farm assistance programs, have a significant positive 
impact on farm investments and farm growth.  
There is three important limitation to this study.  
First, the quality measures used in the farm survival-growth model are only proxy 
variables with respect to milk quality. In the survey, we asked for more detailed 
information on different milk quality characteristics, but the quality of the data was 
relatively low as farmers often did not know whether their milk was tested and even if 
they knew they often did not have any information on how well their milk samples 
scored. More accurate information about milk quality could be obtained by laboratory 
tests, which would  increase the survey cost.  
Second, we only consider the impact of supply chain modernisation on farm 
survival and growth, but we do not consider the welfare implications for the different 
groups of farmers. These welfare implications will be addressed in future research. 
Third, since the survey only includes farm households it is important to note that 
that our results cannot be generalised for the entire Bulgarian dairy sector. In Bulgaria, 
approximately two third of the milk production that is processed in dairy companies is 
been produced by large corporate farms and cooperatives. Since these large corporate 
farms and cooperatives have a different organisation, the factors that are expected to 
affect farm survival and growth of these farms are fundamentally different of those 
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affecting farm survival and growth of farm households. Hence, including both types of 
farms in one analysis would not be useful.   
Despite these limitations, we believe our analysis contributes to the literature as it 
is the first study that analyses the determinants of farm survival and growth over the 
period 2003-2009 in the Bulgarian dairy sector. Our findings are relevant beyond the 
Bulgarian dairy sector as changes in quality regulations and supply chain modernisation 
are taken place in many other transition and developing countries.    
 
7 REFERENCES 
Bakucs, L.Z. and Fertő, I. (2009). The growth of family farms in Hungary. Agricultural 
Economics, 40(1), 789-795. 
Bragg, L.A. and Dalton, T.J. (2004). Factors affecting the decision to exit dairy farming: A 
two-stage regression analysis. Journal of Dairy Science, 87, 3092–3098. 
Breustedt, G., and Glauben, T. (2007). Driving Forces behind Exiting from Farming in     
Western Europe. Journal of Agricultural Economics 58,115–127. 
Chavas, J., and Magand, G. (1988). A dynamic analysis of the size distribution of firms: 
The case of the U.S. dairy industry. Agribusiness, 4, 315–329. 
Crampes, C. and Hollander, A. (1995). Duopoly and Quality Standards. European 
Economic Review, 39(1), 91-82. 
Dolan, C. and Humphrey, J. (2000). Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The 
Impact of UK Supermarkets on the African Horticulture. Journal of Development 
Studies, 37, 147-176. 
Dries, L. and Swinnen, J. (2004). Foreign Direct Investment, Vertical Integration and 
Local Suppliers: Evidence from the Polish Dairy Sector. World Development, 32, 
1525 – 1544. 
Dries, L. and Noev, N. (2006). A comparative study of vertical coordination in the dairy 
chains in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia. In World Bank (2006), The dynamics of 
Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
ECSSD Working Paper 42, 135-165. 
Dries, L., Germenji, E., Noev, N. and Swinnen, J. (2009). Farmers, Vertical Coordination, 
and the Restructuring of Dairy Supply Chains in Central and Eastern Europe. 
World Development, 37, 1742-1758. 
Evans, D. (1987). Tests of alternative theories of firm growth. Journal of Political 
Economy, 95, 657–674. 
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
85 
 
Falkowski, J. (2012). Dairy supply chain modernisation in Poland: what about those not 
keeping pace? European Review of Agricultural Economics, 39(3), 397-415. 
Foltz, J.D. (2004). Entry, Exit, and Farm Size: Assessing an Experiment in Dairy Price 
Policy. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 86, 594-604. 
Goetz, S. J., and Debertin, D. (2001). Why farmers quit: A county-level analysis. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83, 1010–1023. 
Gow, H., Streeter, D. and Swinnen, J. (2000). How private contract enforcement 
mechanisms can succeed where public institutions fail: The case of JUHOCUKOR 
a.s.. Agricultural Economics, 3, 253-265. 
Hertz, T. (2009). The Effect of Nonfarm Income on Investment in Bulgarian Family 
Farming. Agricultural Economics, 40, 161-176. 
Hoppe, R. A., and Korb, P. (2006). Understanding U.S. Farm Exits. Economic research 
report no. 21. Economic Research Service, USDA, Washington, DC. 
Huettel, S. and Jongeneel, R. (2011). How has the EU milk quota affected patterns of 
herd-size change? European Review of Agricultural Economics, 38(4), 497-527. 
Ivanov, B. (2007). Problems and Opportunities for the Milk Sector in Bulgaria. Bulgarian 
Journal of Agricultural Science , 13, 85-98. 
Ivanov, B. (2009). An Assessment of the Competitiveness of the Dairy Food Chain in 
Bulgaria. Deliverable 2.1, AgriPolicy Enlargement Network for Agripolicy Analysis.  
Jackson-Smith, D.B. 1999. Understanding the Microdynamics of Farm Structural Change: 
Entry, Exit and Restructuring among Wisconsin Family Farmers. Rural Sociology, 
64(1), 66-91. 
Jia, X., Huang, J., Luan, H., Rozelle, S. and Swinnen, J. (2012). China’s Milk Scandal, 
government policy and production decisions of dairy farmers: The case of Greater 
Beijing. Food Policy, 37(4), 390-400. 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Selection and Evolution of Industry. Econometrica, 5, 649-670. 
Kimhi, A. and Bollman, R. (1999). Family Farm Dynamics in Canada and Israel: The Case 
of Farm Exits.  Journal of Agricultural Economics, 21, 69-79.  
Kimhi, A. (2000). Is Part-time Farming Really a Step in the Way Out of Agriculture? 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82, 38-48.  
Kostov, P., Patton, M., Moss, J., and McErlean, S. (2006). Does Gibrat’s law hold amongst 
dairy farmers in Northern Ireland?, MPRA Paper No. 3370.  
Leland, H. (1979). Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Standards,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 1328-1346. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food. Farm Structure Survey Results; Agrostatistical 
Reference Book 2000-2012.  Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Various Years.  
National Dairy Board (2008). Conditions and Challenges to the dairy sector in Bulgaria. 
Presentation Romanian – Bulgarian – Hungarian Common Project for Young 
Farmers.  
Nelson, R. and Winter, S. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
86 
 
Noev, N., Dries, L. and Swinnen, J. (2009). Institutional change, contracts, and quality in 
transition agriculture. Eastern European Economics 47(4), 62-85. 
O'Donnell, S., Horan, B., Butler, A.M. and Shalloo, L. (2011). A survey of the factors 
affecting the future intentions of Irish dairy farmers. The Journal of Agricultural 
Science, 149(5), 647-654. 
Peerlings, J.H. and Ooms, D.L. (2008). Farm growth and exit: consequences of EU dairy 
policy reform for Dutch dairy farming. Paper presented the 12th EAAE Congress 
‘People, Food and Environments: Global Trends and European Strategies’, Gent, 
Belgium. 
Rahelizatovo, N. C., and Gillespie, G.F. (1999). Dairy farm size, entry, and exit in a 
declining production region. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 31, 
333–347. 
Rizov, M. and Mathijs, E. (2003). Farm Survival and Growth in Transition Economies: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence from Hungary. Post-Communist Economies, 15, 
227-242. 
Ronnen, U. 1991. Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition. Rand 
Journal of Economics, 22(4), 490-504. 
Shapiro, D., Bollman, R.D. and Ehrensaft, P. (1987). Farm size and growth in Canada. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69, 477–483. 
Stiglbauer, A. and Weiss, C. (2000). Family and non-family succession in the Upper-
Austrian farm sector. Cahiers d’économie at sociologie rurales, 54(1),  5-26.   
Stokes, J.R. (2006). Entry, exit, and structural change in Pennsylvania's dairy sector. 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 35, 357–373 
Sumner, D.A. and Leiby, J.D. (1987). An econometric analysis of the effects of human 
capital on size and growth among dairy farms. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 69, 465–470.  
Sumner, D.A. and Wolf, C. (2002). Diversification, vertical integration, and the regional 
pattern of dairy farm size. Review of Agricultural Economic, 24(2), 442-457. 
Susanto, D., Rosson, C.P., Anderson, D.P. and Adcock, F.J. (2010). Immigration policy, 
foreign agricultural labor, and exit intentions in the United States dairy industry. 
Journal of Dairy Science, 93, 1774-1781.  
Tonini, A., and Jongeneel, R. (2009). The distribution of dairy farm size in Poland: a 
Markov approach based on information theory. Applied Economics, 41(1), 55-69. 
USDA (2010). Dairy Sector Update. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service Gain Report, 
USDA.  
Van Herck, K., Noev, N. and Swinnen, J. (2012). Institutions, Exchange and Growth: 
Evidence from Bulgarian Agriculture on the Impact of Hold-ups and Contract 
Innovations.  European Review of Agricultural Economics, 39(1), 29-50. 
Weatherspoon, D. D. and Reardon, T. (2003). The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa: 
Implications for Agrifood Systems and the Rural Poor. Development Policy Review, 
21, 333-355. 
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
87 
 
Weiss, C. (1999). Farm growth and survival: Econometric evidence for individual farms 
in Upper Austria. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81, 103-116. 
Yotkova, S., Grigorova, Y. and Kazakova, Y. (2009). The Problems of Small and Medium-
sized Milk Producers in Bulgaria. Brochure published by the WWF Danube-
Carpathian Programme Bulgaria. 
Zepeda, L. 1995. Asymmetry and nonstationarity in the farm size distribution of 
Wisconsin milk producers: An aggregate analysis. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 77, 837–852. 
Zimmerman, A. and Heckelei, T. (2012). Structural Change of European Dairy Farms: A 
Cross-Regional Analysis. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63(3), 576-603.  
Chapter 3  – Small farmers, Standards and Value Chains 
88 
 
Table 1: Evolution of the number of farms and dairy farms in Bulgaria, 2003-2009 
  
2003 2005 2007 2009 
Difference 
between 2003-
2009 
Total Bulgaria 
All farms  665.548 534.613 481.920 371.100* -44%* 
Dairy farms  193.684 151.660 120.327 90.561* -53%* 
Central Bulgaria 
All farms  288.009 235.908 197.351 161.200* -44%* 
Dairy farms  86.836 78.311 61.312 43.524* -50%* 
Survey       
Dairy farms  226 200 155 117 -48% 
   of which delivering to a dairy company  226 198 151 102 -55% 
*Data 2010 
Source: Ministry of agriculture and food – Farm Structure Survey Data 2003,2005, 2007 and 2010 
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Table 2: Farm structure in the survey and in Central Bulgaria, 2003-2009 
 
  Survey Central Bulgaria 
  2003 2009* 2003 2010 
# of 
cows 
per 
farm 
# 
farms 
Share 
farms 
(%) 
Share 
cows 
(%) 
Aver-
age 
herd 
size 
# 
farms 
Share 
farms 
(%) 
Share 
cows 
(%) 
Aver-
age 
herd 
size 
# 
farms 
Share 
farms 
(%) 
Share 
cows 
(%) 
Aver-
age 
herd 
size 
# 
farms 
Share 
farms 
(%) 
Share 
cows 
(%) 
Aver-
age 
herd 
size 
1 to 2 175 59,2 24,3 1,5 58 49,6 8,8 1,4 76843 88,5 57,8 1,4 35606 81,8 30,9 2,0 
3 to 9 102 34,4 41,6 4,3 39 33,3 21,8 5,1 8593 9,9 21,6 4,6 5255 12,1 16,3 7,0 
> 10 19 6,4 34,1 19,4 20 17,1 69,4 31,5 1400 1,6 20,6 23,8 2663 6,1 52,8 45,8 
Total 296 100 100 3,6 102 100 100 8,7 86836 100 100 2,1 43524 100 100 5,2 
* Note that these data also include the households that stopped delivering to a dairy company in the period 2003-2009, but are still 
producing milk for home consumption or direct sales. Out of these 15 households producing solely for home consumption and direct 
sales 12 households own one cow, 2 households own two cows and 1 household owns three cows in 2009. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry – Farm Structure 
Survey (2003 and 2010) for Central Bulgaria 
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Table 3: Overview of the different pathways chosen by the households in our sample, 2003-2009 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
 
 
 
2003   2009 
 
  
Not 
found 
  
Stopped 
producing 
milk 
Stopped 
delivering 
to a dairy 
company 
(but still 
producing 
milk) 
Still 
delivering 
to a dairy 
company  
FDI Domestic 
     
Collection 
at the 
farm 
MCP 
Collection 
at the 
farm 
MCP 
FDI 
Collection at 
the farm  
5 1 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 
  MCP       101 24 44 3 30 1 0 5 24 
Domestic 
Collection at 
the farm  
28 9 4 0 15 1 0 12 2 
  MCP       162 36 61 12 53 2 0 10 41 
Total   296 70 109 15 102 6 0 29 67 
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Table 4: Reasons for attrition based on information obtained from neighbours 
and key informants in the village on the households that were interviewed in 
2003, but that we were not be able to trace back in 2009 
 Number of 
households 
Percentage 
Household members passed away  29 41% 
They were too old to live alone and moved in with family 
members 
16 23% 
They moved to another village or city (new address not 
known) 
16 23% 
They moved abroad 9 13% 
Total 70 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 5: Information on dairy processing companies in Bulgaria, 2003-2009 
 Danone BCC Handel Milky Lux Iotovi Truncho-
vica 
Obnova 
Mandra 
Milki Eks Weighted 
average* 
 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 
         
Main Products Yoghurt Yoghurt, Milk Cheese, 
Butter 
Cheese Cheese Milk, Yoghurt Cheese - 
FDI Y Y N N N N N N N N N N Y Y - - 
Annual milk supply (mio liter) 36  45 20 26 22 26 11  15 3 3,7 1,8  2,3 0,4  0,5 - - 
                 
Export (% of prod.) N Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N N N N   
EU-countries  - 20 0 10 0 0 - 12 - - - - - -   
Non-EU countries  - 0 10 10 15 10 - 3 - - - - - -   
                 
Delivery from (% of prod.)                 
Individual farms  70 70 80 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 84 84 
through individual collection at 
the farm gate 
50  70 0  50 100  50 90 70 5 100 5 0 0 0 52 60  
through milk collection points 20  0 80  30 0  50 10 30 95  0 95 100 100 100 32  24 
Cooperatives and corporate 
farms 
30  30 20  20 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 16  16  
                 
Delivery that fulfils EU standards 
for bacterial standards (% of 
prod. by this type of farm) 
                
Individual farms    -              
through individual collection at 
the farm gate 
70 100 10 100 20 70 40 70 0 100 0 - - - 42 90 
through milk collection points 0 - - 15 - 10 0 20 0 - 0 10 0 0 0 13 
Cooperatives and corporate 
farms 
80 100 0 100 - - - - - - - - - - 58 100 
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Table 5: Information on dairy processing companies in Bulgaria, 2003-2009 (continued) 
 Danone BCC Handel Milky Lux Iotovi Truncho-
vica 
Obnova 
Mandra 
Milki Eks Weighted 
average* 
 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 
                 
Government support to improve 
the quality of the milk produced 
N N N Y N N N Y N Y N Y N N - - 
Quality certificates ISO22000 ISO9001 ISO9001,
HACCP 
N ISO9001,
HACCP 
N ISO9001,
HACCP 
N ISO9001,
HACCP 
N ISO9001,
HACCP 
N ISO9001 - - 
Quality tests performed                 
      Microbiological Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y - - 
      Fat content Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - - 
      Solids non-fat Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y N N - - 
      Adulteration Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y N N - - 
Quality* (% of prod)                 
Low 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 100  0 100  0 20 10 5 0  
Medium 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 80  50 0 0 
High 40  0 100  30  100  60 100 50 0  0 0  100 0  40 72 28  
EU 60  100 0 70  0  40 0  50 0  100 0 0 0 0 23 72 
                 
Assistance programs                 
   Credit supply programs Y  Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y - - 
Input supply programs Y  Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N - - 
Bank loan guarantees Y   Y Y Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N N - - 
Extension and veterinary 
assistance 
Y  Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N Y N N - - 
Note: Weights used to calculate the weighted averages to calculate the amount of milk delivered by different types of dairy farmers and the amount of milk by each type of 
milk quality are derived from the annual milk supply in 2003 and 2009, respectively.  
* Low quality: germ count higher than 500,000 micro-organisms per millimetre raw milk and somatic cell count higher than 500,000 cells per millimetre raw milk; 
Medium quality: germ count between 400,000 and 500,000 per millimetre raw milk and somatic cell count between 400,000 and 500,000 per millimetre raw milk; High 
quality: germ count between 100,000 and 300,000 per millimetre raw milk and somatic cell count below 400,000 cells per millimetre raw milk; EU quality: germ count 
less than 100,000 micro-organisms per millimetre raw milk and somatic cell count below 400,000 cells per millimetre raw milk. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy processing company survey sample 
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Table 6: Farm households in the survey with at least one farm assistance programs according to farm size*, 2003-2009 
    Credit Input 
Bank loan guarantee 
or recommendation 
Extension aid  or 
veterinary services 
    # Share # Share # Share # Share  
2003 1 to 2 cows 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
3 to 5 cows 1 1% 2 3% 0 0% 0 0% 
 
6 to 9 cows 2 8% 0 0% 0 0% 3 13% 
 
10 or more cows 4 21% 5 26% 1 5% 4 21% 
  Total 7 2% 7 2% 1 0% 7 2% 
2009 1 to 2 cows 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 2 4% 
 
3 to 5 cows 1 4% 1 4% 0 0% 1 4% 
 
6 to 9 cows 4 33% 0 0% 0 0% 2 13% 
 
10 or more cows 10 50% 0 0% 2 10% 3 15% 
  Total 16 16% 1 1% 2 2% 8 8% 
* We distinguish between credit supply, input supply, bank loan guarantees and recommendations, and extension aid and veterinary 
programs. Credit supply programs include the provision of credit to make more general agricultural investments (e.g. equipment), dairy 
specific investments (e.g. buying of cooling tank) and cows.  Input supply programs include the provision of feed, seeds, fuel or other inputs 
for agricultural production. Extension aid and veterinary programs include agricultural extension services, veterinary assistance and 
assistance in applying for agricultural subsidies. 
Note that shares are calculated based on the total number of farm households delivering to a dairy company in each size group in 2003 and 
2009, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 7: Milk quality indicators being tested for farm households delivering to a dairy company, 2003-2009 
2003 
 Number of 
households 
Percentage of all 
farms delivering to a 
dairy company in 
2003 
Results 
Not 
informed 
High quality Medium 
quality 
Low quality 
Germ Count 5 2% 2 0 3 0 
Cell Count 5 2% 4 0 1 0 
Fat Content 229 77% 48 116 57 8 
Solids non-fat 157 53% 68 47 36 6 
Density 173 58% 82 55 32 4 
Temperature 15 5% 8 3 4 0 
 
2009 
 Number of 
households 
Percentage of all 
farms delivering to a 
dairy company in 
2009 
Results 
Not 
informed 
High quality Medium 
quality 
Low quality 
Germ Count 75 74% 38 11 25 1 
Cell Count 69 68% 36 11 21 1 
Fat Content 82 80% 35 30 15 2 
Solids non-fat 67 66% 45 11 9 2 
Density 75 74% 48 13 11 3 
Temperature 71 70% 41 21 9 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 8: Main reason of households to stop milk deliveries to a dairy company and milk production in the period 2003-2009 
 Households that 
stopped milk deliveries 
to a dairy company in 
the period 2003-2009 
of which 
 
Number of 
households 
Percentage households that 
stopped producing 
milk 
households that still 
produce milk for 
home consumption 
or direct sales 
We have health problems/ we are too old to 
keep cows and produce milk on a commercial 
basis. 
79 64% 71 8 
Other agricultural productions are more 
profitable/ milk prices are too low 
24 19% 21 3 
We found other (non-farm) employment 17 14% 15 2 
The MCP in the village closed down 3 2% 1 2 
Milk quality is low and we are not able to 
make the necessary investments to upgrade 
the quality of the milk  
1 1% 1 0 
Total 124 100% 109 15 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 9: Main occupation of the household heads that stopped delivering to a dairy company in the period 2003-2009 
(a) All households 
 Number of households 
that stopped delivering 
to a dairy company  in 
the period 2003-2009 
Of which 
households that 
stopped producing 
milk 
households that still 
produce milk for home 
consumption or direct 
sales 
Farmer 10 7 3 
Employee in a private or state enterprise 23 19 4 
Pensioners/ invalids 86 78 8 
Unemployed 5 5 0 
Total 124 109 15 
 
(b) Households that indicated low profitability as the main reason to stop delivering milk to a dairy company 
 Number of households 
that stopped delivering 
to a dairy company  in 
the period 2003-2009 
Of which 
households that 
stopped producing 
milk 
households that still 
produce milk for home 
consumption or direct 
sales 
Farmer 3 1 2 
Employee in a private or state enterprise 7 7 0 
Pensioners/ invalids 11 10 1 
Unemployed 3 3 0 
Total 24 21 3 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 10:  Description of the variables in the econometric analysis, 2003-2009 
Variable name Variable description All HHs 
interviewed in 
2009 
HHs that 
deliver to a 
dairy 
company in 
2009 
HHs that 
stopped 
delivering to a 
dairy company 
in 2003-2009 
HHs that were 
not re-
interviewed in 
2009 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Outcome variables       
SURVIVAL Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
household is delivering milk to a dairy company in 2009 
and zero otherwise 
0.45 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GROWTH Difference of the natural logarithm of the number of dairy 
cows that a household owned in 2009 and the natural 
logarithm of the number of dairy cows that a household 
owned in 2003, divided by the number of years between 
the two survey rounds (i.e. six years). 
- - 0.07 0.90 - - - - 
       
Dairy production and farm characteristics       
QUALITY_INDEX Quality index based on indicators that affect the quality of 
the milk produced such farm structure and equipment, 
milk deliveries and price; and animal management. 
0.01 0.92 0.23 1.20 -0.21 0.53 0.03 0.90 
FDI Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household 
delivered milk to foreign dairy company in 2003 and zero 
otherwise 
0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 
COWS2003 Natural logarithm of the number of dairy cows in 2003 0.91 0.82 1.24 0.87 0.64 0.67 0.79 0.71 
COWS2003SQ Squared natural logarithm of the number of dairy cows in 
2003 
1.50 2.39 2.29 3.05 0.85 1.35 1.12 1.55 
COWS2003CU Cubic natural logarithm of the number of dairy cows in 
2003 
3.14 7.78 5.31 10.69 1.36 3.14 1.89 3.70 
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Table 10:  Description of the variables in the econometric analysis, 2003-2009 (continued) 
Variable name Variable description All HHs 
interviewed in 
2009 
HHs that 
deliver to a 
dairy 
company in 
2009 
HHs that 
stopped 
delivering to a 
dairy company 
in 2003-2009 
HHs that 
were not re-
interviewed 
in 2009 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Dairy production and farm characteristics (continued)       
FARMAGE Natural logarithm of the number of years that the 
household is involved in dairy farming in 2003 (years +1) 
2.53 0.56 2.60 0.59 2.47 0.52 2.43 0.72 
YIELD Average daily milk yield in 2003 (litre per cow) 11.5 3.51 11.54 3.46 11.45 3.58 10.71 3.43 
LANDOWNED Size of agricultural land owned by the household (ha) 3.54 4.32 3.02 4.29 3.96 4.31 3.61 3.62 
       
Household characteristics       
OFFFARM Number of household members working off-farm in 2003  0.58 0.90 0.43 0.78 0.70 0.98 0.51 0.70 
PENSION Number of pensioners in the household in 2003 1.31 0.89 1.14 0.89 1.46 0.87 1.29 0.80 
ADULTS Number of adults in the household (older than 15) in 2003 3.00 1.21 3.14 1.24 2.90 1.18 2.77 1.17 
EDU Years of education of the household head in 2003 9.64 2.45 9.73 2.47 9.58 2.45 9.43 3.30 
CHANGEHH Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household 
head changed in the period 2003-2009 
0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.33 - - 
          
Variables included in the robustness check       
BELOWSTANDARD Variable that measures the number of incidents during 
which the household delivered milk to the dairy company 
below the minimum standard in 2003 
0.14 0.56 0.13 0.48 0.10 0.31 0.21 0.70 
PREMIUM Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household 
received in 2003 a milk subsidy from the state or a quality 
premium on top of the milk price from the dairy company 
for producing high quality milk and zero otherwise 
0.08 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.37 
MILKPRICE Average milk price that the household received in 2003 0.28 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.28 0.03 0.28 0.03 
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Table 10:  Description of the variables in the econometric analysis, 2003-2009 (continued) 
Variable name Variable description All HHs 
interviewed in 
2009 
HHs that 
deliver to a 
dairy company 
in 2009 
HHs that 
stopped 
delivering to a 
dairy 
company in 
2003-2009 
HHs that were 
not re-
interviewed in 
2009 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Variables included in the robustness check (continued)       
DIRECT Dummy variable that takes a value of one if milk is 
collected directly at the farm in 2003 and zero otherwise. 
0.11 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.35 
PROGRAM Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the household 
received at least one assistance program from the dairy 
company and zero otherwise. 
0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17 
GROWTH_MP Difference of the natural logarithm of the milk production 
(in litres) in 2009 and the natural logarithm of the milk 
production (in litres) in 2003, divided by the number of 
years between the two rounds of the survey (i.e. six 
years). 
0.08 1.23 0.08 1.23 - - - - 
MP2003 Natural logarithm of the milk production (in litres) in 
2003 
9.38 1.00 9.73 1.07 9.09 0.82 9.16 0.93 
MP2003SQ Squared natural logarithm of the milk production (in 
litres) in 2003 
89.07 19.17 95.85 21.23 83.35 15.11 84.79 17.28 
MP2003CU Cubic natural logarithm of the milk production (in litres) 
in 2003 
854.76 281.66 955.22 321.40 770.20 209.98 792.61 243.51 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 11: Variables included in the quality index  
Farm structure and equipment indicators 
Stable for the cows Categorical variable: 0=No stable; 1=Free 
stable; 2=Tie stable 
Milking machine Dichotomous variable  
Cooling tank  Dichotomous variable 
Cool storage for milk Dichotomous variable 
Milk aggregates Categorical variable:0= Plastic; 1= 
Steel/aluminium; 2= Bulk cooler 
Manure removal Dichotomous variable 
Feed storage Dichotomous variable 
Milk deliveries and price indicators  
Distance to the MCP Continuous variable: 0 when the milk is 
collected at the farm, otherwise expressed 
in kilometres 
Frequency of deliveries to MCP or milk 
collection at the farm 
Categorical variable: 0= Less than once per 
day; 1= Once per day; 2= Two times per 
day 
Incidents of non-standard milk 
deliveries 
Continuous variable  
Quality premium Dichotomous variable 
Milk price Continuous variable  
Laboratory test Dichotomous variable 
Assistance program from dairy Dichotomous variable 
Animal management indicators  
Average age of the cows Continuous variable ranging between 1 
and 10 years 
Specialised milk producing breed Dichotomous variable 
Frequency of veterinary visits  Categorical variable: 0= No visits; 1= 
Regular visits, but less than once per 
month; 2= At least once per month 
Use of vaccines Categorical variable: 0= No vaccines; 1= 
Only few vaccines; 2= All vaccines 
Type of fodder Categorical variable: 0= Only grazing; 1= 
Silage; 2= Corn or Concentrated feed 
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Table 12: Heckman regression results of dairy farm survival and growth, 2003-2009 
 Model A Model B 
 Survival Growth Survival Growth 
 Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| 
Dairy company and farm characteristics 
QUALITY_INDEX 0.130 0.73 0.220 2.10** 0.173 1.14 0.373 2.84*** 
FDI -0.241 -0.54 0.363 1.29 -0.412 -1.01 0.530 1.35 
FDI*COWS2003 -0.015 -0.04 -0.073 -0.39 -0.106 -0.34 -0.228 -1.14 
         
COWS2003 0.672 3.03*** -1.286 -2.39** 0.610 3.20*** -1.435 -2.61*** 
COWS2003SQ - - 0.781 2.21** - - 0.937 2.35** 
COWS2003CU - - -0.150 -1.97** - - -0.198 -2.20** 
FARMAGE 0.403 2.07** 0.060 0.28 0.383 2.22** 0.014 0.06 
YIELD -0.037 -1.15 0.007 0.30 -0.032 -1.12 -0.013 -0.50 
LANDOWNED -0.116 -2.95*** -0.017 -0.30 -0.122 -3.40*** -0.021 -0.29 
         
Household characteristics         
OFFFARM -0.407 -2.83*** -0.018 -0.09 -0.338 -2.59*** -0.009 -0.04 
PENSION -0.328 -2.34** -0.058 -0.40 -0.273 -2.14** -0.130 -0.83 
ADULTS 0.197 1.83* 0.212 2. 38** 0.178 1.83 0.204 1.89* 
EDU 0.051 1.08 0.050 1.30 0.054 1.21 0.065 1.41 
CHANGEHH -0.720 -1.86* 0.232 0.59 -0.637 -1.82* 0.117 0.26 
         
Constant -1.244 -1.36 -0.166 -0. 13 -0.944 -1.34 0.051 0.03 
         
Village fixed effects Yes No 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Wald  121.96 (0.00) 60.39 (0.00) 
Lambda -0.30 (-0.39) -0.32 (-0.34) 
Observations 222 222 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  We used the Heckman’s (1979) two-step efficient estimator of the model. The value reported 
between brackets for Wald  and Lambda is the p-value.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample  
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Table 13: Robustness checks: Heckman regression results of dairy farm survival and growth (Models C, D and E), 2003-2009  
 Model C Model D Model E 
 Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth 
 Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| 
Dairy company and farm characteristics 
QUALITY_INDEX 0.104 0.74 0.246 2.24** 0.253 1.28 0.220 1.98** -0.088 -0.51 0.271 2.93*** 
FDI -0.334 -0.85 0.319 1.04 -0.233 -0.51 0.390 1.44 -0.351 -0.79 0.406 1.43 
FDI*COWS2003 0.221 0.72 -0.077 -0.41 -0.043 -0.11 -0.129 -0.72 -0.182 -0.51 -0.082 -0.47 
             
COWS2003 0.476 2.58*** -1.106 -1.91* 0.656 2.85*** -1.118 -2.17** 0.549 3.99*** -1.299 -2.59*** 
COWS2003SQ - - 0.797 2.27** - - 0.767 2.21** - - 0.767 2.33** 
COWS2003CU - - -0.161 -2.15** - - -0.155 -2.07** - - -0.150 -2.18** 
FARMAGE 0.332 2.18** 0.172 0.65 0.411 2.08** 0.104 0.53 0.319 2.10** 0.167 1.41 
YIELD -0.010 -0.37 0.002 0.12 -0.029 -0.89 0.003 0.14 -0.048 -1.52 0.000 0.01 
LANDOWNED -0.113 -3.16*** -0.050 -0.61 -0.146 -3.17*** -0.003 -0.04 -0.074 -2.28** -0.019 -0.65 
             
Household characteristics         
OFFFARM -0.346 -2.75*** -0.133 -0.53 -0.370 2.50** -0.074 -0.44 -0.338 -2.41** -0.072 -0.57 
PENSION -0.240 -1.99** -0.132 -0.77 -0.309 -2.14** -0.124 -0.97 -0.287 -2.15** -0.143 -1.32 
ADULTS 0.124 1.46 0.166 1.76* 0.192 1.74* 0.161 1.78* 0.265 2.47** 0.122 1.77* 
EDU 0.054 1.40 0.066 1.38 0.056 1.14 0.060 1.55 0.067 1.54 0.052 1.60 
CHANGEHH -0.384 -1.05 0.067 0.18 -0.523 -1.29 0.136 0.44 -0.513 -1.42 0.116 0.43 
             
Constant -1.449 -1.96** -1.497 -0.73 -1.361 -1.46 -1.172 -0.88 -0.837 -0.94 -0.693 -0.74 
             
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes          
Wald 124.92 (0.00) 134.44 (0.00) 174.87 (0.00)          
Lambda 0.21 (0.19) -0.15 (-0.17) -0.28 (-0.48)          
Observations 292 214 222 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We used the Heckman’s (1979) two-step efficient estimator of the model. The value reported 
between brackets for Wald  and Lambda is the p-value. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 14: Robustness checks: Heckman regression results of dairy farm survival and growth (Models F, G and H), 2003-2009  
 Model F Model G Model H 
 Survival Growth Survival Growth Survival Growth 
 Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| Coeff. |z-value| 
Dairy company and farm characteristics 
QUALITY_INDEX 0.143 0.81 0.340 3.04*** - - - - - - - - 
FDI 1.018 0.34 2.318 1.17 -0.516 -1.23 0.445 1.05 -0.263 -0.57 0.573 1.07 
FDI*COWS2003 - - - - -0.103 -0.32 -0.200 -0.93 0.003 -0.30 -0.291 -1.55 
FDI*MP2003 -0.135 -0.44 -0.211 -1.03 - - - - - - - - 
             
BELOWSTANDARD - - - - 0.055 0.27 0.016 0.12 -0.024 -0.10 0.159 1.03 
PREMIUM - - - - 0.010 0.03 0.179 0.57 0.144 0.35 0.449 1.74 
MILKPRICE - - - - 5.631 1.57 0.070 0.02 5.620 1.56 1.269 0.46 
             
MODERN - - - - 0.459 1.11 0.738 2.01** - - - - 
PROGRAM - - - - - - - - -0.014 -0.02 1.028 3.62*** 
             
COWS2003 - - - - 0.595 3.11*** -1.212 -2.09** 0.719 3.28 -1.075 -2.22** 
COWS2003SQ - - - - - - 0.790 1.85* - - 0.808 2.38** 
COWS2003CU - - - - - - -0.152 -1.73* - - -0.162 -2.27** 
             
MP2003 0.612 3.02*** -43.628 -2.98*** - - - - - - - - 
MP2003SQ - - 4.329 2.89*** - - - - - - - - 
MP2003CU - - -0.143 -2.81*** - - - - - - - - 
             
FARMAGE 0.379 1.95* 0.210 0.89 0.390 2.23** 0.083 0.31 0.391 1.96** 0.088 0.49 
YIELD -0.081 -1.26 -0.016 -0.41 -0.036 -1.24 -0.020 -0.72 -0.041 -1.24 -0.002 -0.10 
LANDOWNED -0.109 -2.72*** -0.030 -0.50 -0.127 -3.42*** -0.041 -0.59 -0.123 -3.07*** -0.052 -1.19 
             
Household characteristics         
OFFFARM -0.427 -2.99*** -0.110 -0.47 -0.381 2.84*** -0.108 -0.48 -0.476 -3.18*** -0.079 -0.42 
PENSION -0.338 -2.42** -0.123 -1.37 -0.299 -2.28** -0.198 -1.18 -0.350 -2.46** -0.086 -0.66 
ADULTS 0.210 1.96* 0.197 1.87* 0.184 1.86* 0.235 2.08** 0.234 2.12** 0.162 1.65* 
EDU 0.053 1.11 0.079 1.82* 0.063 1.38 0.080 1.72* 0.068 1.38 0.048 1.34 
CHANGEHH -0.683 -1.73* 0.152 0.35 -0.612 -1.75* 0.033 0.07 -0.710 -1.80* -0.015 -0.04 
             
Constant -1.449 -1.96** 144.24 3.06*** -2.498 -2.08** -0.545 -0.27 -4.030 -2.47** -1.590 -0.87 
             
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes          
Wald 132.24 (0.00) 96.88 (0.00) 155.45 (0.00)          
Rho 0.11 (0.13) 0.69 (0.91) 0.12 (0.19)          
Observations 222 222 222 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We used the Heckman’s (1979) two-step efficient estimator of the model. The value reported 
between brackets for Wald  and Lambda is the p-value. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Table 15: Correlation matrix 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
 
 BELOWSTANDARD PREMIUM  MILKPRICE QUALITY_INDEX DIRECT PROGRAM FDI 
BELOWSTANDARD 1.0       
PREMIUM 0.015 1.0      
MILKPRICE -0.043 0.073 1.0     
QUALITY_INDEX -0.107 0.080 0.313 1.0    
DIRECT -0.114 0.039 0.248 0.905 1.0   
PROGRAM -0.093 0.024 0.205 0.716 0.555 1.0  
FDI 0.086 0.151 0.078 -0.090 -0.098 -0.074 1.0 
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Figure 1: Number of milk collection points (MCPs) in the villages where 
households have been surveyed, 2003-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the farm size distribution of milk producing households in 
our Bulgarian household sample, 2003-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the dairy household survey sample 
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CHAPTER 4.  CAPITALISATION OF DIRECT PAYMENTS IN LAND RENTS:  
EVIDENCE FROM NEW EU MEMBER STATES 
 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
An increase of land sales and rental prices due to agricultural subsidies is 
important for two reasons. First, a general purpose of agricultural subsidies is to 
increase farmers’ incomes. However, the positive income effects can be eroded if 
subsidies are capitalised in land sales and rental prices. Second, an increase in land sales 
and rental prices affects land mobility and hence farm restructuring. New farmers face a 
higher initial investment cost and existing farmers face a higher cost of expansion. 
Consequently, the transfer of land from less to more efficient users is reduced which has 
a negative impact on structural adjustments in the agricultural sector.  
The influence of agricultural subsidies on land prices is currently also very 
relevant from a policy perspective in the European Union (EU). The 2013 CAP reform 
will change both the implementation of agricultural subsidies and their budget. An 
                                                        
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Johan Swinnen and Liesbet Vranken (see Van Herck et al. 
2013). 
Chapter 4 - Capitalisation of Direct Payments in Land Rents 
110 
 
important aspect of the current reform is how the change in the implementation will 
affect the capitalisation of direct payments (DPs) in land prices (Swinnen et al., 2013). 
Insights on the capitalisation of DPs provide interesting information for EU policy 
makers and national authorities to make their choices on the policy implementation. 
Several studies already analysed the impact of subsidies on land sales and rental 
prices (Floyd, 1965; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; Hennessy 1998; Lence and 
Mishra, 2003; Guyomard et al., 2004; Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Ciaian and Swinnen, 
2006, 2009; Latruffe and Mouël, 2009; Kirwan, 2009; Kirwan and Roberts, 2010; Kropp 
and Peckham, 2012). However, the majority of the empirical studies have dealt with the 
land market in North America (the United States (US) and Canada).2 Only recently a 
number of studies have empirically analysed the impact of DPs on land rents in the EU 
(Patton et al., 2008; Ciaian et al., 2010a; Breustedt and Habermann, 2011; Ciaian and 
Kancs, 2012; Kilian et al., 2012; Latruffe et al., 2013). Almost all of these studies have 
focused on the EU-15 (e.g. Patton et al., 2008; Ciaian et al., 2010a; Kilian et al., 2012; 
Latruffe et al., 2013).  
To our knowledge there is only one study that analyses the impact of DPs in the 
EU New Member States (EU-NMS).3 In particular, Ciaian and Kancs (2012) investigate 
the impact of the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) in selected EU-NMS based on 
farm-level panel data for the period 2004-2005. Our analysis complements this study in 
three ways.   
                                                        
2 See e.g.  Barnard et al. (1997); Goodwin et al. (2003); Lence and Mishra (2003); Goodwin et al. (2005); 
Kirwan (2009); Kirwan and Roberts (2010); Goodwin et al. (2011); Hendricks et al. (2012); Kropp and 
Peckham (2012); Vyn et al. (2012). 
3 In 2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and 
Malta joined the EU, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
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First, the use of farm-level data by Ciaian and Kancs (2012) has obvious 
advantages, as one can control for land heterogeneity, heterogeneity of farm access to 
subsidies, farm-specific transaction costs, and specific farm-level factors affecting local 
demand and supply. However, it has the disadvantage that there is only limited 
variation in the level of agricultural subsidies across farms within a country. This is 
particularly important for the EU-NMS where currently DPs consist mainly of Single 
Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) payments, which are in principle uniformly distributed 
over all agricultural land in a country (applies for all EU-NMS except for Slovenia, 
Cyprus and Malta). As a result, all farmers in one country are expected to receive an 
equal subsidy per hectare such that there is hardly any differentiation of the per hectare 
subsidy level across farms within a country. However, there is considerable variation in 
the average subsidy level between countries. In addition, in a given region, all land rents 
(including rents paid by farmers who did not receive subsidies) are affected by the 
subsidy level. Hence, there is typically less variation in the capitalisation level within 
regions and countries, while there is more differentiation in the capitalisation level 
across countries. Therefore, this study uses country-level data to exploit the variation in 
land price adjustments and subsidy levels across different regional markets, while 
problems related to the lack of variation across farms can be avoided.4 
Second, there is even more variation in DPs over time. We use data from 1994 to 
2009 (compared to only two years by Ciaian and Kancs (2012)). Moreover, by covering 
                                                        
4 In general, one can assume that land markets in different countries are segmented regionally due to 
transportation costs, land immobility, and different country-level land market regulations. Therefore, 
land price responsiveness to subsidies will differ across countries. However, using country-level data 
addresses regional land market segmentation only partially because in the long run farms may relocate if 
there are persistent differences in land prices across countries. 
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the 1994-2009 period, we include both the post-accession period and the pre-accession 
period. 
Third, our analysis extends the Ciaian and Kancs (2012) analysis by focusing on 
the interaction between credit and land market imperfections. Ciaian and Swinnen 
(2006, 2009) have shown theoretically that credit and land market imperfections, 
which are particularly important in the EU-NMS, may affect capitalisation of agricultural 
subsidies into land prices. However, so far, nobody has formally empirically studied 
these interactions. This analysis is the first to do so.  
Similar to Patton et al. (2008); Ciaian and Kancs (2012); Kilian et al. (2012); and 
Michalek et al. (2014), this study uses data on land rental prices (and not on land sales 
prices). In the EU-NMS, investigating the effect of agricultural subsidies on land rents is 
more relevant than investigating the impact on land sales prices for at least three 
reasons. First, rental rates are less affected by urban and other non-agricultural 
pressures (Whitaker, 2006). Second, in the EU-NMS, the rental market is particularly 
important to ensure efficiency enhancing land transfers because there are still 
substantial transaction costs associated with land sales transfers. These costs include 
the usual costs associated with land transactions, such as notary fees, taxes, and 
administrative charges as well as costs related to enforcing property rights, 
withdrawing land from the former collective and state farms, and obtaining the 
necessary official documents for transferring land through sales (Swinnen and Vranken, 
2009, 2010). This is reflected in a considerably higher number of land rental 
transactions than sales transactions (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009). Finally, rental rates 
are observed in the market while land sales prices are often stated by the owner – 
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because of the limited number of sales transactions – and are therefore subjective 
(Whitaker, 2006). 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly 
discuss the development and functioning of rental land markets in the EU-NMS. We give 
a short overview of the agricultural policy and in particular of the use of DPs in the EU-
NMS. Section 3 reviews briefly the existing literature on the impact of agricultural policy 
measures on land rents. In section 4, we discuss the empirical model used to test the 
impact of DPs on land rents in the presence of land and credit market imperfections. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Finally, we conclude in section 6.  
 
2 RENTAL MARKETS AND DPS IN EU-NMS 
In this section we briefly review the key characteristics of rural land markets in 
the EU-NMS. In addition, we discuss agricultural policies, and in particular the subsidy 
schemes, implemented in the EU-NMS before and after EU accession.  
 
2.1 Rental land markets in EU-NMS 
Similar to the US and several EU-15 countries, a large amount of the land 
transactions in the EU-NMS take place through the rental market. However, there are 
large variations among countries (Table 1). In Slovakia and the Czech Republic, more 
than 80 percent of the cultivated area is rented in 2007. In Bulgaria, land renting is also 
very prominent (79 percent of total land). In Hungary, Estonia, and Lithuania, between 
48 percent and 56 percent of the cultivated area is rented, while in Latvia, Poland, and 
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Romania, considerably less land is exchanged through rental (respectively 27 percent, 
20 percent, and 17 percent).  
In addition, there are also striking differences in farm structure. For example, in 
the Czech and Slovak Republic 70 percent of the total agricultural land area or more is 
used by corporate farms in 2007. Also in Hungary, corporate farms still use around half 
of all land. In contrast, there are almost no corporate farms in countries such as Poland, 
Latvia, and Lithuania where more than 85 percent of the land is used by family farms.   
Differences in land market developments and farm structures result from the 
privatisation and land reform choices as well as from differences in technology and the 
role of agriculture in the economy. One can actually define different “patterns of land 
market development” (Macours and Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen and Vranken, 2007).  
One pattern (A) is that of capital intensive agricultural economies where land 
controlled by state and collective farms under the Communist regime was restituted to 
former owners and where large-scale corporate farms continue to dominate. This 
dominance can be attributed to the land reform process that was implemented at the 
start of transition. Land was restituted to the former owners out of which the majority 
are not (or no longer) active in agriculture. They may be retired or living in urban areas 
and are more likely to rent it out, in particular to large-scale corporate farms and this 
for several reasons. First, because of limited information about the sales price and the 
expected increase in land prices upon EU accession, most of these new landowners 
were unwilling to sell their newly acquired assets and preferred to rent them out 
instead. Second, since identifying potential tenants involves search and negotiation 
costs, the easiest way for the new landowners was to rent out their land to the 
corporate farms, which were the historical users of the land (Mathijs and Swinnen, 
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1998). Third, the corporate management was closely involved in the land reform 
process and their search and negotiation costs to identify and contract with those new 
owners were significantly lower than the costs faced by newly emerging structures 
(particularly family farms and de novo companies). In combination, these factors 
resulted in a higher demand for rented land by corporate farms than by family farms 
and an increased supply of rented land to corporate farms than to family farms. As a 
result, restitution has contributed to a consolidation of the large-scale farming 
structures (collective and state farms in the past, now corporate farms) through the 
land rental market. In these systems, renting is mostly from households, who are no 
longer active in agriculture, to large-scale corporate farms. These corporate farms 
continue to use the land on which they had been operating under the Communist 
regime, but now rent it from the new owners.  This dominance of large farming 
structures in the land market increases their bargaining power with the owners when 
negotiating the terms of the rental contract so that they typically pay lower rental prices 
than family farms (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009). These farming companies, with formal 
administrations and official book-keeping, typically use written rental contracts and 
prefer longer term contracts (5-10 years) as they provide them stability in their 
operations – and possibly lock the owners into lower payment contracts, as payments 
were generally low at the start of transition. Examples of this pattern are Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and a large part of Hungary.  
A very different pattern (B) is that of more labour-intensive agricultural 
economies where land was either still owned by small farmers or where land was (at 
least partly) distributed in kind to rural households and where small scale family 
(household) farms dominate. In these countries, there is relatively little land renting, 
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mostly household to household. Initially, this land renting was short-term and informal 
renting. However, renting has become more formal since EU accession because farmers 
can only receive EU subsidies for land on which they have formal rental contracts. The 
combination of the land property rights distribution and labour-intensive technology 
caused the domination of small household farms who use much of the land. As a 
consequence, rural households themselves generally use most of the land they own. 
Examples of this pattern are Poland, Romania, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Land prices also varied strongly among EU-NMS with rental prices being almost 
ten times higher in Poland than in Latvia. In the period 2000-2008, a strong and 
persistent increase in land rental prices is observed in all EU-NMS, and the increase was 
especially strong around the period of EU accession. For example, if one compares 
rental prices from just before (2003) to just after accession (2006), real land rental 
prices grew by more than 20 percent in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia (Figure 1). This large increase in land rents largely coincides with an 
increase in DPs in the same period (Figure 2).  
 
2.2 Agricultural subsidies in the EU-NMS 
Before EU accession, agricultural subsidies in the EU-NMS consisted of a wide 
variety of DPs. For example, in Poland there were output payments for crop production 
such as bread cereals (payment/tonne), and in the Czech Republic and Slovakia there 
were payments for livestock production such as for sheep, beef, or milk (payment per 
head or per litre). In addition, a significant share of the DPs consisted of area payments, 
which are payments based on the cultivated area (payment/ha); e.g. for flax in the Czech 
Republic or for arable land in Slovakia.  
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When the Eastern New Member Countries joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, they 
introduced a system of DPs (with exception of Slovenia) called the Single Area Payment 
Scheme (SAPS).5 The SAPS is a payment per hectare (independent of the production 
activities on the land), and farms are eligible for SAPS for all area they cultivate in a 
given year. Further, the SAPS value per hectare is uniform across all farms in a country. 
However, there are substantial differences in the level of SAPS per hectare between 
countries. These variations stem from the fact that the SAPS amount per hectare is 
calculated by dividing the national financial “envelope” by the national agricultural area. 
The EU rules for the determination of the national financial envelope imply that higher 
land productivity results in higher hectare payments, as historical yield levels (2000-
2002) were factored into the determination of the financial envelope. There was a large 
variety in the reference yield of the different EU-NMS, which results in a disparity in 
SAPS payments per hectare across the EU-NMS.  
The EU-NMS were allowed to supplement the SAPS payments by national “top-up” 
payments (or Complementary National DPs [CNDPs]). These “top-up” payments can be 
implemented in a similar way as SAPS, namely as a fixed payment per ha, such as for 
example in Slovakia for arable crops. However, the EU-NMS can also decide to couple 
the support to a specific production and provide payments per ha or per animal head, 
such as for example the per-hectare payment for hops in Slovakia or the suckler cow 
premium in Hungary.  
In all EU-NMS countries, the SAPS payments represent the largest share of the 
total amount of DPs that farmers receive. In 2009, SAPS represented 95 percent, 92 
                                                        
5 Originally, SAPS was established for a period of up to five years after the accession. Following the 2008 
"Health Check" of the CAP reform, the validity of SAPS was extended until the end of 2013. 
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percent, 87 percent, 77 percent, 66 percent, and 52 percent of all DPs in Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Latvia respectively. Furthermore, DPs 
increased strongly in the EU-NMS in the period 2000-2010, and the increase was 
particularly strong around EU accession (Figure 2). Hence, analysing the effect of SAPS 
in the EU-NMS is particularly interesting because one can consider the SAPS 
introduction as a quasi-natural experiment, as EU accession created a “subsidy shock”.  
 
3 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Given the focus of this study on land market effects of DPs, a set of recent 
theoretical studies on the efficiency and income distributional impacts of DPs in the EU 
are particularly important (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006, 2009; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008; 
Kilian et al., 2012; Michalek et al., 2014). These studies yield several insights regarding 
the impact of DPs on land prices.  
First, there is an extensive literature that analyses the impact of the type of 
support on capitalisation of agricultural subsidies in land rents. Theoretical findings by 
Ciaian et al. (2010) show a difference in the capitalisation rate of output and area 
payments. In cases where land is the most inelastic production factor, both output and 
area payments are expected to be capitalised in land rents, and the price of land will 
increase relative to the price of the other factors. Moreover, in cases where the land 
supply elasticity is equal to zero (or land supply is fixed) area payments will be fully 
capitalised in land rents. Output payments are only fully capitalised in land rents if, 
additional to zero land supply elasticity, either the supply of non-land inputs is perfectly 
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elastic or factor proportions are fixed.6 In empirical studies, land supply elasticities are 
usually found to be rather low, mostly owing to natural constraints.7  
Second, capitalisation of DPs in land prices is higher when the substitution 
between inputs in the production process is more elastic (i.e. when it is easy to use land 
instead of other inputs).8 Especially in the case of area payments, farms have an 
incentive to substitute other inputs for land, which increases land demand and leads to 
the capitalisation of subsidies into land rents.  
Third, theoretical studies find that capitalisation of DPs in land prices is higher 
when DPs reduce credit constraints (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Many farms, in 
particular in the poorer rural regions of the EU-NMS, face credit market constraints 
(Petrick, 2004). Access to cash payments such as DPs may reduce these credit market 
constraints, either directly or indirectly through easier access to bank loans. This will 
increase capitalisation of DPs because it increases the demand for land.  
Finally, theoretical models predict that capitalisation of DPs in land prices is lower 
when farms have strong bargaining power vis-à-vis landowners and there is unequal 
access to subsidies (e.g. when small farms have problems in fulfilling the subsidy 
requirements). There is significant variation within the EU in terms of the size of farms 
                                                        
6 In addition to the type of subsidy, the capitalisation of subsidies also depends upon the exact policy 
implementation. If subsidies are only implemented for a limited period of time, they may not be 
capitalized in the land value. Also the criteria determining the eligibility to receive the future stream of 
policy transfers may limit the capitalisation of subsidies (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006, 2009; Kilian and 
Salhofer, 2008). For example, area payments may be subjected to cross-compliance, set-aside, greening, 
or other requirements, which may reduce the capitalisation rate as farmers have to incur certain costs in 
order to meet the eligibility criteria. 
7 For example, based on an extensive literature review, Salhofer (2001) concludes that a plausible range 
of land supply elasticity for the EU is between 0.1 and 0.4. Similarly, Abler (2001) finds a plausible range 
between 0.2 and 0.6 for the US, Canada, and Mexico. 
8 Based on 32 studies, Salhofer (2001) reports average elasticities of substitution between land and 
labour of 0.5, between land and capital of 0.2, and between land and variable inputs of 1.4 for Europe. 
Similar values are reported in Abler (2001) for the US and Canada. 
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and the amount of land that a typical landowner has. In several EU-NMS (such as 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic) very large farms rent land from families with small 
and fragmented land plots. Obviously, if large corporate farms dominate the land rental 
markets, they typically use their market power to bargain on land rents. Corporate 
farms typically pay lower rental prices than family farms, are more likely to pay rents in 
kind than family farms (who pay cash), have rental contracts of longer duration (locking 
in land), and often use their political powers/relationships to influence policies that 
shift effective land property rights in their favor (Swinnen et al., 2006). Therefore, 
capitalisation of subsidies in land rents is expected to be inversely related with the 
share of land used by corporate farms when there is unequal access to the subsidies.  
Various empirical studies analysed the capitalisation rate of agricultural policy 
measures in land prices (Patton et al., 2008; Breustedt and Habermann, 2011; Ciaian et 
al., 2011; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; Kilian et al., 2012). However, so far there is no 
empirical evidence for EU land markets regarding the two theoretical predictions that 
there is stronger capitalisation of DPs in more credit-constrained markets, and that 
capitalisation of DPs is lower in countries where more land is used by corporate farms, 
which can be interpreted as a reflection of the strong bargaining position of these farms 
in the land market. Therefore this analysis does not only want to contribute insights on 
the capitalisation of DPs by using country-level data for EU-NMS, but it also provides – 
to our knowledge - the first empirical evidence on the interaction between 
capitalisation and credit constraints and on the interaction between capitalisation and 
transaction costs in agricultural land markets. 
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4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes six NMS: the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, and Latvia. We use annual data from 1997 to 2009 
for the Czech Republic, from 1994 to 2009 for Poland, from 2001 to 2007 for Slovakia, 
from 2001 to 2009 for Hungary, from 2000 to 2009 for Lithuania, and finally, from 2004 
to 2009 for Latvia. The begin and end years of the data series for the different countries 
vary due data availability. Overall, this results in an unbalanced panel data set with 61 
observations.  
 
4.1 Baseline model 
To econometrically quantify the effect of DPs on land rents, we start by estimating 
the following baseline model:  
𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (1) 
where the dependent variable 𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 represents the average deflated rental 
price of agricultural land in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Data on rental prices are obtained from 
national statistics.9 Data on the deflator used is obtained from Eurostat.  
The main variable of interest is the deflated average level of DPs per ha expressed 
in euros (𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡). Due to data limitations, we aggregated all DPs (output and area 
payments [including SAPS]) in one variable, although it is possible that the effect differs 
between different types of subsidies. Data on the level of 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  are obtained from OECD 
for the pre-accession period and are calculated as the sum of the OECD support 
                                                        
9 VUZE for Czech Republic; GUS, ANR, and Zagorski for Poland; VUEPP for Slovakia; the Central Statistical 
Office for Hungary; Lithuanian Institute of Agricultural Economics and the State Enterprise Centre of 
Agricultural Information and Rural Business for Lithuania; FADN for Latvia. 
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categories “Payments based on output” and “Payments based on area planted/ number 
of animals” divided by the total utilised agricultural area as obtained from Eurostat. 
After EU accession, 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  are calculated as the sum of SAPS payments and national “top 
up” payments based on national statistics,10 divided by the total utilised agricultural 
area as obtained from Eurostat. Given the theoretical evidence of the capitalisation of 
DPs, we expect a positive coefficient on the 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  variable. However, since we combine all 
DPs (output and area payments), which may have theoretically a different effect on 
capitalisation, the coefficient on 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  may be higher than in the case where we would 
only analyse output payments and lower than in the case where we would only analyse 
area payments. We will analyse the impact of the type of subsidy in section 4.3.4 of this 
chapter. 
Second, to capture the effect of market returns on land rents, we include the 
variable 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡, which is the deflated agricultural output value per hectare, 
expressed in euros and is based on data obtained from Eurostat. We expect a positive 
correlation between land rents and agricultural output value per hectare.  
Third, EU accession is expected to affect land markets directly by freeing them and 
integrating them into a single EU market. Indirectly, EU accession will also affect land 
markets and thus land prices, as it improved the functioning of other factor markets 
(including credit and technology) and stimulated foreign direct investments in the food 
industry and agribusiness, with spillover effects on farming (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
In order to control for these accession effects, we include a dummy variable 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡, 
which equals one from the year of accession (2004) onwards and zero otherwise. 
                                                        
10 Green Report (Ministry of Agriculture) for Czech Republic; ARiMR and ARR for Poland; Green Report 
(Ministry of Agriculture) for Slovakia; Payment Agency for Hungary; the Lithuanian Institute of Agrarian 
Economics for Lithuania; Rural Support Service for Latvia. 
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Finally, there might be some country-specific effects such as national land 
regulations that are largely time invariant and correlated with our explanatory time 
varying variables. In addition, DPs are based on regional productivity levels so that 
there might be an unobserved country-level effect. To control for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity, which may lead to an inconsistent estimate of the 
capitalisation rate, we estimate a country fixed effects model. The fixed effects (𝛿𝑖) 
capture all time-invariant heterogeneity between countries such as soil characteristics 
and environmental and climatological conditions as well as time-invariant differences in 
regulations, institutions, and productivity. Table 2 gives an overview of all variables 
used in the estimations. 
 
4.2 Endogeneity and robustness tests  
The estimation results corresponding to equation (1) might be biased due to 
potential endogeneity problems; therefore, additional regressions were run to test the 
robustness of the results.  
A first source of endogeneity may arise because of simultaneity bias which occurs 
if unobserved characteristics, such as for example productivity or production choices, 
simultaneously affect land rents and agricultural subsidies. Simultaneity bias is 
controlled for by running a fixed effects regression.11 By using such panel estimation 
                                                        
11 Note that there exists another potential strategy to deal with endogeneity in a panel dataset. Dynamic 
estimation models such as those proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) can be used. However, in general 
these estimation models are only appropriate in case a dataset has a large cross-sectional dimension and 
a small time dimension, which is clearly not the case for our dataset. Nevertheless, despite these concerns 
we have also estimated equation (1) using the methodology proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 
results are available upon request from the authors, and the magnitude and significance of the estimated 
model coefficients remain largely unchanged.   
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technique, time-invariant unobserved effects that affect both productivity and DPs, such 
as soil quality, are excluded. In addition, the simultaneity bias is controlled by including 
the variable 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡 which measures value per hectare and thus captures changes in 
agricultural productivity.12 Further, there may be simultaneity bias as changes in 
production choices simultaneously affect rents and DPs. Csaki and Jambor (2009) show 
that there is overall only limited variation across time within the selected EU-NMS and 
that differences in production choices mainly occur between countries. Hence, changes 
in production choices are captured by the country fixed effects.  
A second source of endogeneity may arise from not including farmers’ 
expectations about future policy changes in the model. In particular, uncertainty about 
the switch of the current SAPS into the Single Farm Payment (SFP), which was expected 
to occur in 2013, may affect the capitalisation rate (Ciaian and Kancs, 2012). Farmers 
anticipating this policy change may adjust their renting behaviour, and they may rent 
more land than they would do without prior knowledge of the future policy change 
because they may expect that the future SFP will be calculated based upon their current 
land use. As a result the changes in the rented area and rental rates may be affected by 
future subsidies, and without including information on the future subsidies in the 
                                                        
12 Multicollinearity concerns may arise when the variables 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  are included 
simultaneously in the regression model. Multicollinearity inflates the standard errors of the coefficients 
on the affected explanatory variables and introduces confoundedness into the model (Woolridge, 2002). 
There may be correlation between 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡  and 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  since particularly before EU accession, the 
majority of the DPs were based on regional productivity and farmers’ production choices (i.e. some 
agricultural products are more heavily subsidized than others). After EU accession DPs mainly consist of 
SAPS, which are based on historical yield levels, and hence are largely exogenous to the contemporaneous 
productivity levels such that after EU accession multicollinearity problems are less likely. In order to 
analyse how susceptible our coefficient on 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  is for multicollinearity problems, we perform three 
different analyses. We analyse whether there are large changes in the estimated coefficient on 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  when 
other variables are excluded from the model. Therefore, we run a restricted model (Model B) with only 
the variable 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  as explanatory variable. In addition, we perform two more formal tests for 
multicollinearity: an analysis of the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the condition number on the 
pooled data for the explanatory variables from the baseline model (Chen et al., 2003). 
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estimation model, the capitalisation rate may be biased. To address this source of bias, 
we run a third model (Model C) which is similar to Model A, but includes as a robustness 
check the expected level of subsidies in the post-2013 period for the years after EU 
accession (𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑆2013𝑖). 𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑆2013𝑖  is the level of expected level of SAPS payments after 
the CAP reforms in 2013. Data on the expected level of SAPS payments is obtained from 
Ciaian and Kancs (2012). Since only after EU accession, farmers may have speculated on 
a policy change from SAPS to SFP, the expected level of SAPS payments in 2013 is 
interacted with the accession dummy.13 Farmers’ expectations are expected to play a 
role in the rental decisions of farmers, as they may increase the area of agricultural land 
they rent in comparison to a situation where they have no prior knowledge on future 
policy changes. As a result, since EU accession, expectations on the future level of SAPS 
payments are expected to have a positive impact on rental prices.  
Finally, a last source of bias could come from general equilibrium effects. In a 
given region, land rents paid by all farms (including those which did not receive 
subsidies) are affected by subsidies such that subsidy capitalisation can be seen a result 
of competitive pressures among farms, where an equilibrium in the land market is 
reached by adjustments in land use (a farm specific effect) as well as adjustments in the 
land rental price (a more general effect). When using farm-level data, one would not be 
able to deal with the general equilibrium effect. However, by using country-level data, 
the non-variation of changes in land rents' response to subsidies across farms is 
eliminated whereas the variation across different regional markets is preserved.  
 
                                                        
13 When we estimate the model by a fixed-effects model estimation, SAPSi will be dropped, since this time 
invariant variable is multi-collinear with the fixed effect (δi). 
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4.3 Extensions of the baseline model 
As one might be interested why the theoretical capitalisation rate is different from 
the observed empirical capitalisation rates, less parsimonious models are estimated in 
which we control for market imperfections, the land tenure system, and substitution 
possibilities between production factors as well as the type of subsidy.14  
 
4.3.1 Market imperfections 
There might still be market distortions in the EU-NMS related to the transition 
process that started in 1989. In order to control for the progress in the reform process, 
we estimate a fourth model (Model D) which is similar to Model A, but includes the 
EBRD overall reform indicator as a control variable (𝐸𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡). This variable rates the 
progress of a country’s reforms in several areas.15 The expected effect of 𝐸𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 is 
uncertain a priori. We expect that in countries with better reforms in different sectors 
surrounding the agricultural sector, landowners feel more secure to rent out land (as 
for example contracts are more enforceable). As a result, the supply of land will be 
increased, which will temper land rents. On the other hand, improvements in other 
factor markets, such as the credit market, may result in a higher demand for land, which 
may result in a positive correlation between 𝐸𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 and land rents. 
                                                        
14 Note that we include the different control variables in different model specifications, and we do not 
include all control variables in one regression. This is not possible since the limited number of 
observations only allows us to include a limited number of independent variables in the fixed effects 
estimation. This is an important limitation of our study. 
15 The EBRD transition indicator gives a score from 1 to 4. It aggregates assessments of the privatisation 
of small- and large-scale enterprises, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and foreign 
exchange system liberalisation, competition policy, and bank and nonbank financial sector reforms. The 
general EBRD indicator is the average of the score given to the reforms in each area. A high value of the 
general indicator is associated with a higher level of reform and hence, better working institutions. 
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Credit market imperfections may affect the capitalisation of DPs in land rents as 
explained in section 3. In order to test the interaction between DPs and credit market 
imperfections we estimate a fifth model (Model E), which is similar to Model A, but 
which controls for the rates of progress in the country’s bank and nonbank financial 
sector reforms⁡(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡). This variable is an index obtained from EBRD and ranges 
between 1 and 4, where a higher value of the index indicates more reform in the 
financial sector, and this is usually associated with better access to credit. Reduced 
credit constraints and improved access to credit are expected to result in a higher 
demand for agricultural land, and therefore we expect a positive correlation between 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 and land rents. In addition, we include in Model E an interaction term 
between the variables 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 . As predicted by the theoretical work of Ciaian 
and Swinnen (2009), we expect that in the presence of credit constraints, capitalisation 
of DPs in land rents is more important since DPs may help to improve farmers’ access to 
credit (e.g. use of DPs as collateral for bank loans). Therefore we expect a negative 
impact of the interaction term on land rents.  
 
4.3.2 Land tenure system 
The structure of the farm sector (agricultural land use by corporate vs. individual 
holdings) may affect the capitalisation of DPs in land rents as explained in section 3 of 
this chapter. In order to test the interaction between DPs and farm structure, we 
estimate Model F, which includes the share of agricultural land used by corporate 
farmers (𝐶𝐹𝑖) as an additional variable. These data are obtained from Eurostat. Since the 
share of land used by corporate farms hardly varies over time and annual data were not 
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available, we included 𝐶𝐹𝑖 as a time-invariant variable.16 When agricultural land use is 
dominated by corporate farms, landowners face significant transaction costs, such as 
bargaining costs with the farm management of the corporate farms, to change the 
allocation of the land, which is expected to be reflected in lower land rental prices 
(Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). In addition, we include an interaction term between 𝐶𝐹𝑖 
and 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  since we expect that capitalisation of DPs will be lower when more land is used 
by corporate farms and when there is unequal access to subsidies.  
 
4.3.3 Substitution possibilities 
The rate of capitalisation will be affected by the substitution possibilities between 
different production factors. If famers can substitute land for other production factors, 
the demand for land and hence the land price will be affected by the price of the other 
production factors (i.e. of the substitutes). We estimate Model G which controls for 
agricultural input prices 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡⁡and agricultural labour productivity 𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 .  
𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 is an index of agricultural input prices based on fertilizer and fodder prices. 
Data are obtained from Eurostat. 𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡  is a proxy for agricultural wages and is 
calculated using output data from FAO and labour data from the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). Most empirical research on land rents does not control for price 
changes of other inputs which are, to a limited extent, substitutes for agricultural land. 
However, theoretically, in case the elasticity between substitutes for land is not zero, 
this affects the level of capitalisation of the coupled DPs (see section 3 of this chapter). 
                                                        
16 When we estimate the model by a fixed-effects model estimation, CFi will be dropped, since this time 
invariant variable is multi-collinear with the fixed effect (δi). 
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As a result, an increase in 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 and in 𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡  are expected to have a positive impact on 
land rents.  
 
4.3.4 Type of agricultural subsidy 
A difference in the capitalisation rate before and after EU accession could be 
potentially related to a shift in type of subsidies (from mainly coupled payments before 
EU accession to mainly decoupled area payments (SAPS) after EU accession). Therefore, 
we estimate Model H, which includes the interaction term between 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡. This 
interaction term is expected to have a positive effect on land rents as theoretical 
findings have shown that area payments are expected to be capitalised to larger extent 
than output payments (see section 3 of this chapter).  
 
5 REGRESSION RESULTS  
5.1 Baseline model results 
The regression results are presented in Table 3. Model A of Table 3 presents the 
estimation results of the baseline model.17,18 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  is found to have a positive and 
significant impact on land rents, indicating that there is rent extraction of government 
payments by landowners. The impact is not only statistically significant, it is also 
economically significant. An increase of one additional euro per ha in DPs, increases 
land rents by 13 to 25 eurocents. The sign and magnitude of the impact of the variable 
                                                        
17 Estimations of a restricted fixed effects model in which we include in addition to DPs (𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡), 
agricultural output (𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡) as an explanatory variable, provide similar results and can be obtained 
upon request. 
18 All regression results are obtained using clustered standard errors. 
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𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  on land rents is similar to the findings of Ciaian and Kancs (2012), who analysed 
capitalisation in land in the NMS during the period 2004-2005 using farm-level data.  
Further, we find that higher levels of agricultural output (𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡) are 
correlated with higher rental prices. An increase of one additional euro per ha of 
agricultural output is expected to lead to an increase of the land rental price by 5 
eurocents.  
Next, EU accession (𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡) significantly increases land rents, indicating that since 
2004, the year of EU accession for all selected EU-NMS, land rents increased by almost 
5,51 euro per ha. The coefficient of 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  remains stable (significantly positive and of the 
same order of magnitude) when the variable 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is excluded from the baseline model 
(regression results available upon request). This clearly indicates that the variable 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is capturing “other” effects of accession beyond the direct subsidy or output price 
effects.  
 
5.2 Results of the robustness tests 
Results of additional robustness tests are presented in Models B and C of Table 3. 
The results of these robustness tests confirm the finding of the baseline model that DPs 
have a statistically and economically significant impact on land rents. In Model B, 
parameter estimates of 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  are close to the one of the baseline model, suggesting that 
the results of Model A are not affected by multi-collinarity problems due to the 
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simultaneous inclusion of 𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡 (the parameters estimate remains 
significant and same order of magnitude).19  
Further, we do not find that farmers’ expectations about a potential shift from 
SAPS to SFP after 2013 have affected land rents (Model C of Table 3). This may be 
explained by the fact that relatively soon after EU accession there were some 
indications that the SAPS subsidy scheme might not be replaced by a SFP subsidy 
scheme.  
 
5.3 Results of the extensions to the baseline model  
The models that investigate the impact of market imperfections on the 
capitalisation rate are presented in Table 3, Models D and E. The 𝐸𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 variable is 
found to have a significantly negative coefficient, which implies that average land rents 
are lower in the case of more institutional reforms (e.g. better functioning input and 
output markets). This is an indication that the positive effects of institutional reforms on 
land supply seem to outweigh the potential effects on land demand. This is not 
surprising as, for example, land owners will be more likely to rent out their land when 
proper institutions are in place to enforce contracts. As a consequence land supply will 
increase and hence rental prices will decline.  
In Model E of Table 3 we analyse the interaction between the level of DPs and 
credit market imperfections. The results show that in the presence of credit market 
                                                        
19 In addition, we performed two more formal tests for multicollinearity: an analysis of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), and the condition number on the pooled data for the explanatory variables from the 
baseline model (Chen et al., 2003). Both tests indicate that there are no concerns related to 
multicollinearity. The VIF is for all explanatory variables below 3, which is far below the threshold of 10 
that is generally used as a cut-off point. The condition number is 6.83, which is far below the threshold of 
15 that is generally used as a cut-off point. 
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constraints, DPs will be more capitalised in land rental prices than in the presence of 
well-functioning credit markets. As such, our results confirm the theoretical work on 
the interaction of DPs and credit constraints by Ciaian and Swinnen (2009). In case of 
poor functioning credit markets (i.e. no reforms in the financial sector or 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 1), 
an additional euro of DPs results in an increase of 40 eurocents in the average land 
rental price. While in case of well-functioning credit markets (𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 4), only 16 
eurocents per additional euro of DPs is capitalised in land rents. On the mean level of 
the 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 variable in the sample (𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 3.59), an additional euro of DPs is 
reflected in an increase of 19 eurocents in the average rental price. 
Further, the regression results of Model F in Table 3 confirm our expectation 
regarding the impact of a country’s farm structure. We find that in countries where a 
larger share of the agricultural land is used by corporate entities (and hence more 
imperfect competition), a lower share of the DPs is capitalised in the average rental 
price. In cases where all agricultural land is used by individual farmers (𝐶𝐹𝑖 ⁡= 0), an 
additional euro of DPs is reflected in an increase of 21 eurocents in the average rental 
price, while in cases where all agricultural land is used by corporate farms (𝐶𝐹𝑖 = 1), 
only 4 eurocents are capitalised in the average rental price. On the mean level of 𝐶𝐹𝑖 in 
the sample (0.38), an additional euro of DPs is reflected in an increase of 15 eurocents 
in the average rental price. 
Our analysis also indicates that substitution possibilities do affect land rents 
(Table 3, Model G). No significant impact of the variable 𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡 on land rents was observed, 
while the 𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡  variable has a positive impact on land rents. This means that when 
agricultural labour productivity is higher, land rents are higher ceteris paribus, 
suggesting that labour can (partially) substitute for land.  
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Finally, we do not find evidence for a significant change in the capitalisation rate 
before and after EU accession (Model G, Table 3). This result is in line with the findings 
by Guastella et al. (2013) who find that the capitalisation rate did not change with a 
switch from coupled to decoupled payments in Italy. However, this result is inconsistent 
with the theoretical prediction that area payments, the dominant type of DPs after EU 
accession, are more capitalised than output payments, which were more commonly 
used before EU accession. According to Ciaian et al. (2010a), Ciaian et al. (2011), and 
Goodwin et al. (2011), there might be various reasons for this discrepancy between the 
theoretical predictions and empirical findings. One important reason mentioned is the 
potential interaction between capitalisation and regional and local land market 
institutions and peculiarities. The issue of rental contract arrangements and regulations 
of land markets is particularly relevant in the EU, where depending on the 
region/country, rental price controls (minimum or maximum prices) or formal and/or 
informal provisions on the duration of rental contracts are implemented (Ciaian et al. 
2010b; Swinnen et al., 2014A scope for future research could be to look into the 
interaction between capitalisation and land regulations and institutions. Another 
explanation for the finding of a non-significant change in the capitalisation rate before 
and after EU accession relates to the nature of the type of subsidies in the selected EU 
New Member States. Before EU accession, a large share of subsidies was allocated in the 
form of coupled area payments (next to output payments). Given the fact that SAPS is 
also an area payment, both types of subsidies create similar distortions on the land 
market and are thus likely to induce the same capitalisation rate in both periods. 
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6 CONCLUSION  
Income effects of agricultural subsidies can be eroded due to the capitalisation of 
subsidies in land sales and rental prices. In this chapter, we estimate the second order 
effect of DPs on the rural land market in selected EU-NMS. These data are particularly 
interesting to study the influence of agricultural subsidies on land prices because EU 
accession resulted in a considerable change in the level of subsidies paid. Hence, this 
can be considered as a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the impact of the increase 
in DPs on land rental prices.  
Our analysis yields several conclusions. First, we find that DPs, which are 
currently largely decoupled from production, have a significant impact on land rents. 
These findings are consistent with earlier studies (such as Goodwin et al., 2011; Kilian 
et al., 2012; Kirwan, 2009; Kirwan and Roberts, 2010; Michalek et al., 2014), which also 
found that decoupled subsidies affect land prices. The reason is that while subsidies are 
no longer coupled with the choice of commodities, they may still be coupled with the 
use of land – as they are in the EU-NMS. 
Second, our results imply that an increase of one additional euro per ha in DPs 
increases land rents by 13 to 25 eurocents, corresponding to a capitalisation rate of 13 
percent to 25 percent. These effects are similar to the estimates of Kirwan (2009), 
Kirwan and Roberts (2010), and Kropp and Peckham (2012) – all analysing the impact 
of DPs in the US and finding an average capitalisation rate between 14 percent and 32 
percent – and Ciaian and Kancs (2012) studying the impact of DPs in the EU-NMS and 
finding an average capitalisation rate of 19 percent.    
Interestingly, Michalek et al. (2014) find lower capitalisation rates (around 6 
percent on average) than our study for decoupled payments in the EU-15 (the old 
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member states). An important factor is probably that most EU-15 member states have 
an historical (hybrid) model of DP allocation, while the EU-NMS use SAPS which is 
similar to a regional model.20 Regional DP implementation models are expected to have 
higher capitalisation rates than historical models (Ciaian et al., 2008). This argument is 
consistent with the disaggregated results of Michalek et al. (2014), which document 
large heterogeneity among regions and, in particular, that regions that use the 
hybrid/historical model have indeed lower capitalisation rates than those who use a 
regional model.  
These findings have important implications for the future since the CAP reform of 
2013 implies a gradual shift from historical/hybrid models of DP allocation to regional 
models across the EU, which would imply an increase in the DP capitalisation, possibly 
towards the level our study found in the EU-NMS where SAPS which is similar to the 
regional model is implemented.   
The latest CAP reform also implies a redistribution of DPs across member states, 
with most EU-NMS gaining and most old member states losing in terms of their total DP 
allocation. This is likely to increase land values in EU-NMS due to the increase in DPs.  
Third, our results are consistent with the prediction that the level of capitalisation 
depends on credit market imperfections. Capitalisation of DPs is higher in countries 
where the financial sector is less advanced and where farmers are thus more credit 
constrained. The level of capitalisation ranges from 40 eurocents (in the case of 
countries with low financial market reform indicators) to 16 eurocents per additional 
                                                        
20 During the 2003 CAP reform, when the EU-15 member states moved from coupled to decoupled, the 
member states could opt for an “historic model” (payment entitlements based on individual historic 
reference amounts per farmer), a “regional model” (flat rate payment entitlements based on amounts 
received by farmers in a region in the reference period – similar to the SAPS in the NMS), or a “hybrid 
model,” either static or dynamic. 
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euro of DPs (in the case of countries with better financial market reform indicators). 
This is consistent with ad hoc empirical observations that DPs reduce farmers’ credit 
constraints, as farms may use the DPs as collateral for bank loans (Ciaian and Swinnen, 
2009; Latruffe et al., 2010). This results in higher marginal productivity of agricultural 
land and thus higher land demand and higher land prices. 
Fourth, our results are also consistent with the prediction that transaction costs 
and imperfect competition (bargaining position) in the land market affects 
capitalisation. We find that capitalisation of DPs is lower in countries where a significant 
share of agricultural land is used by (large) corporate farms, a result which is consistent 
with ad hoc empirical observations of strong bargaining positions of such farms in 
regional land markets. We estimate that the level of DP capitalisation in the land rental 
price ranges from around 4 percent in regions where corporate farms dominate to 21 
percent in regions where there is no such domination and land is rented to small family 
farms.  
In summary, our empirical findings are consistent with several theoretical 
predictions for which there was little statistical empirical evidence so far; and they are 
consistent with other empirical studies on the size of the impact.  
While these are interesting conclusions, there are several ways in which empirical 
analyses can be improved in the future. Having more data for a longer time period 
would improve the quality of the empirical analysis, as one would be able to better 
address endogeneity issues. In addition, output and area payments are aggregated in 
our analysis. Disaggregated data would allow us to investigate how capitalisation differs 
with the type of payment. Further, it would be interesting to look into the interaction 
between capitalisation and land regulations and institutions. Finally, EBRD reform 
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indices are used to control for (credit) market imperfections. While these indices are 
widely used, they do suffer from some shortcomings (e.g. subjective by nature, non-
informative about the quality of market institutions, providing limited sector level 
information) (EBRD, 2010). Hence, the quality of the analysis could be improved if one 
could check the robustness of the result that credit market imperfections aggravate the 
capitalisation of DPs in rental prices using alternative credit market imperfections 
indicators/proxies. 
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Table 1: Share of rented agricultural land and land used by corporate farms in the 
EU-27, 2005-2007 (%) 
 
Share rented land 
Share used by corporate 
farms 
 
2005 2007 2005 2007 
Belgium 67 67 5 10 
Bulgaria 76 79 53 53 
Czech Republic 86 83 71 71 
Denmark 25 29 2 5 
Germany 62 62 31 32 
Estonia 48 50 44 48 
Ireland 18 18 0 0 
Greece 32 32 0 0 
Spain 28 27 31 32 
France 72 74 50 54 
Italy 23 28 18 13 
Cyprus 50 54 7 8 
Latvia 24 27 10 9 
Lithuania 53 48 12 14 
Luxembourg 54 57 0 0 
Hungary 57 56 51 52 
Malta 80 81 7 7 
Netherlands 26 25 8 7 
Austria 26 27 17 19 
Poland 20 20 10 10 
Portugal 24 23 25 28 
Romania 14 17 35 35 
Slovenia 30 29 5 5 
Slovakia 91 89 82 80 
Finland 34 34 8 9 
Sweden 40 39 18 19 
United Kingdom 31 32 15 13 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 2: Description of the variables in the land rents regression 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
Dependent variable 
RENTS Deflated average land rents 
(€/ha) 
42.51 28.6 
    
Main variable of interest 
DP Deflated DPs per ha (€/ha) 79.97 57.99 
    
Control variables 
OUTPUT Deflated market value output (€/ 
ha) 
746.84 361.78 
ACC Accession dummy (0/1) 0.56 0.50 
SAPS2013 Deflated level of SAPS payments in 
the post-2013 period 
197.74 51.57 
SAPS2013*ACC Interaction term SAPS2013 and 
ACC 
104.64 103.88 
EBRD EBRD transition indicator (score 1 
to 4) 
3.52 0.28 
CREDIT EBRD indicator for financial 
reform (score 1 to 4) 
3.59 0.36 
CREDIT*DP Interaction term CREDIT and DP 302.47 235.44 
CF Share of land cultivated by 
corporate farms (0 to 1) 
0.38 0.29 
CF*DP Interaction term CF and DP 35.04 39.71 
IP Agricultural input price index 
(100=2007) 
89.38 14.66 
ALP Agricultural Labour Productivity 
(deflated €/worker) 
745.34 1558.64 
ACC*DP Interaction term ACC and DP 65.66 68.41 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the sample 
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Table 3: Regression results of the fixed effects baseline model and robustness tests 
 Baseline Model Robustness Tests 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coeff. t-value 
DP 0.13 (10.96)*** 0.25 (5.88)*** 0.14 (24.64)*** 
OUTPUT 0.05 (2.07)*   0.05 (2.06)* 
ACC 5.51 (2.62)**   12.18 (0.69) 
ACC*SAPS2013     -0.03 (-0.37) 
Constant -7.23 (-0.42) 22.61 (6.68)*** -7.61 (-0.45) 
R² 0.80 0.71 0.80 
Observations 61 61 61 
      
 Extension of Baseline Model 
 Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
DP 0.15 (12.86)**** 0.48 (4.34)*** 0.21 (4.89)*** 0.12 (16.54)*** 0.18 (3.50)** 
OUTPUT 0.05 (2.15)* 0.06 (2.28)* 0.04 (2.04)* 0.04 (2.54)* 0.05 (1.98)* 
ACC 7.10 (3.04)** 6.80 (1.70) 4.47 (1.42) 6.22 (3.04)** 8.52 (1.86) 
EBRD -12.24 (-3.03)** - - - - - - - - 
CREDIT - - -13.05 (-1.44) - - - - - - 
CREDIT*DP - - -0.08 (-3.33)** - - - - - - 
CF*DP - -   -0.17 (-2.83)** - - - - 
IP  - - -  - - 0.09 (0.71) - - 
ALP - - -  - - 0.00 (2.04)* - - 
ACC*DP - - -  - - - - -0.05 (-0.71) 
Constant 29.73 (2.82)** 29.81 (2.00)* -4.06 (-0.29) -13.46 (-0.62) -8.23 (-0.71) 
R² 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81 
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1% 
We use clustered standard errors and report the within R2.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the sample 
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Figure 1: Evolution of land rents in the selected NMS (€/ha)* 
* Note. Rental prices are real 2010 prices  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the sample 
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Figure 2: Evolution of DPs in the selected NMS (€/ha)* 
* * Note. DPs are real 2010 prices  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the sample 
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CHAPTER 5.  TRAPPED IN AGRICULTURE? 
CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION  
AND AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT 
 
1 INTRODUCTION1  
It is well known that agricultural employment declines with economic 
development. Another well known (political economic) pattern is that government 
support to agriculture increases with economic growth (Anderson and Hayami, 1986; 
Anderson, 2009).2 Such increase in subsidies occurred in the United States, Japan and in 
(Western and Eastern) Europe in the second half of the 20th century and in emerging 
countries such as China in recent years (Anderson, 2009; Swinnen, 2010; OECD, 2013). 
This increasing protection of agriculture has been criticised for distorting 
agricultural markets and for creating distortions in the economy by constraining or 
preventing structural change that is essential for economic growth (Johnson, 1973; 
                                                        
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Ruxanda Berlinschi and Johan Swinnen (see Berlinschi et al. 
2014). 
2 For explanations of the causes of this pattern, see e.g. Swinnen (1994) and Anderson et al. (2013). 
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OECD, 2008). At the same time proponents of agricultural protection have defended 
these policies by arguing that it is essential to support incomes of farmers for sustaining 
rural communities by preventing the decline of rural employment and outflow of people 
(e.g. European Commission, 2010; European Parliament, 2010).  
Both arguments – albeit that they are used for different policy conclusions - are 
consistent with basic economic models of labour allocation in which agricultural 
employment is responsive to changes in returns to agricultural labour. Given this 
responsiveness, one would expect that factors that cause farm incomes to increase 
would have a positive impact on agricultural employment. One such factor are 
agricultural subsidy programs, but this argument also applies to other factors, such as 
price changes. 
However, a simple look at the data does not seem consistent with this argument. 
Despite massive subsidies, agricultural employment in industrialised countries has been 
steadily decreasing over the past decades. As we document in section 2 of this chapter, 
more elaborate analyses of the data yield the same conclusion: there is no clear 
evidence that increased protection of agriculture enhances agricultural employment. At 
best, study results yield a mixed picture.     
Explanations in the literature for this puzzling observation are that subsidies may 
be ineffective because of imperfections in input and output markets, causing off-setting 
indirect effects because of labour, capital or land reallocation.3 For example, (an 
                                                        
3 It is also well known that the income effects of subsidies are only partial, because of a variety of factors, 
such as targeting problems and factor market adjustments.  There is a large literature showing these 
effects differ with the nature of the subsidies, with different income effects of price support, direct 
payments, etc, and the nature of the output and factor markets.  While these arguments are obviously 
important in designing optimal policies, they do not affect the arguments in our analysis. The only 
assumption that we use (implicitly) in our arguments is that subsidies have some (positive) income effect 
(OECD, 2001).    
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increase in) subsidies may also have an indirect (second-order) negative impact on 
agricultural employment, which in some circumstances (depending on the country 
and/or time period) may dominate the direct (first-order) positive impact (i.e. the 
direct income effect). Subsidies may lead for example to capital-labour substitution 
(Goetz and Debertin, 1996) or to a reduction of the credit constraint hampering farm 
expansion, thus enabling farmers to purchase other farmers’ land (Goetz and Debertin, 
2001).  
In this chapter we propose an alternative explanation looking at medium and 
longer term adjustments. Our explanation is based on how subsidies and other factors 
that increase farm incomes affect the most important mechanism of labour adjustment 
in agriculture, which is intergenerational farm transfers. In many parts of the world (as 
in most European countries), the majority of farmers are self-employed household 
farmers. Active farmers quitting farming and taking a job in another sector is only one, 
and often not the most important, mechanism in the long run structural adjustment of 
labour allocation with economic growth. The most important element in the long-term 
decline in agricultural employment with economic development is due to farmers’ 
children choosing to work in the industrial or service sector rather than taking over 
their parents’ farm.4 
We argue that factors that cause an increase in farm income may affect the 
education of farmers’ children and thereby their employment choices in the next 
generation. In case farmers are credit constrained, increasing farm incomes may allow 
farmers to increase their investment in their children’s education. If children with 
                                                        
4 There are few representative data on this.  Whatever information that is available suggests that this 
factor is very important.  Data from some EU countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, indicate 
that less than 25% of farmers older than 50 years have a successor. 
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higher education levels find more attractive job opportunities outside the agricultural 
sector then an increase in farm income may result in a reduction of agricultural 
employment, instead of an increase.  This effect may mitigate or (more than) offset the 
(direct) positive effect of farm income increases on labour allocation, depending on the 
relative income effects, the costs of education, and the strength of the credit constraints. 
We provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence supporting this argument.  
Both our theory and empirical evidence relate changes in the next generation 
labour supply to changes in farm income, rather than changes in farm subsidies. The 
reason is both conceptual (theory) and data related (empirical). Empirically, it was very 
difficult to find data to test our hypotheses, because it requires intergenerational and 
sequential information on educational and occupational decisions of farmers’ children 
in combination with farm income data, in an environment with farm credit constraints 
(and preferably agricultural subsidies). The dataset we use has information on farm 
incomes which includes farm subsidies, but which does not allow to separate out the 
subsidies. For our analysis this is not a problem since conceptually our argument 
applies to any factor that increases farm incomes, not just agricultural subsidies.  Hence, 
also in our theory we derive predictions for the effects of income changes in general, 
rather than only for subsidies. This is a consistent approach, since even if one had 
separate subsidy data one would have to control for other factors affecting farm income.    
Our analysis is the first to provide a theory and to test the hypotheses coming out 
of the theory.  The data that we use are from four European countries, because of the 
availability of the necessary indicators. There is clear evidence that there were 
important credit constraints for farms in these countries at the time of the survey. 
However, it would obviously be interesting to apply the empirical analysis to data from 
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developing and emerging countries where such constraints are most likely more severe, 
if the necessary data will be available, possibly in the future.   
Our analysis also contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature analysing 
the links between income distribution, human capital accumulation and growth, which 
argues that income inequality, in presence of credit constraints, has a negative impact 
on human capital accumulation and consequently slows growth (Galor, 2011). Recent 
studies on how investment in education is crucial to reduce rural-urban income 
differences, and enhance (non-farm) income prospects of farmers’ children in rural 
China are consistent with our arguments (Chen et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2012)  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2 we present evidence on 
the puzzling relationship between agricultural subsidies and employment.  In section 3 
we develop the theoretical model and derive hypotheses. In section 4 we present the 
data, the estimation methods and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION AND EMPLOYMENT: A PUZZLE 
As explained in the introduction, both those who are in favour of subsidies to 
enhance incomes and employment in agriculture and those who are against because of 
their distortionary effects in the economy, including the argued sub-optimal allocation 
of labour, assume that agricultural subsidies increase employment. This is consistent 
with basic economic models, which show that agricultural employment is responsive to 
changes in returns to agricultural labour.  
However, a simple look at the data does not seem consistent with this argument. 
Despite massive subsidies, agricultural employment in industrialised countries has been 
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steadily decreasing over the past decades. A striking example of this evolution is what 
happened in lower income countries when they joined the EU with its high farm 
subsidies. Consider a country like Spain, where in the 1970s almost 30% of the 
population was still employed in the agricultural sector, while currently this is barely 
5% despite the fact that subsidies have increased strongly over this period. In fact, 
accession of Spain to the EU in 1986 was associated with a strong increase in farm 
subsidies and an increase in the outflow of people from agriculture in the years 
(decades) afterwards. The same happened with other Southern European countries like 
Greece in the 1980s and East European countries like Poland and Bulgaria in recent 
years (Figure 1).  
Cross country observations suggest the same conclusion: there is no evidence of a 
positive correlation between agricultural subsidies and agricultural employment. If 
anything, the relationship is negative. In the OECD countries, the outflow of labour from 
the agricultural sector over the 1987-2007 period has been the strongest in the 
countries where farmers have been supported most heavily.5 
Of course these negative correlations do not necessarily imply causality. Other 
factors, such as overall income growth, may have been important determinants. 
Moreover, the relationship could be due to reverse causality: the political economy of 
subsidies is such that where the farming population is small, governments have political 
incentives to increase agricultural subsidies (Olson, 1965; Swinnen and de Gorter, 
1993).  
                                                        
5 Similar conclusions follow from a comparison of subsectors within the agricultural sector. For example, 
data for Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece show that in the subsectors where agricultural 
subsidies were higher, agricultural labour outflow was stronger in the period 1990-2007 (Swinnen and 
Van Herck, 2010). 
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Therefore, the relationship which measures the correlation of changes in subsidies 
and changes in employment presented in figure 2 is more intriguing. Over the past 20 
years, the decline in agricultural employment has been the lowest in countries with the 
strongest subsidy reduction or, vice versa, the decline is the strongest where subsidies 
increased the most.  
While these are aggregate figures, more careful and detailed analyses also yield 
results which do not support the “simple story” that subsidies have a positive impact on 
agricultural employment and increase labour allocation distortions. Some studies find a 
positive impact on employment (e.g. Pietola et al., 2003; Foltz, 2004; Key and Roberts, 
2006; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Olper et al., 2012), others find no impact (e.g. 
Barkley, 1990; Mishra et al., 2004; Glauben, et al., 2006) and yet others find a negative 
impact (e.g. Goetz and Debertin, 1996, 2001; Hoppe and Korbi, 2006; Petrick and Zier, 
2011).6 
Explanations for this puzzle are that subsidies may be ineffective because of 
imperfections in input and output markets, causing off-setting indirect effects because 
of adjustments in capital, labour and land allocations and constraints (Goetz and 
Debertin, 1996, 2001).  In the rest of this chapter we develop an alternative explanation 
by analysing how factors that change farm incomes affect the most important 
                                                        
6 The literature on the effect of agricultural subsidies on agricultural employment can be divided into two 
approaches. The first and most popular approach uses the occupational choice model developed by 
Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970). Empirical models using this approach are usually based on 
aggregate (country or regional level) data. In general, long time series are available, allowing for the use 
of panel regression techniques (e.g. Dries and Swinnen, 2002; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Petrick and 
Zier, 2011; Olper et al., 2012). The second approach uses household models to analyse the impact of 
agricultural subsidies on agricultural employment (Becker, 1965). Empirical models using this approach 
usually employ farm-level data (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin, 1997; Mishra et al., 2004; Dries and Swinnen, 
2004). These data are often more time constrained, but may include more detailed and specific 
information than aggregate data and are therefore used in depth analyses, such as for example with 
respect to farm succession (e.g. Kimhi, 1994;  Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000). In 
our model we follow the latter approach, using household level data. 
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mechanism of labour adjustment in agriculture, which is intergenerational farm 
transfers. As explained in the introduction, we focus, for conceptual and empirical 
reasons, on farm income as a more general indicator (instead of subsidies by 
themselves). 
 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider a two-period model of investment in schooling based on Acemoglu and 
Pischke (2001). The economy is composed of farm households. Each farm household 
has one child and earns an exogenously given agricultural income 𝑤𝑎. 
In period 0, each household consumes 𝑐0, saves 𝑠 and may invest a fixed amount ℎ 
in the child’s education. The cost of education ℎ depends on individual factors such as 
distance to education institutions and the child’s learning skills and motivation. We 
denote it by 𝐹(ℎ), the cumulative distribution function of ℎ. The child’s education level 
is 𝑒 = 1 if his parents invested in education and 𝑒 = 0 otherwise.  
In period 1, the child decides whether to continue his parents’ farming activity or 
to work in the non-agricultural sector. The income that the child can obtain in each 
sector depends on the child’s human capital. Various human capital dimensions 
determine earnings and occupational choices, including education, health, family 
background cognitive and non-cognitive skills and social contacts (Cawley et al., 2001; 
Heckman et al., 2006; Bentolila et al., 2010). The focus of this analysis is on education, 
which is an important, endogenous and costly determinant of human capital and which 
has been traditionally used  as a proxy of human capital in the labour and development 
economics literature. Other human capital dimensions are assumed exogenous and are 
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not explicitly modeled.7 A non-educated child earns 𝑤𝑎 in the agricultural sector and 
𝑤𝑛𝑎 in the non-agricultural sector. An educated child earns 𝑤𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑎) and 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 +
𝜃𝑛𝑎) in the two sectors respectively.⁡𝜃𝑎  and 𝜃𝑛𝑎  are the rates of return to education in 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors respectively, and  
0 < 𝜃𝑎 < 𝜃𝑛𝑎      (1) 
i.e. the returns to education are lower in the agricultural sector – an assumption 
consistent with empirical evidence.8 
The household’s utility function depends on its own consumption level (𝑐𝑜), as 
well as on the child’s consumption level (𝑐1). For simplicity, we assume that the same 
weight is attached to both consumption levels:9 
𝑈(𝑐𝑜, 𝑐1) = 𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑜 + 𝑙𝑛𝑐1⁡    (2) 
Households choose the levels of consumption, saving and education which 
maximize their utility function subject to the budget constraints: 
𝑐𝑜 + ℎ𝑒 + 𝑠 = 𝑤𝑎     (3) 
𝑐1 = 𝑠 + 𝑤1      (4) 
 
                                                        
7 Attributes such as intelligence and non-cognitive skills, are implicitly included in the income the child 
can earn in each sector. A more sophisticated model would include interactions between various human 
capital attributes, jointly determining educational and occupational choices. This is beyond the scope of 
this analysis  
8 Based on a sample of high school graduates in the US, Orazam and Matilla (1991) find that the returns to 
schooling are higher for non-agricultural occupations than for agricultural employment. Using data from a 
large sample of different countries, Psacharopoulos (1994) finds that these results hold in a more global 
perspective. Middendorf (2008) uses 2001 data to estimate the returns to schooling in different EU 
countries, (including the countries used in our econometric specification). He also finds that returns to 
education are higher in the industrial and services sector compared to the agricultural sector. Galor et al. 
(2009) propose that in general individuals in agricultural economies have a lower level of education 
because there is a lower complementarity between human capital and land as compared to the 
complementarity between human capital, physical capital and technology. 
9 Introducing an altruism rate/discount factor different from one would not alter our qualitative results. 
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where 𝑤1 is the child’s income and the interest rate is set to zero for simplicity. 
The child’s utility only depends on his consumption level. He chooses the sector of 
activity which allows him to earn the highest income. 
The model is solved by backward induction. First, we determine the child’s 
occupational choice for a given education level. Second, we determine the household’s 
choice of the education level. 
For a given education level 𝑒, the child will work in the non-agricultural sector if 
𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑛𝑎) > 𝑤𝑎(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑎). For a given education level 𝑒, this inequality is only 
satisfied if 𝑤𝑎 is sufficiently low. Education affects the child’s occupational choice when 
farm revenue 𝑤𝑎 is between 𝑤𝑛𝑎  and 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎)/(1 + 𝜃𝑎). In this case children leave 
farming if they are educated and choose farming if they are not. For lower farm 
revenues, children leave farming independently of their education and for higher 
farming revenues, they choose farming independently of their education. This yields the 
intuitive result:   
Proposition 1.  For a given education level, the child leaves farming if farm income is 
sufficiently low, and having education induces medium income farmers’ children to leave 
farming. 
 
We now solve the farm households’ optimisation problem. We consider two cases: 
with and without credit constraints. In the absence of credit constraints, households can 
smooth consumption between the two periods by borrowing or lending any sum they 
want in the financial markets. In particular, they can finance part of the educational 
expenditures by borrowing (or choosing a negative level of savings in period 0). In the 
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presence of credit constraints, households cannot borrow sums to be reimbursed by 
their children, so the level of savings can only be positive or nil.  
 
3.1 Educational choices in the absence of credit constraints 
When households can freely smooth consumption, they will equalise consumption 
levels between the two periods and invest in education if and only if its benefit exceeds 
its cost.  
If 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎, the child will leave farming independently of his education. In this 
case the benefit of education is 𝑤𝑛𝑎𝜃𝑛𝑎 and the household will invest in education if 
ℎ < 𝑤𝑛𝑎𝜃𝑛𝑎. Therefore the probability that the farm household invests in education is 
𝐹(𝑤𝑛𝑎𝜃𝑛𝑎). If 𝑤𝑛𝑎 < 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎 (1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) (1 + 𝜃𝑎)⁄ , the child will only stay in farming if 
he is not educated. In this case the benefit of education is 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) − 𝑤𝑎 and the 
household will invest in education if ℎ < 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) − 𝑤𝑎. Therefore the probability 
that the farm household invests in education is 𝐹(𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) − 𝑤𝑎). Finally, if 
𝑤𝑎 > 𝑤𝑛𝑎 (1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) (1 + 𝜃𝑎)⁄ , the child will choose farming independently of his 
education. In this case the benefit of education is 𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑎 and the farm household will 
invest in education if ℎ < 𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑎.  Therefore the probability that a farm household invests 
in education is 𝐹(𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑎). As 𝐹 is a cumulative distribution function, it is increasing in its 
argument. Therefore we can state: 
Proposition 2. In the absence of credit constraints, the probability that a farm 
household invests in its child’s education is independent of farm income for low incomes, 
decreases with farm income for medium incomes and increases with farm income for high 
incomes. 
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The intuition for this proposition is the following. A non-credit constrained farmer 
invests in education if its benefits exceed the costs. The cost of education is exogenously 
given, while the benefit may depend on farm income. When farm income is low 
(𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎), the child chooses the non-agricultural sector whether or not he is educated,  
so the benefit of education is independent from farm income. When farm income is 
medium ((𝑤𝑛𝑎 < 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎 (1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) (1 + 𝜃𝑎)⁄ ), education allows the child to choose a 
skilled job in the non-agricultural sector instead of farming.  The net benefit of  
education is therefore decreasing with farm income.  Beyond a certain farm income 
level ((𝑤𝑎 > 𝑤𝑛𝑎 (1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) (1 + 𝜃𝑎)⁄ ), the child will choose farming independently of his 
education, but education proportionally increases income from farming.  The benefit of 
education  is therefore increasing with farm income. 
 
3.2 Educational choices in the presence of credit constraints 
In this case, households cannot freely smooth consumption between the two 
periods. As the interest rate is zero, the optimal level of savings is equal to zero. 
Households’ optimisation problem is then reduced to comparing utility levels with and 
without education. These depend on the child’s subsequent occupational choice. 
If 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎, the child will not stay in farming independently on his education. 
Then the household’s utility level is higher with 𝑒 = 1 if and only if ln(𝑤𝑎) + ln(𝑤𝑛𝑎) <
ln(𝑤𝑎 − ℎ) + ln(𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎))  ℎ < 𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑛𝑎/(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎). The probability to invest in 
education is therefore 𝐹[𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑛𝑎/(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎)],  an increasing function of 𝑤𝑎.  
If 𝑤𝑛𝑎 < 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎 (1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) (1 + 𝜃𝑎)⁄ , the child will only stay in farming if he has 
no education. Then the household’s utility level is higher when 𝑒 = 1 if and only if 
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ln(𝑤𝑎) + ln(𝑤𝑎) < ln(𝑤𝑎 − ℎ) + ln⁡(𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎))  ℎ < 𝑤𝑎 − 𝑤𝑎
2/(𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎)). The 
probability to invest in education is therefore 𝐹[𝑤𝑎 − 𝑤𝑎
2/(𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎))], increasing 
with 𝑤𝑎 as long as 𝑤𝑎 < 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎)/2 and decreasing afterwards.  
Finally, if 𝑤𝑎 > 𝑤𝑛𝑎 (1 + 𝜃𝑛𝑎) (1 + 𝜃𝑎)⁄ , the child will choose farming 
independently of his education level. Then the household’s utility level is higher when 
𝑒 = 1 if and only if ln(𝑤𝑎) + ln(𝑤𝑎) < ln(𝑤𝑎 − ℎ) + ln⁡(𝑤𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑎))  ℎ < 𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑎(1 +
𝜃𝑎). The probability to invest in education is therefore 𝐹[𝑤𝑎𝜃𝑎(1 + 𝜃𝑎)], an increasing 
function of 𝑤𝑎. This reasoning implies: 
Proposition 3. In the presence of credit constraints, the probability that a farm 
household invests in its child’s education increases with farm income for low and high 
incomes, and decreases with farm income for medium incomes. 
 
The difference with the non-credit constrained case is the fact that for low 
agricultural incomes, the probability of investment in education increases when these 
incomes increase. These farmers do not invest in education when incomes are low 
because they are credit constrained.  
We can now compute the net impact of changes in farm income on agricultural 
labour supply in the next generation.  This impact includes both the change in farm 
income with respect to the other sectors, and the change in the next generation’s 
education level. The probability that the child of a farmer with income  𝑤𝑎 chooses a 
non-farming job is equal to the probability that 𝑓(𝑤𝑎) ≡ 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑛𝑎)/[𝑤𝑎(1 +
𝑒𝜃𝑎)] > 1. The value of  𝑓′(𝑤𝑎) gives the impact of a change in  𝑤𝑎 on the probability 
that the child leaves the agricultural sector.  After simplifications, this value is equal to: 
𝑓′(𝑤𝑎) = [𝑤𝑎𝑤𝑛𝑎(𝜃𝑛𝑎 − 𝜃𝑎) 𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑤𝑎 − 𝑤𝑛𝑎(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑛𝑎)(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑎)⁄ ] [𝑤𝑎(1 + 𝑒𝜃𝑎)]²⁄  
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Whenever 𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑤𝑎 < 0⁄ , 𝑓′(𝑤𝑎) < 0. In this case an increase in farm income has a 
positive impact on agricultural labour supply, both by decreasing investment in 
education and by increasing the attractiveness of the agricultural sector with respect to 
the other sectors.  This effect may be observed for farmers with a medium income, as 
shown in Proposition 3. When 𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑤𝑎 > 0⁄ , 𝑓′(𝑤𝑎) can be negative, positive or nil, 
depending on the magnitude of all parameters. In this case an increase in farm income 
has an ambiguous impact on agricultural labour supply, because it increases both 
investments in education and the attractiveness of the agricultural sector. This effect 
may be observed for farmers with either low or high income, as shown in proposition 3.  
However, the increased investments in education of high income farmers will be used in 
the agricultural sector, so the net effect on agricultural labour supply is only negative for 
low income farmers.  Thus we can state: 
Proposition 4. An increase in farm incomes will decrease labour supply in the 
agricultural sector if farmers have relatively low incomes and are credit constrained.   
 
An increase in the incomes of relatively poor farmers will increase investment in 
their children’ education so they can find better paid employment in other sectors. Of 
course, if the increase in farm income is sufficiently large so that it is making the 
agricultural sector more attractive even for educated children, agricultural labour 
supply will increase.  For smaller income increases, the effect is ambiguous, depending 
on the magnitude of the increase, on the distribution of farm income and on the returns 
to education in the agricultural and non-agricultural sector.  
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4 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Data 
To empirically analyse the impact of farm incomes on education of farmer’s 
children and on the job selection of the children, it is necessary to have access to panel 
data which include this type of information.  Very few datasets include this information. 
In fact, none of the datasets that we considered from developing or emerging countries 
included the necessary information. For this reason we use data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) which surveyed households in several EU 
countries between 1994 and 2001.  For our empirical analysis we consider farms from 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy in the 1990s, and evidence indicates that were there 
were significant credit constraints in these farm households (see below).  
The ECHP is a panel survey in which a sample of individuals and households was 
interviewed each year. It includes information on a wide range of topics including 
detailed income information, employment, educational background, social relations and 
health information. The total duration of the ECHP was 8 years, running from 1994 to 
2001. The Member States included in the ECHP were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom.  The sampling scheme of the panel survey enables us 
to identify the same individuals and households in different years. This unique feature 
of the dataset allows us to analyse the actual educational and occupational decisions 
taken by respectively, parents and children.  
To estimate the impact of an increase in farm income on agricultural employment 
in the next generation, we constructed a sample including parents and their children 
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based on information obtained from two time periods, namely 1994 (first wave of the 
ECHP) and 1999 (sixth wave of the ECHP). The first time period (1994) was selected 
because it was the first wave of the ECHP. The second time period (1999) was selected 
to ensure that there were sufficient years between the two time periods such that most 
of the children that were enrolled in the educational system in 1994 have finished their 
studies and made an occupational choice by 1999. 
We selected households in which at least one of the parents was self-employed in 
the agricultural sector in 1994 and one of the children finished its education by 1999 
and made an occupational choice. Hence, we excluded households of which the children 
were enrolled in the educational system in 1994 and in 1999 to avoid censoring 
problems as these children have not yet made an occupational decision. We only 
consider self-employed farmers because most of the farms in the countries included in 
the analysis are self-employed family farms for which succession usually takes place 
within the household (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000).  
Overall, this resulted in a dataset of 109 households from four EU countries: 
Portugal (48), Italy (32), Ireland (21) and Spain (8).  Not surprisingly these were among 
the poorer countries in the EU at the time of survey. Data from the household survey 
indicate that almost 90% of the households in the analysis had problems financing basic 
household expenses.10 Although this is only an indirect indicator of credit constraints, 
the data are consistent with the argument of important credit constraints among EU 
                                                        
10 89% of the households answered “no” on at least one of the following 6 questions in the survey: (1) Can 
the household afford keeping its home adequately warm?; (2) Can the household pay for a week’s annual 
holiday away from home?; (3) Can the household afford replacing any worn-out furniture?; (4) Can the 
household buy new, rather than second-hand, clothes?; (5) Can the household afford eating meat, chicken 
or fish every second day, if wanted?; (6) Can the household afford having friends or family for drink or 
meal at least once a month?). 
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farm households at the time of the survey. In addition, there are several studies that 
provide evidence of credit constraints in the agricultural sector in the EU and the US 
(Lee and Chambers, 1986; Färe et al., 1990; Blancard et al., 2006 Briggeman et al., 2009 
and Ciaian et al., 2011).   
This set-up allows us to analyse the actual choices of farmers’ children, while most 
existing studies rely on the beliefs of current farmers about their children’s future 
choices.11 In general there are substantial differences between stated and revealed 
behavior of children, which may cause a “generation bias” in the analysis (Väre et al., 
2010).  
 
4.2 Empirical specification  
To econometrically estimate the impact of farm income on the educational and 
occupational choice of farmers’ children, we estimate a recursive simultaneous bivariate 
probit model. This type of model has been used by Hennessey and Rehman (2007) to 
analyse the interdependence between occupational and educational choices of Irish 
family farms in 2002.12 
                                                        
11 Exceptions analysing ex-post (actual) succession decisions using panel data are studies by Kimhi 
(1994), Kimhi and Bollman (1999), Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) and Väre et al. (2010). 
12 In addition to the recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model, we have also estimated an 
instrumental probit model. In this model specification, HIGH_EDU is considered to be a continuous 
variable, while in reality this is a binary variable. This is different from the recursive simultaneous 
bivariate probit model, where both HIGH_EDU and LEAVE are binary variables, which makes the latter 
model better suited to test our hypotheses. Nevertheless, the main results remain robust across the two 
specifications and the results of the instrumental probit model specification are available upon request 
from the authors. 
Chapter 5 – Trapped in Agriculture? 
164 
 
There are two important reasons to use a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit 
model to analyse the impact of an increase in farm income on the child’s decision to 
leave the agricultural sector.  
First, it is most likely that educational and occupational choices are determined 
jointly, such that the decision to participate in education is not exogenous to the 
decision to leave the agricultural sector (Hennessy and Rehman, 2007). In this case, the 
bivariate model is the appropriate econometric specification as the endogeneity of the 
educational choice is taken in account (Maddala, 1983; Greene, 2003). 
Second, the model allows us to measure both the direct and indirect effect of farm 
income on employment choice. There is a direct impact of farm income on the 
occupational choice, but in addition there is an indirect effect. Since farm income enters 
the educational choice equation, it influences the educational choice of the child and 
because the educational choice also appears in the occupational choice equation, it 
indirectly also affects the occupational choice through its effect on education.  
The model consists of two simultaneous equations: the occupational choice 
equation, which allows us to estimate the direct impact of increased farm income on the 
decision to leave the agriculture, given a certain education level; and the educational 
choice equation, which allows us to measure the indirect impact of increased farm 
income through the educational choice of the child.  
Hence, in order to test propositions one and three we estimate the following  
model: 
𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑖 =⁡𝛼0 +⁡𝛼1𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖 +⁡𝛼2𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖 +⁡∑𝛼𝑎𝑋𝑖,𝑎 +⁡𝜀𝑖
𝑘
𝑎=3
 
(occupational choice equation) 
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𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖 =⁡𝛽0 +⁡𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖 +⁡𝛽2𝐹𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑆𝑄𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑏𝑌𝑖,𝑏 +⁡𝜇𝑖
𝑙
𝑏=3
 
(educational choice equation) 
with  (
𝜀
𝜇)~⁡𝑁 [(
0
0
) , (
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
)] 
 
where the dependent variable in the first equation, is a dummy variable (𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑖) 
that takes a value of one if the child has left the agricultural sector in 1999, and zero 
otherwise.  The dependent variable in the second equation is a dummy variable 
(𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖) that takes a value of one if the child has obtained a higher education level 
than “basic or lower secondary education” in 1999, and zero otherwise.13 Table 1 
presents the joint distribution of the two dependent variables.  
The main explanatory variable of interest is a the natural logarithm of the average 
farm income of the household in the years between 1994 and 1999 during which the 
child was in the educational system (FARMINCi).14 This variable is included as an 
explanatory variable in both the occupational choice and educational choice equation. If 
farmers are credit constrained for educational investments, this variable is expected to 
have a positive impact on education, and controlling for the level of education, it is 
                                                        
13 We choose the education level “Basic or lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2)” according to the 
ISCED classification level) as the base category since this is in all countries in our sample the minimum 
compulsory education level (Murtin and Viarengo, 2008). 
14 For example, in case a child was in the educational system in 1994 and finished its education in 1996, 
we use the natural logarithm of the average self-employed farm income of the household in the period 
1994-1996 as the dependent variable. If the same child finished its education in 1999, we use the natural 
logarithm of the average self-employed farm income in the period 1994-1999. This will reduce potential 
measurement error and the effects of temporary income shocks. 
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expected to have a negative impact on the decision to leave agriculture.15 In order to 
capture the non-linear effect of farm income on the educational choice suggested in 
proposition 3, we also include FARMINC_SQ, the squared form of FARMINC.16 
𝑋𝑖,𝑎 represents a vector of control variables included in the occupational choice 
equation, 𝑌𝑖,𝑏  represents a vector of control variables included in the educational choice 
equation; and 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜇𝑖 are jointly normally distributed error terms with correlation ρ.  
Table 2 gives an overview of the variables used in the econometric model.  
Note that although strictly speaking we can have the same independent variables 
in the occupational and educational choice equations, it is recommended to have 
exclusion restrictions as it improves the identification of the model (Wilde, 2000; Jones, 
2007). We have followed a similar approach as Hennessey and Rehman (2007) and 
estimated univariate model including all variables. Based on the results of these 
regressions, we found that variables OFFFARM, SOCIAL and AGR did not have a 
significant influence on the occupational choice but only on the educational choice.17 
Therefore, we did not include these variables in the occupational choice equation and 
                                                        
15 One could argue that while the occupational choice depends on the expected farm income, the 
educational choice depends rather on the total household income, including both self-employed farm 
income as well as income from wage labor and other sources. Therefore, as a robustness check, we 
included in the educational equation the natural logarithm of the average total household income in the 
period between 1994 and 1999 that the child was in the educational system, while in the occupational 
choice equation we included the natural logarithm of the average self-employed farm income of the 
household in the period between 1994 and 1999 that the child was in the educational system. However, 
this did not change our main results and the results are available upon request to the authors. 
16 Note that we also run a model in which we included the cubic form of FARMINC in the educational 
equation as suggested by proposition 3. However, this term appeared to be insignificant, which may 
indicate that in our sample we only observe a selected farm income range compared to the full income 
range discussed in the theoretical framework. It is possible that very high farm incomes are not included 
in the sample, which is plausible given that we have only a limited number observations (109) from 
countries where there are many poor farmers (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland). 
17 OFFFARM and SOCIAL are two dummy variables that take a value of one if the farmer or the spouse 
received, respectively, off-farm income or social payments during the years that the child was in the 
educational system in the period 1994-1999 and zero otherwise. AGR is the average share of self-
employed agricultural income in total household income during the years that the child was in the 
educational system in the period 1994-1999. 
Chapter 5 – Trapped in Agriculture? 
167 
 
only in the educational choice equation. In addition to these variables, we have also 
included the regional availability of higher education (AVAIL_EDU) in the educational 
choice equation as an exclusion restriction. This variable is measured as the percentage 
of higher educated children in the total population of children in a region that were in 
the educational system in 1994 and finished their education by 1999, independently on 
the occupation of their parents.18 In regions where higher education is more widely 
available, farmers face lower transaction costs when sending their children to school. As 
a result, farmers in regions where more higher education is available are more likely to 
send their children to school. 
 
4.3 Results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results.19 The coefficients found on the income 
variables support our theoretical model. Farm income has a significant effect on 
children’s education. An increase in farm income leads for farmers with low farm 
incomes to an increase in the probability of the child being educated. This is consistent 
with earlier findings by Thomson (2013) who analysed the impact of the recent price 
increases for agricultural products on high school drop-out rates in agricultural areas in 
                                                        
18 The use of the regional availability of higher education as an explanatory variable could be problematic 
in case the educational decisions of farmers’ children would be the main driver of this variable. However, 
the regional availability of higher education is calculated based on the education level attained by all 
children in a region, independently on the occupation of their parents. As a result, this variable has been 
calculated based a much larger sample (5483 observations) than the sample of farmers’ children used in 
our analysis (109 observations). Therefore, it is unlikely that the observations in our sample of farmers’ 
children drive the outcome for the regional availability of higher education. This approach is similar to 
the one followed by Key and McBride (2008) who use regional contract availability as an instrument to 
identify the effect of contract use on farm productivity. 
19 The covariance ρ between the random errors ε and μ is found to be significant, indicating that the two 
dependent variables are jointly determined and the recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model is the 
appropriate estimation technique.   
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the US. He finds that when agricultural prices increase, young people in areas with high 
levels of agricultural employment become more likely to stay in school relative to those 
in areas with little or no agriculture. However, in addition we find evidence for a non-
linear effect of farm income:  for farmers with a high farm income, an increase in farm 
income leads to a lower probability of the child being educated. Controlling for 
education, farm income has a negative and significant impact on the probability to leave 
agriculture.  
Hence, overall farm income has two effects on the probability to leave agriculture: 
a direct effect as it appears in the occupational choice estimation and an indirect effect 
as it appears in the educational choice estimation and changes the probability of being 
highly educated. The direct effect is the effect of the change in farm income on the 
probability that that an individual leaves the agricultural sector, conditional on his 
education. The indirect effect is the effect on the probability of education, which in turn 
affects the probability that an individual leaves the agricultural sector. The marginal 
effect of a change in farm income is the sum of these effects and is calculated using the 
method discussed in Greene (1998) and Dong et al. (2010).  
Table 4 shows the total marginal effect of farm income (i.e. the direct, negative 
effect plus the indirect, positive impact through education) on the probability to leave 
agriculture and the probability itself for different levels of farm income. In addition, the 
table also shows the percentage change in the probability to leave agriculture as a result 
of a ten per cent increase in farm income for different levels of farm income. Figure 3 
presents the latter result graphically. 
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The results show that the effect of farm income on the probability to leave 
agriculture depends on the income level and is significant and positive for low incomes 
and significant and negative for high incomes.   
For poor farm households, an increase in farm income has a positive effect on the 
probability that their children leave the agricultural sector, which suggests that for poor 
farm households the indirect, positive effect through the educational channel 
dominates. A ten per cent increase in farm income for the poorest households increases 
the probability that their children leave the agricultural sector by 2.46%. For rich farm 
households, an increase in farm income has a negative effect on the probability that 
their children leave the agricultural sector, which suggests that for rich farm households 
the direct, negative effect of farm income dominates. A ten percent increase in the 
income of the richest households decreases the probability that their children leave the 
agricultural sector by 1.21%. For farmers with an intermediate income, the two effects 
balance each other out and the net effect is not significantly different from zero. These 
findings are consistent with the argument that credit constraints, which are more 
important for small farms, are an important factor in determining labour supply in the 
agricultural sector.  
Finally, the estimates of the control variables in the occupational and educational 
choice equations are consistent with the existing literature. With respect to the 
determinants of the occupational choice, we find that married individuals are less likely 
to leave the agricultural sector, which is consistent with earlier findings by Dries and 
Bojnec (2004). Children of more educated farmers (for whom at least one of the parents 
is highly educated) are less likely to leave the agricultural sector. A higher educated 
farm operator may be more efficient in processing information, allocating resources and 
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adopting new technologies and thus may operate a more modern and efficient farm, 
which is more attractive for his heirs. This finding is also consistent with previous 
studies (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Mishra et al., 2004; Glauben et al., 2004). Women 
and individuals who have more siblings (and hence more potential farm successors) are 
more likely to leave the agricultural sector. With respect to the determinants of the 
educational choice, we find that parents who obtain a higher share of their income from 
agricultural activities and social assistance payments are less likely to send their 
children to school. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Agricultural employment typically decreases with economic development.  A 
remarkable observation is that increases in agricultural incomes, e.g. through 
substantial agricultural subsidies in rich countries, have not had a positive effect on 
agricultural employment – and therefore had less effect on labour distortions than often 
argued.  Empirical studies find mixed effects of the impact of increasing farm incomes 
on agricultural employment.  The literature has explained these findings by suggesting 
that there are two effects of increases in subsidies or farm incomes:  a direct positive 
effect on agricultural labour supply and an indirect negative effect, such as substitution 
of labour by capital with increased income in the presence of credit market constraints.  
The two effects work in different directions and the net effect depends on various 
factors specific to the country and the sector. 
In this chapter we provide a new (additional) explanation by arguing that 
increases in farm income may affect farm households’ investments in education in the 
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presence of credit constraints, and thus the level of education of farmers’ children. The 
evolution of agricultural employment largely depends on the willingness of farmers’ 
children to continue their parents’ farming activities. Increases in farm income may 
enable farm households to improve their children’s education. Children with higher 
education levels have access to better paid jobs in other sectors. They are therefore less 
likely to become farmers themselves.  
Our work is the first attempt to develop this argument, both theoretically and 
empirically. We derive hypotheses and find empirical support for the hypotheses using 
data from four European countries.  
Our findings are relevant in explaining the limited impact of agricultural subsidies 
on agricultural employment observed in several studies on various OECD countries in 
the last fifty years. However, they also may have important implications for inter-
generational farm transfers in emerging and developing countries, where still a large 
share of the rural population is employed in agriculture.  For example, recent work on 
rural-urban migration in China shows the crucial role of education of rural households’ 
children in finding urban employment (Yi et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012).  Our study 
may have important implications given the fact that China has strongly increased 
subsidies to farmers over the past decade – it has now become the country with most 
agricultural subsidies in the world (OECD, 2013) – and agricultural prices are high on 
internal and global markets.  With important credit constraints in rural areas and high 
costs of education, the combination of increasing subsidies and high agricultural prices, 
may have an important, albeit possibly unexpected, impact on rural-urban migration 
and labour allocation by enhancing rural children’s education and their employment 
prospects outside agriculture.    
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Note that the analysis of how different types of subsidies would affect education, 
and therefore intergenerational labour adjustments, is a very interesting question, but 
more complicated than what we try to analyse.  The question we address in this paper is 
only part of that: we analyse the effect of a change in income (which could be caused by 
a change in subsidies) on employment.  In order to answer the more extensive question 
of how a change in type of subsidies affects employment, one would have to combine 
our results with detailed results on the income effects of different types of subsidies 
(OECD, 2001).  This seems like a very interesting question for future research. Another 
area for future research is empirical studies using data from developing and emerging 
countries to test the hypotheses coming out of our theory, as agriculture is a more 
important sector in these countries and credit constraints are likely to be more severe 
in rural households.   
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Table 1: Description of the variables in the recursive bivariate probit model 
 Source: Own calculations based on a subsample of the EHCP survey 
 
 
  
  
Child completed higher education (EDU) 
Child left the 
agricultural sector 
(LEAVE) 
 
No Yes Total 
No  14 (13%) 14 (13%) 28 (26%) 
Yes 31 (28%) 50 (46%) 81 (74%) 
Total 45 (41%) 64 (59%) 109 (100%) 
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Table 2: Description of the variables included in the econometric analysis 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Outcome Variable 
LEAVE  Dummy equal to one when the child is not employed 
in the agricultural sector in 1999 and zero otherwise 
0.74 0.44 
HIGH_EDU  Dummy equal to one when the child has completed 
higher (upper secondary or tertiary) education in 
1999 and zero otherwise 
0.59 0.49 
Dependent variables in the occupational and educational choice equation 
FARMINC Natural logarithm of the average household farm 
income (PPP-adjusted, in euros) during the years 
that the child was in the educational system in the 
period 1994-1999 
7.35 1.84 
FARMINC_SQ Squared form of FARMINC 57.34 26.22 
GENDER Dummy equal to one when the child is a woman and 
zero otherwise 
0.43 0.50 
SIBLING Number of siblings of the child  4.16 1.35 
HHSIZE Household size in 1994, measured by the number of 
adult equivalents (based on OECD calculation 
method) 
3.74 1.07 
PARENT_EDU Dummy variable that takes a value of one if one of 
the parents has completed higher education (equal 
or higher than the secondary level education) and 
zero otherwise  
0.08 0.28 
Dependent variables in the occupational choice equation 
MARRIED  Dummy equal to one when the child is married in 
1999 and zero otherwise 
0.12 0.33 
Dependent variables in the educational choice equation 
AVAIL_EDU Availability of higher education in the region, 
measured as the percentage of higher educated 
children in the  total population of children that was 
in the educational system in 1994 and finished their 
studies by 1999  
0.53 0.18 
OFFFARM Dummy equal to one when the farmer or the spouse 
have an off-farm income during the years that the 
child was in the educational system in the period 
1994-1999 and zero otherwise 
0.61 0.49 
SOCIAL Dummy equal to one when the farmer or spouse 
have received social payments during the years that 
the child was in the educational system in the 
period 1994-1999 and zero otherwise 
0.88 0.33 
AGR Share of self-employed agricultural income in total 
household income during the years that the child 
was in the educational system in the period 1994-
1999 
0.82 0.16 
Source: Own calculations based on a subsample of the EHCP survey 
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Table 3: Regression results of the recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model 
used to estimate the determinants of the occupational and educational choice of 
farm children  
 Occupational choice 
(outcome variable =LEAVE) 
Educational choice 
(outcome variable =  EDU) 
 Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value 
   
FARMINC      -0.274 -3.86*** 1.543 2.70*** 
FARMINC_SQ - - -0.069 -1.88* 
HIGH_EDU  1.619 5.74*** - - 
     
GENDER  0.811 2.37** 0.327 1.21 
SIBLING  0.394 2.19** 0.126 0.87 
HHSIZE -0.435 -2.39** -0.115 -0.68 
PARENT_EDU -0.960 -2.43** 0.825 1.22 
MARRIED -1.026 -2.64*** - - 
AVAIL_EDU - - 1.550 2.17** 
OFFFARM - - 0.126 0.39 
SOCIAL - - -0.962 -2.40** 
AGR - - -4.744 -2.37** 
    
Constant 1.674 2.13** -3.608 -1.97** 
   
Log likelihood   -100.10 
Wald test 118.39 (0.00) 
Wald test for 
exogeneity 
8.32 (0.00) 
Observations 109 
Note. Robust standard errors and country dummies are used. 
 *significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1%  
Source: Own calculations based on a subsample of the EHCP survey 
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Table 4: Total impact of agricultural income on the probability to leave the 
agricultural sector 
Income 
group 
Total marginal 
effect of 
agricultural 
income 
Probability to 
leave the 
agricultural 
sector (%) 
Impact of a 10% 
increase on the 
probability to leave 
the agricultural sector 
(% change in the 
probability) 
Lowest 
incomes 
1 0.167** 0.68 2.46 
2 0.143** 0.79 1.81 
3 0.111* 0.86 1.29 
 4 0.078 0.89 0.88 
 5 0.047 0.90 0.52 
 6 0.021 0.90 0.23 
 7 0.000 0.90 0.00 
 8 -0.017 0.89 -0.19 
 9 -0.031 0.87 -0.36 
 10 -0.044* 0.84 -0.52 
 11 -0.055** 0.83 -0.67 
 12 -0.066** 0.78 -0.85 
Highest 
incomes 
13 -0.076** 0.74 -1.03 
14 -0.085** 0.70 -1.21 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1%  
Source: Own calculations based on a subsample of the EHCP survey 
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Figure 1: Share of agricultural employment in selected EU countries* 
 
 
*Note. EU accession for Greece in 1981, for Spain in 1986, for Poland in 2003 and for Bulgaria in 2007.  
Source: National statistics, ILOstat, Eurostat 
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Figure 2: Change in agricultural labour and PSE* (1987-2007) 
 
*The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is “an indicator of the annual monetary value of gross transfers 
from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers, measured at farm gate level, arising 
from policy measures, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income” 
(OECD, 2011). 
Source: OECD, ILO, national statistics 
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Figure 3: Total impact of agricultural income on the probability to leave the 
agricultural sector 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on a subsample of the EHCP survey 
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, it contributes to the existing 
knowledge on the determinants of farm restructuring and in particularly on the impact 
of supply chain modernisation and institutional innovations on farm survival and 
growth in the EU new member states. Second, it contributes to the existing knowledge 
on the functioning of agricultural factor markets and in particularly on the impact 
agricultural subsidies have on land and labour markets in the EU. 
In all four chapters, market imperfections are found to play an important role in 
the development of the agricultural sector in the EU. In the Bulgarian dairy sector, 
labour and credit constraints and in particularly ways to overcome these constraints 
have been important determinants of structural change in the past two decades 
(Chapter II and III). Chapter II analyses the determinants of farm growth in the 
Bulgarian dairy sector in the period 1994-2003, focusing in particular on the role of 
contractual exchange problems (late payments) and institutional innovations (farm 
assistance programs). Both factors are found to affect farm growth through their impact 
on farmers’ credit constraints. First, contractual exchange problems, such as late 
payments worsen farmers’ cash flow and credit constraints, which limits their access to 
inputs and investment capacity. As a result, late payments are found to have a negative 
effect on farm growth. Second, vertical integration and institutional innovations, such as 
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farm assistance programs offered by dairy processing companies, are found to have a 
significant positive impact on access to credit for the farms and on mitigating their 
credit constraints.  As result, farm assistance programs are found to have a positive 
effect on farm growth. Chapter III analyses the determinants of farm survival and 
growth in the Bulgarian dairy sector in the period 2003-2009. This chapter shows that 
the main drivers behind the rapid restructuring of the Bulgarian dairy sector in this 
period are ageing of the household and health problems. In addition to demographic 
changes, off farm employment alternatives are found to have contributed positively to 
the decrease in dairy farms in the period 2003-2009. These findings on off farm 
employment suggest that off farm employment is a stepping stone to leave the 
agricultural sector. It also suggest that credit constraints are maybe less important for 
Bulgarian dairy farmers than often suggested as in regions where rural credit market 
imperfections are a very important constraint for farms, households’ access to off farm 
income sources is expected to have an important positive impact on farm development. 
Further, the results confirm the results from chapter II that vertical integration and 
supply chain modernisation had a significant positive impact on access to credit for 
those farms willing to invest in dairy farming.  
In addition, market imperfections are proven to affect the effectiveness of 
agricultural subsidies in the EU (Chapter IV and V). Chapter IV provides empirical 
evidence of the interaction between the capitalisation of subsidies (direct payments) in 
land rents and market imperfections (credit and land market imperfections) in the EU 
new member states. In the presence of credit market imperfections capitalisation of 
direct payments is found to be higher, while capitalisation of direct payments is lower 
when more land is been used by corporate farms. Chapter V suggests that credit market 
imperfections could contribute to the puzzling observation that increases in agricultural 
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incomes (e.g. through subsidies) have not had a positive effect on agricultural 
employment.  In fact, the factors that cause an increase in farm income may affect the 
education of farmers’ children and thereby their employment choices in the next 
generation. In case farmers are credit constrained, increasing farm incomes may allow 
farmers to increase their investment in their children’s education. If children with 
higher education levels find more attractive job opportunities outside the agricultural 
sector then an increase in farm income may result in a reduction of agricultural 
employment, instead of an increase.  This effect may mitigate or (more than) offset the 
(direct) positive effect of farm income increases on labour allocation, depending on the 
relative income effects, the costs of education, and the strength of the credit constraints. 
Overall, my research findings imply that it is important to focus on the role of 
market imperfections in agricultural development in the EU, in particularly credit 
market imperfections. In this dissertation, we have analysed two ways to overcome 
these credit constraints.  
First, my findings on the impact of agricultural subsidies on land and labour 
markets in the EU provide insights on how public support programmes affect farmers’ 
credit constraints. My results on their impact are mixed. In the agricultural labour 
market, agricultural subsidies (through their impact on farm income) are found to 
reduce credit constraints for education and farmers may use them to invest in their 
children’s education. If children with higher education levels find more attractive job 
opportunities outside the agricultural sector then an increase in farm income may result 
in a reduction of agricultural employment. However, although subsidies are found to 
alleviate credit constraints, there are two important concerns. First, the direct impact of 
agricultural subsidies on farm incomes is mitigated by the second order effects that 
subsidies have on the other agricultural factor markets. For example, in the analysis on 
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the impact of agricultural subsidies on agricultural land markets in the EU new member 
states, I show that subsidies are partly capitalised into land rents. Overall, I find a 
capitalisation rate of up to 25% and even higher in the presence of credit constraints. In 
case land owners are no longer active in the agricultural sector, this implies that the 
effectiveness of the agricultural subsidies to increase farmers’ incomes is significantly 
reduced and hence also their impact on alleviating credit constraints. Second, in case 
farmers are credit constrained for education, farm subsidies are most likely not the 
most effective manner to tackle these constraints.  
Second, my findings on the determinants of farm restructuring and in particularly 
on the impact of supply chain modernisation and institutional innovations on farm 
survival and growth on the Bulgarian dairy sector provide insights on how private 
investments affect farmers’ credit constraints. They illustrate the importance of 
stimulating private institutional innovations and supply chain modernisation, 
characterised by timely payments and farm assistance programs, for farm growth. In 
the past years, these investments, have been one of the, if not the, main engine behind 
productivity growth, quality improvements, and enhanced competitiveness in the EU 
new member states. In order to attract these investments, it is important to stress the 
importance of creating a stable macro-economic and legal investment climate. This will 
attract investors and at the same time have a positive impact on the general progress in 
the rural finance system.  
In addition, my findings show that one should be aware of easy conclusions and 
simple assessments. For example, when one observes the massive decline in the 
number of Bulgarian dairy farms in the period 2003-2009, one is tempted to argue that 
supply chain modernisation and the introduction of more stringent food safety and 
quality were at the primary cause of this evolution. However, my findings suggest that 
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other factors, such as ageing of the farming population and off farm employment 
alternatives were driven this evolution. 
Although this dissertation yields some important insights on agricultural 
development in the EU, there is a scope for future improvements, in particularly with 
respect to the data used empirical analyses. Using detailed data, preferably using 
surveys specifically designed for the research question, could provide interesting 
insights. For example, currently Chapter V uses a dataset that contains intergenerational 
and sequential information on educational and occupational decisions of farmers’ 
children in combination with income data based on a household survey in four 
European countries. However, as this survey was not designed specifically for our 
research question, the dataset does not include any farm characteristics and does not 
allow to separate data on farm subsidies from income. In addition, it would obviously be 
interesting to apply the empirical analysis to data from developing and emerging 
countries where credit constraints are most likely more severe. However, the required 
data were not available for developing and emerging countries at the time of our study. 
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